Tag: Netflix

Most Important Story of the Week – 11 October 19: Evolving Feature Film Strategies By The Streamers

I’ll admit it: I have a key question on my brain this month:

Should you release your film in theaters or straight to streaming?

Obsessed with it. Trying to compare Netflix to Disney to Amazon to Apple and the rest of the traditional studios is tough enough, and each has a different answer to that question. How can we tell who is right? Well, I’ll try. But I can’t answer it in one column. Instead, this is the amuse bouche for that discussion…

The Most Important Story of the Week – Evolving Feature Film Strategies By The Streamers

The “fun” story of the week was about He-Man and his potential reboot at Sony moving over to Netflix. Whether or not this move specifically happens–this story falls into the category of “are exploring” which half the time means it won’t–it pairs well with this in-depth New York Times article about Amazon Prim-Video-Studios’ evolving theatrical release strategy. Essentially, they (Amazon) won’t. 

For today, though, instead of focusing on “how” they release their films, I’ve been thinking about “what” types of films the streamers are releasing. Especially with Amazon releasing the relatively expensive (for them) Aeronauts, Netflix releasing a probably pricey Breaking Bad spinoff film El Camino and Netflix about to release the supremely expensive Martin Scorcese The Irishman

As I started to explain this shift, I came up with a thesis, but it didn’t really work. But then I had an opposite explanation. An antithesis if you will. So with that start, you know what? We’re going “Hegelian” on this today.

Thesis – Introduce the Low Priced Option and Then Move Up Cost/Quality Frontier

On the surface, this looks like a great way to explain what Netflix and Amazon are doing in feature films. Essentially, the low-cost entry method is all about finding a way to make a product for much, much cheaper and competing with incumbents by offering this cheaper option. Then, once you’ve established a foothold, you start making more expensive options and competing with incumbents directly. Presumably with higher quality and hence better margins. 

Take cars. Japanese automakers started by making cars that are safer and cheaper (Toyota, Nissan) then they moved into luxury market (Lexus, Infiniti). 

On the surface, that looks like what Netflix and Amazon are both doing. They start by making “prestige”-type films. (I do a quick definition of this in my latest Linked-In article.) So the streamers head to film festivals and buy films for “only” $14 million or so. They buy a bunch though, and give these to their customers. After the prestige films, they move onto the mid-tier films–say $20-50 million dollar price tags–like romantic comedies or horror films. And now both are graduating to the top of the income bracket: big budget films like The Irishman or He-Man. (Besides Aeronauts, Amazon hasn’t shown a willingness to go much bigger budget, but facts are no reason to spoil a nice narrative.) (As for previous studios trying to do this, Lionsgate is the best example.)

The challenge? As a reader pointed out on Twitter quite a while back, it isn’t like Netflix or Amazon Studios really figured out a way to make the films for lower costs. Netflix did when it came to licensed content; they routinely got studios to license them library films and TV series for way below the market value because studios considered in “found money”. (Indeed, back in August, I described how cable channels launched with reruns as a low cost option, then moved up the value chain as Netflix did here.) (Lionsgate tended to sell international rights to fund production, then made money off US distribution.)

Indeed, the main “innovation” of Netflix and Amazon was to take films that previously sold for $5 million at Sundance and pay three times as much for them. Definitively, then, this is NOT a low cost strategy. So what is it?

Antithesis – Make Increasingly Popular Films

Maybe this is moving up the “popularity” value chain. I like this approach because it combines two of my old bailiwicks. First, as I repeat ad nauseam, is that popularity is logarithmically distributed:

chart-2-movies-again(More examples here.)

In other words, the most popular film in America–Avengers: Endgame–is as popular as the bottom 500 films released in America in 2018 put together. My second bailiwick is that something that is popular on one platform is popular everywhere it airs. (ie The Force Awakens was the most popular film in the US on theatrical, home entertainment and linear TV. And very, very probably streaming too, if Netflix would share the data.) With this knowledge, we could reframe the initial strategy of both Netflix and Amazon as: 

Start by making pretty unpopular films, then make slightly more popular films and finally start making very popular films.

Prestige films and documentaries are less popular than teen rom-coms, gross out comedies and horror films, which are less popular than superhero movies. Crucially, the popularity is still roughly the same whether it goes to theaters or straight-to-streaming; popularity is popularity.

