Tag: CBS

Most Important Story of the Week – 21 Aug 20: The Apple/SuperCBS Bundle Arrives

The biggest story of the last two week’s is “Apple v Fortnite”. Yet, for the second week it hasn’t made this list. Like the AT&T-Warner Bros. merger or the Disney-Fox merger, this is a seismic event we can tell will change things in the moment. However, that “moment” will last months, not years. It is potentially the story of the year, and we’ll get to it. Just not today.

(As often happens, I wrote a couple thousand words on it. So I decided to save it for my “Intelligence Preparation of the Streaming Wars” series.)

In the meantime, let’s return to a favorite theme: bundles!

Most Important Story of the Week – The Viacom/CBS Bundle Launches on Apple

Apple is offering a new bundle of SuperCBS channels. (SuperCBS is my name for ViacomCBS.) Instead of paying $10 for CBS All-Access and $11 for Showtime, Apple is offering them together–if you subscribe to Apple TV+–for only $10. So get CBS All-Access and the tech giant will throw in Showtime for free.

(Apple is also exploring a “super-sized” bundle of TV, music, news, gaming and more, but will likely provide details in a few weeks.)

For those of us predicting a return to bundling (read me here, here or here), this move isn’t that surprising. The previous high point of bundling was Disney’s decision to bundle Disney+, Hulu and ESPN+ last fall in the United States. And then in their earnings call Disney announced plans to include Star/Hotstar as another bundle globally.

Let’s unpack the ramifications of the bundle. Why it exists. How this bundle happened. Why this bundle in particular. And why this bundle is NOT the future.

Why Bundle? Because The bundle is a Terrific Deal, for Customers and Companies.

That’s a controversial opinion, surely. (Especially on certain entertainment podcasts I listen to weekly.) 

But the math is fairly inescapable. For companies, getting into a maximum number of households is usually worth a slightly worse per subscriber cost. So if AMC–the channel–can be in 85% of households, each paying $1.50–that’s better than being in 10% of households each paying $10. Or take ESPN: right now nearly every cable household pays over $6 to get it. Yet, if everyone cut the cord, ESPN would struggle to get probably 25% of households for the same price, not to mention quadrupling the price. (Moreover, the additional subscriber has zero marginal costs, so maximizing it makes sense.)

Hence, bundles help companies maximize revenue. It’s a classic economics chart weighing prices to buyers and maximizing the value.

The lower prices also help customers. The criticism of the bundle was the simplistic complaint, “Everyone has 500 channels they can subscribe to, but they only watch 20.” The problem is no one watches the same 20 channels/shows/streamers. In cable times, a viewer might watch Friends on NBC, 60 Minutes on CBS, Sports Center on ESPN and NYPD Blues on ABC. But another viewer subs out History Channel for Sports Center. The bundle gives each customer the same low price. (In streaming, if you want to watch Stranger Things, The Handmaid’s Tale, The Mandalorian, The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel and Watchmen, you need a bundle of streamers.)

(What about how high prices are for the cable TV bundle? Well the problem there is the word “cable” not “bundle”. As local monopolies, cable providers for years had insurmountable barriers to entry, so they could raise prices without fear of cord cutting. Streaming is changing that.)

Thus, bundling is coming. But how?

How This Bundle Happened, Part 1: This is still a “Same-studio” bundle

This is fairly key, because it means the costs are fairly easy to allocate. The challenge comes when you try to get two different companies to bundle together. Then each has to ask the other who has the  more valuable channels and how they should split costs.

(Imagine a super bundle with Disney, Warner Media, Viacom CBS and NBC Universal in the same package. Now try to imagine the leadership of those companies trying to figure out how to allocate revenue. They’d probably kill each other before they settled. Ergo Hulu.)

That’s why Disney was the first “bundle”, because all the money ends up in the same place. Meaning it is up to Disney to decide how to allocate the value of the bundle and how to allocate investment and content and what not. The same thing is happening here, since CBS can decide how to attribute subscribe value between Showtime and CBS All-Access simply for accounting purposes.

How This Bundle Happened, Part 2: Apple is likely taking a big loss.