Does this help explain the behavior of our streamers better? Probably. According to the article, Netflix wants to make one “quality tentpole” quarterly AND it needs international appeal. Presumably films getting 80 million subscribers like Bird Box and Murder Mystery show the value of moving up this popularity theshold. The Breaking Bad film El Camino likely fits this category as well, being the equivalent of a Downton Abbey-sized film, bigger than many Sundance acquisitions but smaller than superhero films. And Aeronauts will likely have more appeal than a lot of other Amazon Studios acquisitions that were geared for awards season only. 

Presumably, a well done He-Man could do even better. Specifically, whereas prestige dramas and TV spinoffs may have a limited appeal globally, we know superhero and big budget sci-fi/fantasy can travel. He-Man fits that bill.

Synthesis – Moving Up the “ROI Cost/Quality Frontier”

The problem with just focusing on popularity is that, yes if all things were equal, you want more popular films. But these films specifically aren’t equal in one key regard: while most Sundance acquisitions are at most $5-15 million, The Irishman and He-Man could easily be in the $150 to $250 million. You could buy all of Sundance for those prices. 

I bring this up because of another Netflix film I haven’t mentioned yet, which is Triple Frontier. A key report in The Information leaked news that even with 40 million customers, it wasn’t “profitable” (though they probably said cost effective) for Netflix. It cost $100 million to make this mid-tier actioner.

That’s because popularity and cost combine together for ROI, or return on investment. Just because something isn’t “popular” doesn’t mean it isn’t cost effective. Horror movies are the gold standard here. Many are nowhere near as popular as superhero films, but they cost so much less that even middling popularity gives great ROI. A few weeks back on Strictly Business the CEO of Walden Media bragged about their strong ROI on their family films, despite not making as much money as say the Disney tentpoles. He’s totally right. I’d add animation has been an ROI gold mine for studios too.

But…

The best ROI really is big four quadrant tentpoles, even with the huge costs. If you can create a franchise, the hit rate skyrockets. Even as it decays over time (see Lord of The Rings Hobbit films, Pirates of the Carribean or Transformers), the films still often make their money back. (See my “economics of blockbusters” here.) That’s more than can be said for most Sundance acquisitions or even mid-tier comedies and horror flicks. I’d add, given that they travel well, big budget tentpoles have even better ROI for a global streaming service.

Netlix knows this and knows that 40 million for $100 million isn’t enough. It needs 150 million global viewers for $200 million. Hence, He-Man. (If it works.) Amazon Studios in a way is already doing this too, just in TV, essentially turning Lord of the Rings into the most expensive TV series of all time. Now, it does require more cash to compete in this expensive arena, but Netflix and Amazon seem willing to do that.

Other Quick Thoughts

I had some other quick thoughts I couldn’t fit into the above narrative too:

– There are additional ramifications for Netflix’s spending. Because if you can make Triple Frontier for $40 million, maybe it is “profitable”. In other words, if costs matter–they do!–then freewheeling spending may not be sustainable. 

– This doesn’t quite explain why Amazon isn’t releasing films to theaters anymore, I’ll admit. Instead, I’d focus on the marketing spend. The mistake wasn’t acquiring Late Night per se, but spending $30 million (at least, maybe higher) to market it unsuccessfully. If the films aren’t even going to make back that marketing spend, well just release them straight to your platform.

– Apple spent a ton of money for a Will Ferrell and Ryan Reynolds Christmas musical. (Yes you read that right.) Does this explain that? Sure, they’re hopping to the middle tier after their first set of films are mostly awards bait. 

– But why the overspending from the streamers? Right now, my working theory is that the marginal benefits of new subs is so high that overspending makes sense financially. As you hit maturity, though, those benefits decline precipitously, so you can’t keep doing it. That’s Netflix’s world right now. (I need to write an article to flesh this out.)

– What about Sony? Well, essentially take my feature film model, and apply your own percentages to it. If you accurately account for all the potential revenue streams (including a successful franchise), and still Netflix will pay you more in a “cost plus 30%” model, then you make that sale.

That’s it for feature film on streaming musings. For now. We still haven’t gotten to the rationale (or lack of) for skipping the theatrical window, which will be a future article series.

Oh, one more thing.

Post-Script: Man, He-Man? Seriously?

Also, just rewatch this trailer:

Maybe that’s why Sony hasn’t been able to get a working script in 12 years.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story – NBCU Reshuffle

I read this Variety story twice to make sure I got everything. Wait a minute. Okay, just read it a third time. Then listened to TV’s Top Five.  

Honestly, I feel like I could read a powerpoint presentation of this and still not quite understand who controls what and who reports to who(m?). There are presidents and chairmen and vice-chairs and folks reporting to multiple bosses galore. (Cue the Office Space joke.) Basically, who will make what decisions on what? I don’t quite know.