This math is fairly inescapable, and fascinating given that Apple is currently at loggerheads with Fortnite over the related issue of “platform tax”. Here’s the math for Apple offering Showtime and CBS All-Access separately:

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.02 AM

That’s a good deal for Apple, assuming lots of folks sign up for both. Now, here’s the same situation with the platform tax.

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.17 AM

Uh oh! Suddenly, this is a really bad deal for CBS All-Access. They lost half their revenue. So what’s the solution? Apple and ViacomCBS met somewhere in the middle. But a middle closer to ViacomCBS making money (since that’s their priority) and using customer acquisition into Apple TV+ to justify the costs.

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.36 AM

Notably, this is still a bad deal for Viacom CBS. They lose nearly a third of their value. So let’s run a final scenario, where Apple limits CBS losses to say 20%. 

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.44 AM

Now you could make a case for both sides. For Apple, they could tell themselves that losing $2 per month is worth it to bring people into the “Apple TV” ecosystem. (In this case, a device ecosystem. Terminology is important!) For Super CBS, they “only” need to add about 20% extra subscribers to make this deal worth it for a bundle. (Implying that the number of bundled subscribers exceeds the amount who subscribed to CBS All-Access and Showtime separately at the previous prices.)

However, there is even a world where Apple is paying the full-freight of $5 to CBS to keep them whole. Meaning they lose a whopping $60 per customer per year on this bundle. I don’t think that’s the case, but I can’t count it out either.

(The caveat that’s worth mentioning is that CBS has discounted CBS All-Access in lots of places. I get it free, for example, through a 24/7 sports subscription. So the $10 price may not be paid by anyone, sort of like how few folks pay full price for Hulu or Disney+.)

Why This Bundle Happened, Part 1: ViacomCBS Still Isn’t Owning the Customer Relationship.

The other big theme of both May and June has been that certain traditional studios have decided that owning the end-to-end customer relationship is very important. Which is absolutely correct! The rise of “direct-to-consumer” implies you’re going direct to the consumer. Which is what Disney, AT&T and Comcast now understand.

SuperCBS hasn’t learned that lesson yet. Clearly.

Instead of insisting that customers pay them directly, they’re letting Apple handle that. Instead of owning the user experience to collect data, they’re letting Apple collect that. Instead of controlling the customer relationship for marketing purposes, Apple gets that. This isn’t too surprising for CBS; they already let Amazon do all of that too! And Roku too!

Why This Bundle Happened, Part 2: CBS Can Offer a Good Bundle

Of the best content streamers, then, CBS was the best that also hasn’t learned the lesson of DTC. Seriously, check out Mike Raab’s lay out of the major players and look how much good stuff CBS owns:

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Thus, if Disney, HBO, Netflix and Peacock won’t play ball, then CBS is the best suitor available. Hence, it’s the first bundle on another digital video bundler. (DVB, explained here.)

The Future: More Deals, But Not Like This (vMVPD 2.0)

Do you remember the halcyon days when Youtube TV first launched? It was the most disruptive of disruptors in TV. Instead of paying $80 or $100 dollars for a cable subscription, Youtube only cost $35! That’s how you become a low cost distributor. 

That was only 3 years ago. Now the price has almost doubled to $65 per month.

What happened? Well, again, when customers buy a bundle, they want all the channels. (Again, no one watches the same 20 channels.) So Youtube had to keep adding channels to keep adding subscribers. Moreover, Youtube TV wasn’t going to offer old-fashioned “low entry price that later raises”, so they just pretended the price was very low.

Importantly, Youtube had zero cost advantage. Youtube was losing money on every subscriber to grab market share. This is why, when I saw plenty of analysts praise Youtube TV, I thought they were bonkers. If you let me lose $5 per subscriber, I can grab lots of market share. But I haven’t solved any problems. Or created any value.

I think some of that is definitely at play here. Apple hasn’t solved any pricing issues, they’re sacrificing short term revenue for long term subscriber acquisition. Which could be a good strategy–though anticompetitive–but it isn’t sustainable. It won’t be sustainable until Apple can prove that the sheer volume of customers it brings to the table exceeds the profits the streamers are losing. 

Hence, this current bundle is the “vMVPD 2.0” scenario. It’s a bundle, but we won’t know if it will work until Apple and CBS are pricing at cost. That will happen eventually, just not soon.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

Fortnite v Apple – The Fight Escalates

This week, in an effort to prove they aren’t using their size to crush smaller competitors, Apple is threatening to destroy Fortnite’s second business of making game engines in addition to destroying its current video game business. (The Unreal video game engine powers many, many video games.) In other words, if you don’t buy our coal, we’ll keep you off our train tracks. It’s a tactic pioneered by Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan and Gates. Now Tim Cook is employing it too.

As I said above, the ramifications for this fight will definitely impact the streaming business. But since we’ll have to follow this saga for years, I’ll save longer thoughts for a future article.

Theaters are Finally Reopening (and Some Films Too)

AMC Theaters is reopening this week at reduced capacity (30% I saw reported) and reduced prices on opening day (15 cents per ticket!). I actually think theaters will be able to match demand to supply since they’re at reduced capacity for the near term. The wild card, as always, is how the disease/containment progresses.

The other wild card is content, and we seem to have hit the moment where studios have decided to release movies regardless of theaters. So Unhinged made it to theaters. Bill and Ted is following. And then Tenet. Some will have PVOD/TVOD components.

Frankly, this makes sense and I think for a film like Tenet, folks would be willing to see it in theaters even if it’s weeks after its “release”. My logic is that Covid-19 has temporarily changed what it means to “release” a film. It’s not like consumer demand will decay if customers who want to see Tenet in theaters literally can’t because their home town theaters are closed. (And some will wait and avoid PVOD.) The studios will make less money than before, but more than if they had waited indefinitely. (And probably more than Disney will on Mulan.)

Boom in Video Games?

Video games are definitely having a lock down moment, though as things reopen, this will likely revert to lower levels, though probably not to the same level.

The question I can’t answer is this: How much of this is due to children?

It seems fairly key. Mainly because the “day job” of children has been the most disrupted. Instead of going to school, they spent April to June at home. Hence, a boom in video games and Netflix. (The latest Nielsen Audience report said Netflix had a rise in viewership that I partially attribute to kids.) Even with schools reopening, classes can run only from 1 to 3 hours, if the programs work at all. Which leaves a lot of time for kids to spend on entertainment.

I’ve seen some speculation that this will create a new generation of video game addicts. But will it? It’s not like kids just discovered gaming because they’re playing on their phones. Nintendos, Segas, Playstations and X-Boxes have always sucked down hours and hours of kids time. Usually it competed with school filling 6-8 hours a day. We’ll see.

Data of the Week – Amazon is “Doubling” Everywhere

If you go by the news, Amazon has “doubled’ their video performance. First, Amazon Video streaming doubled according to Amazon CFO Brian Olafsky. Then they leaked that their AVOD audience reach, through IMDb TV, has doubled as well to 40 million users.

Caveats abound. 

For Amazon Video, the good news is Olafsky said it was total hours that doubled. The bad news is we don’t know what it doubled to. 100% growth during lockdown is great, but what does that bring us to? Also, the caveat is this is global, not US, so it’s even harder to track where the growth came from.

The AVOD audience is even more suspect. When Amazon Advertising says “reach” is up, that could mean a dedicated video viewer, or an ad running on the background of some Amazon page the user can’t even see. (We call that “Facebooking” given their epic misdirection on the performance of their videos.) Moreover, Amazon was touting “integrations” which means partners are expanding Amazon’s reach, not IMDb TV by itself, which was the story I saw most reported. 

So Amazon Video–in all its forms–is doubling. But we should be pretty skeptical for what that means.

Lots of News with No News – Ron Meyer Leaves NBC Universal

The strange part of this sordid saga, as I see it, is that Meyer was still employed by NBC-Universal. The ultimate survivors, he transitioned through countless leadership changes as NBC/Universal was passed from GE to Vivendi to Comcast. Yet, the news of the last few months has barely included Meyer since all the energy is in streaming.

Most Important Story of the Week – 5 June 20: We’re All Streamers Now, a Look at Fall Broadcast TV

With no “big” entertainment news, my gaze fell on a story simmering all month. Call it the “story of the month”, which is that TV is planning its return to the small screen. By TV, I mean broadcast and cable television. Which are, obviously, dead. That’s the narrative.