I almost elevated this to my top story because I’ve long wanted to explore Bonnie Hammer’s role at NBC Universal. She’s right on the cusp of being a top development exec–meaning I put her in that Moonves/Burnett level–but she stops just short. Syfy has had just too many slip ups to make her track record spotless and she doesn’t get credit for Bravo’s success rate. Meanwhile, USA Network had a great 2000s (silently) but the 2010s have been…fine.

As for the final piece of this puzzle–Comcast veteran Matt Strauss moving to head Peacock–we don’t know. Strauss helped spearhead Xfinity’s operating system. That’s a great user experience. But streaming is much bigger and he won’t really have control over the content side. Hammer and the dozens of execs over there will determine what ends up on Peacock as originals and second runs. Which means that the internal turf wars at NBC Universal aren’t going anywhere anytime soon. Also, call me old fashioned but I still like it when one boss leads a business. Don’t divide, the technical and creative sides to keep execs happy; find a boss who can lead.

Data of the Week – TV Ratings Bump from 3 Days to 4 Weeks

What is your default for streaming video? Either you believe that customer behavior is truly different on Netflix or it’s basically the same. That’s my take for DVRs, and Rick Porter has fun details on how long folks wait to watch content on delay on traditional TV, which certainly matches my experience. (We’re currently watching season 3 of Mr. Robot in preparation for the new season. We recorded it two years ago, so yes those commercials are out of date.) Porter’s data gives a tiny glimpse into this phenomenon.

My only so-so hot take is that this shows that TV viewing across platforms is more similar (sometimes very delayed, but the majority within the first four weeks) than it is different.

Entertainment Strategy Guy Update

TV Ratings Updates!

We had a lot of data from last week. Batwoman came out strong in the ratings–for The CW–and the All American may be getting a “Netflix bump”. Lessons? Some combination of marketing, buzzy IP and easy catch-up help ratings. Meanwhile, the NFL ratings are still strong, which does hell for narratives and helps create narratives galore. (Maybe the NFL ratings were a politics thing? Or maybe folks got over their concussion fears? Is cord cutting dead?) Honestly, we don’t know.

Overall Deals

Jordan Peele re-upped his overall deal with Universal films. I didn’t see a price, but I like this fine for Universal. However, if I had a first look with him–cough Amazon cough–I’d be pretty mad. I mean, between these films, CBS’ Twilight Zone, HBO’s Lovecraft Country, when is he going to give you any attention to pitch?

Management Advice – Email

I’ve had this article by Cal Newport bookmarked for a while now. I absolutely love his (deep) work. In my mind, your team, division or business–yes, you right there–can drastically improve its effectiveness by limiting, controlling and managing work outside of email. Key quote here:

Cal Newport Quote

Why Most Netflix Charts Start in 2012: A History of Netflix Subscribers

On a recent The Weeds podcast, Matt Yglesias talked with Binyamin Applebaum about “how economists took over the world”, based on Applebaum’s recent book. Midway through, Applebaum told a fascinating story about how business leaders often get their forecasts about government regulations/interventions wrong. During the Great Depression, as part of the New Deal, President Roosevelt wanted to create the SEC and force companies to release audited financial statements. Apparently, part of the roaring 20s including gross accounting fraud, including create false prospectuses and financial documents.

Naturally, business folks and economist types of the time said these onerous requirements would destroy investing/capitalism.

But they didn’t! In fact, the value created from audited financial statements is arguably one of the greatest value creating regulations in financial history.

Why tell this story in an article ostensibly about Netflix? First, it’s a great example of how regulations make things better for society, despite the cries of protest from business.

Second, even now, a lot of financial statements are currently pretty rubbish. Sorry “suboptimal” in business parlance. What they lack in substance, they make up in heft; they are long, filled with hundreds of pages of legal jargon designed to obscure and CYA, but they still don’t tell you that much.

When you pull up the financials of a company like Google—for example—you discover that they only break out the operating segment information for two businesses: Google and moonshots “Other Bets”. What? Why not break out Youtube and Gmail and Waze? As Matt Stoller informed me, Google runs 8 businesses with 1 billion or more users; they shouldn’t be broken out by themselves? (Google does provide more granularity on revenue sources, but still only four revenue streams!)

Let’s look at Amazon: they run Prime Video, Music, Games, Channels, Twitch, and Comixology. Could they make a “media enterprises” business segment and share operating performance for all those companies combined?

Yep! And guess what, it would be fairly easy to do.

Which brings us to Netflix. They too have tried to minimize the numbers they provide over time. Worse, every so often they change their definitions, and stop reporting old numbers. Which makes an enterprise like the one I pursued last week much more fraught. To help build the table with subscriber numbers, I had to go through essentially 20 years of Netflix annual reports to figure out how they defined subscriber totals every year.  Fortunately, this deep dive taught me a lot about Netflix, and could help you understand their history a bit better.

Today, I’ll tell you what I learned, including the different definitions of subscribers, how they have evolved over time and the two pieces of data I’d still love to see.

The Six Definitions Netflix Has Used for Subscribers in the US

As I mentioned last week, here’s an example from Statista of a chart of Netflix global subscribers. 

IMAGE 1 - Statista Netflix Subscribers

Here’s another one. Here’s another one from my archives in Statista that doesn’t match my numbers:

IMAGE 2 - Statista NFLX 2011 Table

Meanwhile, most of the other charts I found with Netflix started in 2012. Which seems like an odd decision. Since I don’t like uncertainty in my estimates, I pulled the data myself for my article applying Bass Diffusion to Netflix. (I had previously done this back in March for this Decider article.)

As I churned through the financial docs, three big categories leapt out at me. Netflix has highlighted different numbers as their “top line” subscriber number, which news reports usually echo. For instance, up until the end of last year, Netflix reported “total subscribers” inluding free-trial and paid subscribers together. Now they’re only emphasizing paid subscribers. When they made the change, some folks thought their numbers had declined. Anyways, the three big areas I see are:

– Location: US, International or Global: Pretty self explanatory, and Netflix has combined these to report “global”. 

– Paid vs Free-Trials: I tend toward “paid” as my preference because it means the people have actually committed to the product and aren’t just sampling. (Netflix changed last year to focusing on paid vs free-trials, which is what they had reported before.)

– DVD vs Streaming: Before 2007, you could only rent DVDs through Netflix. After 2007, you could rent DVD or stream content or do both. Before 2011 a subscription paid for both, then it didn’t. 

The only challenge is some of those categories are mutually exclusive (paid vs free trial) and some aren’t (DVD vs streaming). So I made a table to simplify it in my head. 

IMAGE 3 - NFLX Metadata

The key is the “unique” number versus total subscribers when it comes to DVDs and streaming. For a short period, Netflix gave the total numbers, even when unique was more accurate. Nowadays, for the record, Netflix just gives streaming as DVD subscriptions decline.

Combining the Definitions in One Chart

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Why I Think Netflix Will End Up with 70 Million US Subscribers: Applying Bass Diffusion To The Streaming Wars

(Before we start, I launched a newsletter! It’s weekly and it’s short, and I explained my logic here. Sign up here.)

My goal is to try, as best I can, to explain the complicated parts of the entertainment biz, trying to walk readers through what I’m doing and how I’m doing it. Unfortunately, even when I’ve tried to simplify things, I’ve gotten comments that my articles are pretty dense. That’s what happens when you don’t have an editor. 

With that preamble, today’s article is math-y.

This is about as math-y as I can get. I’ll be slinging terms like linear programming and mean absolute percentage error. To help out, I’m going to start with a BLUF (bottom line up front) so you can read my findings even if you don’t want to read my process to learn how I pulled it off.

Today is the “Bass Diffusion Model” in action. In layman’s terms, the Bass Diffusion Model is a way to calculate a “total addressable market” (TAM or “market size” in non-jargon terms) for various new products or innovations. As the headline suggests, today we’re turning our gaze towards Netflix as a stand-in for the streaming world.

BLUF – Netflix’s Market Size in the US is closer to 70 million than 90 million

When you apply the Bass Diffusion Model to Netflix’s US operations, the model which fits best has a market size in the United States of around 70-72 million subscribers. In other words, a saturated US market is much closer to the low end of Netflix’s projected outcome (60 million) than the high end (90 million). 

The Bass Diffusion model fits the data pretty well. My average “error” fitting the Bass Model to Netflix is 1 million for streaming only and 600K for all subscribers.

That said, applying the Bass model to Netflix isn’t perfect. First, Netflix transitioned from a DVD company to a streaming company, which is arguably two different product innovations. Second, Netflix isn’t alone in the streaming world, and we only have current Netflix subscribers in any period, and don’t know how many folks are still streaming, but no longer Netflix subscribers. Third, this is a US only model. In the future, I plan to apply the projections to the international markets (which has its own problems) and for all streamers.