But since they still, somehow, impossibly, are watched by tens of millions of people in American and rake in billions of dollars, it’s worth at least one column.

Most Important Story of the Week – When Fall TV returns, It Will Look LIke Old-School Streaming

Here’s the plan, first I’ll explain the logistics of producing an episode of TV. Next, I’ll drop my big theory. Then, I’ll run through each network and my thoughts on their strategy. Good? Good. Let’s do it.

(By the by, everyone should listen to all of May’s TV Top Five podcasts. I don’t listen to as many entertainment biz podcasts as you’d guess because podcasting is my escape from my day job. But they do such great coverage it’s a must listen. May was basically explaining what we know and don’t about each broadcast network.)

TV Series Production Timelines…Explained!

First, it’s important to understand what the three to four month shutdown of TV production means. (Sets were shutting down in mid-march, and may return in June or July.) My rule of thumb for producing an episode of TV looks like this

X Weeks – Writing
6 Weeks – Pre-production
1-2 Weeks – Shooting (5 biz days for half hour; 10 days with a weekend for dramas. Single cam)
4 Weeks – Editing (sometimes up to six)
4 Weeks – Post Production

This is explained in this thread here, but it’s what I used when I did content planning a streaming company. That’s the calendar for scripted TV content. Reality can move faster, also depending on whether it’s a slice of life, game show, documentary, competition or what not. 

What matters is adding them all up. Or about 4 months. Give or take a few weeks. (It’s my ballpark estimate.)

With coronavirus even that four months has a lot of uncertainty. Will pre-production take longer with coronavirus? Same for post production if folks have to edit from home or can’t work as closely. (I can’t imagine editing a show via Zoom!) Plus, if you want all your shows to launch simultaneously, like fall TV seasons of yore, you have to build in slacks for delays.

Add it all up, and if we start shooting in June, we’ll, fingers-crossed, have some half-hour shows ready by October. (Again, my schedules were for streaming, but are mostly the same.) More likely, we won’t have most shows until the end of November, and no broadcaster wants to launch shows then, for pre-existing biases. (We’ll get to whether those concerns are valid shortly.)

My Big Theory – Without Content, the Broadcasters Will Look Like Old School Streamers

I’m really talking about Netflix at its licensed content peak. Shows from other networks that were cancelled? Sure. International dramas that are surprisingly good? Absolutely. Random old shows refurbished? Yep, that too.

That’s what the hodgepodge broadcast season will look like. 

It makes sense because the forces impacting the broadcast business have the same outcome as the forces impacting Netflix at the start. When Netflix started, it needed cheap content. Reruns provided that. Even better were “gently used” content, as Lesley Goldberg brilliantly describes it, that felt new, even if they were old. And they needed a lot of it.

Broadcast needs that now. They’re perfectly calibrated release schedules are in shambles with the shutdown. Meanwhile, they can’t afford to over-produce Netflix-style. So “gently used” content it is. Especially interesting will be how much content from their owned streamers will make it onto networks. 

Each Network Ranked

So with these constraints, each network has to figure out how to get back to normalcy as much as possible. Here’s my ranking of how well I like each network’s plan, balancing roughly their plan to get “originals” back on the air and their plan for rep

  1. The CW: What? The CW is number one? This is the answer to my question for the broadcast exec I have the most respect for right now. His hand is so tough, and yet Marc Pedowitz makes the most out of it every season. As THR called it, his fall season is “coronavirus” proof, yet somehow feels like a typical CW season. A CBS All Access  rerun? Check. A new DC series (that’s already been cancelled) in Swamp Thing? Check. Some doses of cheap, easy to produce reality? Yep. Meanwhile, they greenlight and renew almost everything, but they get the ratings they need. Meanwhile, half of everything is presold to streamers.
  2. Fox: Fox had already implemented a plan that meant they were most protected in a downturn. They’ve turned multiple nights into essentially live sports. Either NFL, WWE, or reality competition shows. Which meant that they’ve locked in their ratings. Throw in their huge animation catalogue for Sunday, and they only needed to fill out two nights. So buying a Spectrum Original no one saw fits that bill. My big caveat is that Fox bought two series that were due for July, and Fox is holding them for fall. I’m sure financially they see the upside, but if current TV is starved for good content, so why not just release them? 
  3. or 6. CBS: CBS is gambling with their fall schedule. They are going to roll out shows when they are available. Right now they are telling Wall Street that will be in October as usual. This is a boom or bust strategy. Hence the 3 or 6 ranking. Which I respect for two reasons. First, I like the idea of getting shows out as soon as they are ready. I don’t know why in these times of turbulence networks are insisting on launching simultaneously. There’s too much content for that to work. Plus, if ABC and NBC have abandoned the fall it’s even easier to get mind share. Finally, CBS All Access provides the most easy to repurpose content. So expect either The Good Fight, Picard or The Twilight Zone to make an appearance.
  4. ABC: They cancelled a bunch of shows, but it’s unclear what their replacements are. Unlike CBS, they are leaning toward January as the return of new content. That feels “suboptimal” compared to the other strategies, but less risky. As for replacement content, it’s tricky. Disney+ only has one series worth ratings (The Mandalorian), but you could see a lot of the documentaries finding time on Saturday night. Hulu has another supply of shows that could work as well. What could push them higher? Well the NBA is going to occupy plenty of nights in September and October which should ease their ratings pain.
  5. NBC. Why so low? For NBC, I’m still not sure what their strategy is. It feels like the least fleshed out. Like ABC, they have leaned towards the January return as the return. Since Peacock hasn’t launched, it doesn’t really have original content to fill out the slate.

Other Contender for Most Important Story – Unions Release Back to Work Schedule

The other big news was that the unions and studios released a set of guidelines to get production back this or next month. It’s a 22 page document and it’s fine.

No one loves regulation more than me. I’m being serious: the idea that regulation strangles business is just wrong. Smart regulation adds tremendous value to society. (See Clean Air Act. See FDA. See antitrust, back when that was a thing.)

This report by committee is a regulation of a sort and it seems to go slightly overboard. I think 90% of the marginal benefits of preventing coronavirus will be seen by three policies:

  1. Regular (weekly) testing and isolation of individuals with positive tests.
  2. Wearing masks.
  3. Keeping moderate social distancing.

That’s it. So the rest of the 22 pages have what? Tons of stuff on cleaning surfaces? That in particular feels outdated because surfaces have largely been shown to not harbor the disease. Something like 98% of transmission is via airborne droplets. In my mind, that’s where you should focus your efforts. Instead, most of the recommendation is on cleaning surfaces. In my mind, that’s “cleaning theater” the way airport screenings were “security theaters”. They provide the illusion of preventing disease spread, while largely not doing anything.

Still, we have a plan and we’ll get back to work. That’s what matters. And once it happens it may surprise us how quickly it starts.

Data of the Week – Those HBO Max/Roku/Amazon Numbers That Bug Me

Let’s start with this: HBO Max is only launched in the United States.

Therefore, when Warner Media went to war with Amazon Channels and Roku Channels last week–read all about it here–the important thing was to index the size of those services for how big they are in America. If half of your users are in Europe, then it doesn’t really matter about this negotiation, does it? So when you see a headline like this…

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You immediately should think, “Wait, is that global or US only number?” As usual, it’s using the global number for US customers. So I went searching to find the answer.

Now, for Roku, this isn’t as big of an issue. Less than 5% of their revenue comes from international sales, so if we apply that percentage to active users, then we still have a whopping 35 million active users in March. Watching about 4 hours per day. 

What about for Amazon? Well, I have no idea how many folks are international versus US users. Because Amazon doesn’t tell us. Meanwhile, most folks speculate that a big chunk and maybe a majority of sales are overseas. So I looked for data and eventually Andrew Freedman of Hedgeye provided the data I craved:

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If we assume usage is roughly correlated to active users–and I do–then we can see that while Fire TV is huge, it’s also significantly less than Roku. Arguably about 44% of Roku’s audience. I’d add, they may not be perfectly correlated. In that sense, I feel like more Roku users are full-time Roku users, and Fire TV users are a bit more sporadic. A good chunk of customers got Fire TV or Fire Sticks as a gift or add-on and use it way less. So let’s call it 15 million Amazon customers. (Also, this data has Amazon and Roku as 63% of the market, which is lower than the 70% often thrown around.)