The Origin Story – Seeing Bass Diffusion Applied in the early 2010s.

Going to b-school during the Qwikster debacle of 2013 made for interesting class discussions. Overnight, Netflix became a laughing stock. Yet, even with that debacle the year before, they had kept adding streaming customers. They were the growth story already—23%!—leading some early analysts to throw out huge potential market sizes. How long would this double digit growth continue for?

That’s when my professor—a marketing professor, naturally—trotted out the Bass Diffusion Model. We’d all learned this model in marketing the year before; I’d never considered applying it here. He did, and out popped a total market size: about 60 million US subscribers. The model fit really well. 

That 60 million has stuck in my head and influenced my thinking ever since. It’s why I launched this series and why I kept my annual subscriber projections a bit lower than most observers last January. Seriously, look at this chart I made back for an article on Hulu at DeciderBass doesn’t leap off as strongly as it did for Fortnite, but you can see it for Netflix and especially see it for Hulu.

Image 1 - NFLX StartFrankly, because of that one application, the 60 million subscribers point in the US felt like the point where we’d see Netflix slow down. Then, in Q2 of this year…that reality finally happened.

The good news for Netflix is the last few years have had better subscriber growth for Netflix than that old Bass model. (For those keeping score, my projection last year was probably too low.) The bad news? Well, 90 million subscribers is looking MUCH harder to reach. But instead of relying on old estimates, today is about making new ones.

The Task – Forecast Netflix Subscriber Growth in the United States

Just to be clear, my goal today is to apply the Bass Diffusion Model to Netflix’s US subscriber count. Why US only? Well, it has a few more data points which will make it a bit more accurate. More over, the recent slow down point gives me a bit more confidence that we’re seeing the inflection, which I’m not sure we’ve seen internationally yet. 

I’ll be building two models, though, because Netflix has actually had two products: the DVD delivery and streaming video. Unfortunately, Netflix has been a bit tricky when it releases subscriber counts, which means I needed to make some assumptions. Let’s explain those.

The Data – Netflix Subscriber Counts Over Time

To really make the Bass model work, I needed to do a lot of cleaning of my Netflix subscriber data to make sure everything I was calculating was apples-to-apples. Wait, doesn’t Netflix provide this? They do, every year. Here’s a Statista table summarizing that. Can’t we just use that?

Unfortunately, it’s a bit unreliable. When I use data, I pull it myself so I can vet it. For example, with those Statista numbers, are those numbers paid subscribers or free? Streaming only? Or all subscribers? Many tables and charts for Netflix actually mix up those categories in the same chart.

In fact, even in my chart above—the one for Decider—I did a bit of that.

So I updated all my Netflix subscriber numbers, calculating streaming and all subscribers for Netflix from the beginning of time. This took me SO long—and I had some insights into Netflix’s history from it—that I’m going to write it up as its own, probably too-in-the-weeds, article. In the meantime, just know these colors are the six different ways Netflix has revealed subscribers to investors:

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Read My Latest at Decider: “To Binge or Not to Binge: Who Won the Battle Between Game of Thrones and Stranger Things”?

I just had a guest article published at Decider, this time asking, “Should Netflix keep binge releasing all its series?” My conclusion: not all of them. Essentially, Netflix is leaving “awareness” on the table.

Take a read and share on social media. Also, shout out to Alan Wolk, who tackled this back in the spring with Game of Thrones. I’d been toying with this idea when I read his take, and tried to update his thesis with the Stranger Things data point.

Like all long articles I write, I had two ideas that didn’t fit in the main piece. Here they are.

Has Hulu’s Weekly Release Helped?

It’s tough to say. Here’s the brutal case against it:

Image 8 - G Trends with Handmaids

Frankly, The Handmaid’s Tale is their most popular series and it is clearly the lightweight to the Game of Thrones/Stranger Things heavyweights. So let’s drop those two, and throw it up against some similar competition.

Chart 7 - Google Trends TV.png

That’s better, and you can see the same weekly interest boost that Big Little Lies and Game of Thrones had, just on a different scale. Instead, I still think that Hulu is just much, much smaller than Netflix right now. (Which, yes, isn’t breaking news.) Or about where HBO is, given that the interest almost matches something like Big Little Lies.

The counter to the binge model, though, could also be this chart. If The Handmaid’s Tale had dropped on one weekend, would Hulu even have a chance to keep it in the conversation? I don’t think so. In this case, Hulu made the right decision. This naturally leads us to ask about not just the current streamers, but the future streamers.

What Should the DAWN (Disney, Apple, Warner and NBC) Streamers Do?