So that nets out to about 60 million devices. Which is a lot! But 25% less than 80 million. For the last piece of context, from 2017 Pew had this breakdown of how many devices are in each home. It repeats the point that likely no home has a single solution for TV. And imagine how much it has likely grown since then.

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Entertainment Strategy Guy Updates

We’re going long, so let’s go quickly. 

Apple and Sports

Apple hired Jim DeLorenzo from Amazon. At Amazon, DeLorenzo helped launch the Amazon Channels biz, specifically the big sports deals. So is Apple looking to get into sports? Definitely maybe. DeLorenzo has that expertise. Although, he can also just help with their Channels business in general. I’ve been monitoring sports rights for a while, and this another sign the big tech players are circling, without any major commitments yet.

Disney+-Japan deal

Disney+ is coming to Japan. This is a no brainer territory for Disney, but it likely required extra programming and product management to get a viable product. Japan loves Disney content as seen by the success of Tokyo Disney, though it is particular about lots of other TV, mostly preferring originals. This is more of a problem for other streamers than Disney, because of the catalogue. 

Also, you’ll note they have another local partnership for distribution. Which is now their modus operandi. Does this invalidate my bundle recommendation from last week? No, as that’s more of a content recommendation and think they could still do that with these distribution deals. (Read that recommendation here.)

Disney+ plays with weekly releases

I held on to this one for a bit, but Disney+ released a series “binge-style”. I doubt this presages a new form of distribution for their tent pole series, but even Disney+ is experimenting with release styles. Which is fine! As long as they maximize their tentpole series. (Read that take in Decider here.)

Youtube Sells the Rights to Cobra Kai

Emphasis on the scripted. Meaning, the pricey originals. And really this is just an extension of their pull back I first wrote about in 2018. “Originals” are a buzzy, seductive trap that haven’t paid off for many of the folks running that strategy. And Youtube didn’t need them either. (Hat tip to Kasey Moore.)

The 2019-2020 NBA-to-Entertainment Translator: The Update

Basketball, in my opinion, is a great testing ground for theories on strategy, valuing assets and data analysis. That’s why I developed my ownValue Over Replacement Executive” theory last fall. Or why I used the NBA to explain the misleading statistics here. Or compared overall deals to NBA trades here. Or why I’ll roll out the “four factors of streaming video” in a few weeks. 

It works because basketball—and really all sports—are a controlled environment, with standardized statistics and clear winners and losers. That makes it a great laboratory to test out a lot of theories. The challenge for entertainment executives is understanding that the data is a lot messier in business than sport.

My favorite basketball-inspired series was from last fall where I rolled out my “NBA-to-Entertainment” translator, comparing each NBA team to its analogue in the crazy world of the Hollywood. I did this in three articles:

Part I: The Eastern Conference

Part II: The Western Conference

Part III: The Rest

In honor of the return of America’s 2nd (or 3rd) biggest sport, I’m going to take a gander back at what I wrote last year. I won’t hit every team/company, but will call out some of the biggest hits, misses or just fun teams/companies to write about. 

(By the way, this is an exercise in narrative building fun, not an accurate, data-crunched analysis. With essentially each “input”—either team or company—being filled with thousands of variables over the course of a year, I can pick and choose to build mostly any narrative I desire. Which makes for a fun read, but should be a sneaky lesson for those of us crafting strategies.)

The Walt Disney Company is…The Los Angeles Lakers

Call: Biggest miss

Let’s not pull punches, fellow Lakers fans. While Disney was having arguably the greatest year in theatrical performance in its history—Avengers: Endgame, Captain Marvel, Toy Story 4, The Lion King—the Los Angeles Lakers were tanking. It wasn’t the worst season in team history, but it wasn’t great. And we had Lebron James on the roster!

Lebron—who I also called the “Marvel Studios” of entertainment—was still Lebron. And the same way that Disney put together superstar studios (Star Wars, Pixar, Marvel), the Lakers added Anthony Davis in the off season. That’s why I have to keep this pairing for now. The Lakers added a superstar and Disney is about to add Disney+. Plus, cynically, both Lebron and Disney have ongoing China business that clouds their moral judgement, so that feels appropriate.

Netflix is…The Golden State Warriors

Call: Biggest hit

Wow, does anything capture Netflix’s last year—continued global subscriber growth, but one earnings miss tanked their stock price—than Golden State making the finals, but losing to Toronto? Emotionally, those feel identical. Other similarities: Golden State lost Kevin Durant, and Netflix is losing all the Disney movies. 

As we gaze towards the future, both Netflix and the Dubs face competing, viable visions of the future. In optimism, Golden State gets back Klay Thompson, De’Angelo Russell becomes a super star, and by next year they’re competing for championships. In pessimism, it all falls apart. In optimism, Netflix gets its costs under control, keeps growing globally, and takes over the world. In pessimism, it all falls apart.

This is a fun one to keep watching.

Amazon Prime/Video/Studios is…The Toronto Raptors

Call: Close miss

One could squint and make the case that Amazon crushed it in 2019. An Emmy win for Fleabag, the super hot Marvelous Mrs. Maisel (also winning awards) and then you have The Boys being a sneaky popular series! Amazon has the hardware and so too do the Raptors.

But it doesn’t quite capture Amazon’s year. For all the TV success, Amazon had a string of movie misses from Booksmart to Brittany Runs a Marathon. Those misses feel like not re-signing Kawhi Leonard. Most importantly, for all its talk about 100 million global subscribers, no analysts really think that the Prime Video service has taken the crown from Netflix. As for Twitch, it’s huge. But how huge? We don’t know.

HBO is…The Houston Rockets

Call: Hit

How can you have the biggest show on television, and feel like your company is falling apart? By having every executive leave and your corporate parent trying to change who you are. The Rockets have the greatest scorer in the NBA, but they didn’t make the Western Conference finals because of a poor regular season, sort of how HBO’s slate outside of GoT is very “okay”. 

The future isn’t terrible, with another polarizing superstar—Russell Westbrook aka The Watchmen—joining the crew, but definitely filled with question marks. (Will the GoT prequel live up to the hype? Will Westbrook and Harden co-exist? Will HBO Max ruin the HBO brand? Will Harden come through in the playoffs?)

While we’re here, we may as well knock out the rest of the AT&T/Time-Warner conglomerate.

Warner Bros is…The Milwaukee Bucks
AT&T/Time Warner is…The Los Angeles Clippers
Dallas Mavericks is…Turner (CNN/TNT/TBS)

Read More

On Content Arms Dealers, Aggregation and the Perfect Bundle: What Is/Should Be ViacomCBS’ Competitive Advantage?

Let’s get right into Part II of my a quest to find SuperCBS’ competitive advantage. (Reminder: SuperCBS is my nickname for ViacomCBS.)

Competitive Advantage: Become a Content Arm’s Dealer

Why?

I’ll be honest, I didn’t come up with this on my own. I first read it on Twitter by Rich Greenfield. Then I heard it from Matt Belloni and Kim Masters on The Business. The logic goes, with 140,000 episodes of television and 3,600 movies, the combined ViacomCBS has the content people already need for their libraries. Moreover, they’ve been making TV and film for decades. So as new entrants like Amazon and Apple struggle to make good shows, CBS already knows how to do that. They boast 750 shows currently in production or ordered. 

Reading their press release announcing the merger makes one even more inclined to consider this position. They clearly think their advantage is content production. Most of the facts from above came from that announcement.

Upside?

Quantifying the upside here is fairly difficult because you need to separate how many shows SuperCBS will sell to its linear channels, its digital outlets and then other folks. Or what happens to their movie output deals. (For instance, Paramount is already making some films for Netflix.) Instead, the main opportunity is feeding the hunger for content from people like Apple, Amazon and Netflix. They’re buying lots of shows to air globally. It’s a sellers market. You should be able to make money off that.