Well, it depends on who you are and what your business model is, but overall, I’d be flexible. If you have a show with tons of pent up demand—like the upcoming Lord of the Rings on Amazon—consider weekly releases for the first season. Ride the potential enthusiasm to help launch weeks worth of content.

For the rest, I’d consider what type of content you have. Disney has a lot of shows that will benefit from weekly releases. Star Wars or Marvel TV series are guaranteed to drive conversation on comics and sci-f (fanboy) websites and podcasts. Weekly releases will amplify their reach from season one. For other dramas? Maybe not.

For HBO Max, they know all about launching prestige television, but HBO is about to quickly run out of days to launch all their content. In that sense, having more binge releases may make sense. Though again many of their fantasy or superhero series are destined to be stars in recap culture. For NBC, I still know so little about their platform that I won’t even speculate.

Apple may benefit the most from the binge release model. They are buying a ton of content and needs lots of buzz right from launch. Moreover, they aren’t trying to build a streaming platform per se, but a TV platform of which the content serves a subsidiary purpose. They should probably consider an approach closer to launching all series on binge, then rolling out the hits weekly for season twos.

Fine, What About Netflix?

If I were Netflix, I think they are missing something essential about how the social conversation drives a show to new heights. Right now, they have one potential mega-hit in Stranger Things. Even if they want to keep binge releases for all ten thousand other releases, they should consider carving exceptions for their biggest hits. A Stranger Things weekly release likely would have brought in new customer which they, um, need nowadays.

The key boils down to flexibility and being innovative. Innovation is not saying “Never, never, never.” It’s about understanding your customers, your business models and the attention landscape to maximize your return on assets.

“Neverflix” – What Netflix’s Q2 Earnings Says About Their Future Strategy

This sub-bullet in CNBC’s “prepare you for the earnings report” article caught my attention:

QUOTE 11 - Wont catch p soonOn the surface, it’s clearly true. One bad earnings report won’t power Disney+ or HBO Max to 150 million subscribers. But as I reflected on it, the key variable is “when is soon?” By the end of the year, sure, Netflix is safe. But what about the end of 2020? Or 2021? If someone does catch up to Netflix, then the streaming wars will have a new champion.

Let’s see if the earnings report sheds any light on that question.

Strategy

Most earnings reports don’t reveal monumental shifts in strategy. This report would mostly qualify, except that Netflix did rule out a key potential revenue stream in fairly definitive terms.

“Neverflix”

At the end of last year, when it came to a Netflix show airing on a linear channel, I called Netflix the “company of Never”:

QUOTE 12 Neverflix

This earnings report doubled down on the fact that Netflix will NOT roll out advertising any time soon. I believe them and agree with this position. Adding advertisements will concretely change the user experience, likely leading to higher subscriber churn than the ad wizards begging for it expect.

I have softened on the position of “never” recently. I do appreciate Netflix’s relentless focus. A good strategy is a focused strategy, and saying “No” to efforts that divide your energy can be a wise tactic. But let’s not go overboard. For example, releasing episodes weekly.

I’d argue that decision is not material to the Netflix customer experience. Instead, binge releasing is a decision they made, and now cling to unnecessarily. Why isn’t, for example, Stranger Things 3 being released weekly? Having one series go weekly won’t lead to customer churn. There may be a 10,000 angry fans on the internet who want the binge, but again that’s noise, not signal. (I like this issue so much, I wrote an article for another publication coming out soon.)

Oh, and one other “never” that should really worry Reed Hastings.

The Never That Terrifies Me: Aggregation

If I understand the Netflix bulls correctly, the sky-high stock price—if it isn’t based on past performance being sky-high—is due to the fact that at some point, Netflix will be TV. Netflix isn’t just “another streamer”, it’s the future of TV. But is that future already in the rear view mirror?

Currently, many people get their HBO, Showtime and Starz through Amazon Channels. More will get Disney+, HBO and Showtime through Hulu. Apple will have another set of channels. Already, people experience streaming through Roku, and they added the ability to buy channels too. 

In other words, as Ben Thompson coined, the streamers are getting aggregated.

Eventually, the aggregators will offer bundles or discounts. Netflix, though, won’t be included because they have started pushing everyone to subscribe through the internet, instead of through those platforms. They did this because all those aggregators charge fees to sell the channels. I see two sub-optimal outcomes for Netflix as a result:

1. Eventually they get aggregated, which means they are “just” HBO.

2. They struggle to get awareness and presence outside the bundled aggregators.

Either choice is bad, and the sooner Netflix realizes it the better. (Hopefully more to come on this topic.)

Distribution: The good news

If avoiding digital bundlers is the downside case for Netflix, the upside case is integration with MVPD providers. Netflix announced that they will now be on AT&T’s devices that enable streaming integration. I’ve seen this work on Cox’s (via Comcast) Contour system, and it really does complement the cable bundle. Amazon Prime/Video is right behind them, and both are well ahead of the new streamers to catch up to their head start.

Competition: This is the low water mark for digital streaming.

Speaking of new SVODs, the other looming cloud over Netflix is the impending launch of the DAWNs: Disney, Apple, Warner-Media, and NBC-Universal. (Hat tip to Variety for coining.) Obviously, this will put pressure on Netflix to keep prices low to stay competitive—they are just below HBO in cost—and keep spending high to produce original content—they lap everyone when it comes to spending.

More interesting is how this will impact subscribers. While the launch of these streamers may inspire more cord cutting, which would benefit Netflix, the launch could also lead people to “cutflix” and trim the number of streaming options. But let’s move to our next section to discuss those implications.

Subscribers

How Many Subscribers Will Disney+ Grab?

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Netflix Q2 Earnings Report – A Lot Less for The Bulls

Back in the halcyon days of April, Netflix had just crushed another quarterly earnings report and it was riding high. In Decider, I said their report had something for both sides—for the haters and the lovers, skeptics and the supporters, bears and the bulls.

Well, Netflix finally had a bad earnings report.

The most fascinating thought, to me, was this one by Gene Munster:

“As much as I love the company, I just think its best days, unfortunately, are in fact behind it…I think we’re going to look back at this quarter as one of the pivotal moments in the Netflix story.”

If the laws of entropy are indeed correct, well at some point, every company’s best days are behind it. Unfortunately, we hardly ever realize this in the moment. This doesn’t mean the companies go out of business a la Blockbuster—IBM is well past it’s high water mark, but it’s still around and publicly traded—and it doesn’t even mean the stock price will decline—since stocks in general have gone up in general even faster than inflation. But at some point everything declines.

So is this the moment of Netflix’s high water market? Honestly, it may be. But we won’t know for sure until years from now.

To figure it out, I’m going to dig through Netflix’s last earnings report for the strategic insights I can find. As a reminder: I’m not here to give you stock advice. I’m here to critique strategy and Netflix’s quarterly reports are the best time to update my priors/data on Netflix’s strategy. Today, let’s discuss meta thoughts and content strategy; tomorrow I’ll go over strategy, subscriber and financial thoughts.

Meta Thoughts

At Least Netflix Gives Us Financial Data to Parse.

Let’s praise Netflix for one thing to start: producing this document in the first place. 

If Apple had bought Netflix in 2015, Netflix would have become an operating segment, which means that Apple could pick and choose selected numbers to release about their performance.  Likely they would have hidden as much as possible, they way they now hide iPhone sales. So I’d have much less data to judge them on.

To get a feel for this, take a gander at AT&T. We used to get a lot of HBO data every quarter—even as part of Warner-Media—but since AT&T acquired them, they went back to not reporting on HBO specifically. Meanwhile, if HBO were a standalone company, we’d have even more data than both previous reporting situations. The current situation leaves us guessing about their revenue, operating income and subscriber totals. We only get little tidbits if AT&T deigns to give it to us.

If we had to power rank the streaming platforms based on data released, right now it looks like this:

1. Youtube
2. Netflix
3. HBO
4. CBS All-Access
5. Hulu
6. Amazon Prime/Video/Studios

And all of them pale compared to the networks and TV channels of old who had TV ratings released every day and provided us financials. To Netflix’s credit, they give us their financials to make columns like this possible.

What is a “Netflix Killer” Anways?

Alan Wolk had a good article at TVRev clarifying that Netflix won’t actually disappear anytime soon, which is a statement I wholeheartedly agree with. Why, then, do so many headlines have “Netflix Killer” in them? 

Well, fuzziness in definitions. For a lot of folks, Netflix is one of the most over-priced companies in the world. They’re usually reacting to folks who think that Netflix is destined to conquer all of television. So you could reasonably say that any of the following end states is the “death of Netflix”, depending on your point of view:

1. Netflix suffers a few bad quarters and ends up with a price-to-earnings ratio around 20-25. (To show the gap, Netflix is currently at 123; most media firms trade between 15-20; Disney is currently a 20.5.)
2. Netflix is acquired by another larger digital company. (I recommend Facebook in this article.)
3. Netflix becomes the 3rd or 4th most subscribed OTT platform in America and/or the world.
4. Netflix goes out of business.

This is how I can think that Munster may be right—Netflix’s best days are behind them—and that Alan Wolk is right—there is a no “Netflix killer”. It depends on the definition. My personal opinion is that option 3 above is exceedingly likely, which means Netflix should valued like HBO, not like Amazon. Netflix is here to stay, but maybe not one of the most highly valued companies in the world, which may be death depending on how much stock you hold.

Content

How do you evaluate the biggest spender in Hollywood’s performance when they dole out so little data? By my count, they’ve released 17 “datecdotes” going back to the Q3 2018 earnings report. They’ve doled out a few more to news outlets over time, like this one to Reuters, this one to Variety or this tweet for Stranger Things last week. 

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Most Important Story of the Week and Other Good Reads – 28 June 2019: The Office Is Leaving Netflix

A “Most Important” column on a Thursday? What’s going on with the Entertainment Strategy Guy’s usual Friday column? Well, an out of town wedding, which means I’ll be on the road tomorrow. So enjoy an early bite at the entertainment biz apple. 

Also, next week, with a birthday, Fourth of July, and some household projects lined up, posting will be light again. However, I have a lot of fun ideas planned for July, so keep checking in.

Most Important Story of the Week – The Office Is Leaving Netflix (in 2021)

Imagine that you have a favorite restaurant. A fancy small plates restaurant with a named chef. The first time you go, the meal is incredible. Almost all the dishes are delicious. (The service is impeccable too.) And for how much food you get, well, the price isn’t too bad!

Naturally, this becomes a restaurant you visit often.

Fast forward a bit. A year or two later. The small plate place has changed its entire menu. It’s a bit more adventurous. You try a few plates, and well this time there are a few dishes that are misses. Meanwhile, your old favorites are gone. (The service is still impeccable.) Do the portions seem a bit smaller? Man, this bill is kinda pricey for what we got.

Naturally, you don’t go as often anymore. 

Since this is a business strategy site, let’s take the above two scenarios and put them in terms of the old quality drivers: the product–in this case the food–isn’t quite as good. Though part of the product–the service–is the same. Meanwhile, the price for the food (both in terms of quantity delivered and quality of dish) is much lower. Hence, you don’t go as often because it isn’t as valuable.

You see the Netflix analogy, right?

One part of Netflix’s product is just fine: the user experience. They’re way out in front of everyone else in streaming. But the prices are going up, starting in the US and expanding to the EU. These prices are going up right as the quality of the product (in terms of both size of offering and quality of individual titles) is about to potentially fall off a cliff facing. Starting about two years ago–and continuing for the next half decade or so–Netflix has lost or will lose theatrical movies from Disney and Universal, new shows from The CW, library TV content from Disney, Fox, and others (including The Office which was widely speculated about online) and more.

Let’s not pretend that losing thousands of hours of the most valuable content is nothing. You can’t lower quality while raising prices and say, “This will have no impact.” Signs are Friends and The Office are Netflix’s most valuable TV series in terms of hours viewed; I continue to believe that Disney has the most popular movies being made because…they do. (See box office.) Moreover, the biggest shows and movies aren’t just bigger by a little bit–long time readers know where I’m going with this–they are MULTIPLES more important. (Article explaining that here.)

As we move into the next wave of the streaming wars, the value of a content library will be increasingly important in separating the services. Consider this (hypothetical) situation with (made up) numbers. Netflix has a service that most customers value at a “5”. Disney offers a service most customers value at a “4”. But Netflix costs twice as much as Disney’s service…so how many keep both? How many cut the cord for Disney? What if HBO ends up with a service customers (hypothetically again) value at an “8”, but it costs even more than Netflix? What if NBC and Hulu are free…but have better content valued at “3”?

I don’t know! That’s a complex equation with too many variables to compute. Then we’ll have to repeat the exercise country by country around the world. But whereas we know one key piece in that equation absolutely—price per month isn’t a secret—we’re left guessing on how much less valuable the Netflix library will be after The Office, Friends and Disney movies (after Dreamworks movies, Fox TV series and others have already left) depart the platform. So will this hurt Netflix? Yes. How much? It remains to be seen.

(Here is where I wish I could link to my article explaining how to value content libraries (versus series, which I did here), and my take on which service has the most valuable content library. But, um, I haven’t written those yet. Yes, I’m on it. I’ll do what I can.)

Other Contenders

Kanopy Dropped by New York City Public Libraries

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