However, as they grow, Netflix has pioneered the trend of controlling more and more of a show’s distribution. In return, the streamers like Netflix pay something like 130% of the production budget of a show to have its rights for 5-10 years. Except that Netflix then takes a 30% distribution fee, and can cancel a show at anytime, while keeping the rights in the near term. This means you essentially are selling your content for exactly what you make it for, which is a zero margin business.

Skepticism?

The reason that there is even a debate between “distribution versus content” (content is king!), is that everyone wants to be a distributor. The way you make money, the conventional wisdom goes, isn’t to be a content producer, but a distributor. As soon as the FCC relaxed rules on the amount of owned content aired on broadcast channels, all the broadcast channels went to majority self-produced content. As a result, many independent TV producers went out of business by the end of the 1990s

TV Value Chain

In the TV or movie value chain, the worst place to be (besides being a customer?) Is to be the producer in the middle. They’re squeezed on both ends. The creatives demand increasingly higher payments to work on the shows or films. (Creatives like JJ Abrams, Shonda Rhimes, Ryan Murphy or Benioff & Weiss are the rare commodities in this market.) Meanwhile, the distributors insist on huge margins for simply putting out your content. (The traditional film distribution “fee”, for example is 25-30%. The streamers have similar fees.)

Sure, the TV producer “owns” the content, but if they can’t sell it anywhere else, where does the extra money come from to pay for overhead, studio lots and, eventually, shareholders?

Worse, the biggest upside TV producers had is potentially disappearing. That was syndication revenue, which was a monster. Shows like Friends, The Simpsons and, now, The Big Bang Theory are worth billion dollar pay days. But it required making hundreds of shows to get those handful of hits that could be sold into syndication. (Netflix doesn’t let a lot of shows get that far anymore.) If the bundle falls apart, syndication goes too. Will streaming be as valuable as syndication? I’m skeptical long term.

Making matters even worse, companies like Netflix are moving to owning more of their shows, so they can keep these margins low. (Netflix can say, “Don’t like our deal? Well, we have Benioff & Weiss, why do we need you?”)

Future M&A Needed?

MGM and/or Lionsgate. 

If you’re selling content, having valuable libraries will only help you deliver on that value proposition. To go with the arms dealer analogy specifically, MGM is like adding a lot of AK-47s while Lionsgate is a few additional heavy tanks. MGM can bring you Gone With the Wind and The Wizard of Oz while Lionsgate has Twilight and The Hunger Games. Those aren’t bad additions to a streaming library!

Competitive Advantage: Become a Distributor

Why?

If I could choose anyone to be in the streaming wars to come, it would be the folks who are distributing the content. My working theory is these distributors will be the best positioned companies to thrive. These distributors are stepping between the “pipes” to become the new multi-channel provider. The people not just selling their own subscription streamer services, but taking 30% off every subscription they sell.

The best way to make money in entertainment? Not even distributor, but distributor of distributors, taking a percentage without doing the hard work of making TV shows. So Amazon, Apple, and Disney won’t just be people owning streaming platforms like Prime Video, Apple Plus and Hulu, but also selling HBO, CBS All-Access and Starz. And taking 30% from each “channel” they sell you. (But not Netflix. No one gets to resell them.)

Upside

My quick math is that if you can get to 30 million US subscribers, with an $80 monthly bill, and take 30% of that, well that’s a $8.5 billion dollar business. Add an international business with 50 million subscribers at $40 a month, and you’ve added $15 billion to your top line. Not bad.

The non-monetary upside is considerable too. If my theorizing is correct, the new carriage wars are going to be about distribution on the new distributors. (Article on that here.) Say Disney and CBS are having a tough negotiation over CBS All-Access on Hulu. Well, CBS is in an even stronger position if they can also threaten to drop Disney+ from their distribution platform then if they have to argue just on the merits of CBS All-Access (and Showtime). So if you’re a streamer, owning distribution makes it easier to negotiate with other distributors.

Skepticism?

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What Is/Should Be SuperCBS’ Competitive Advantage?

Competitive advantage is tricky. In a nutshell, it’s a business’ unique attributes that give it an edge. If you don’t like that definition, here’s the Wikipedia article. I looked in my strategy textbook to find a simple definition—again, I’m standing on the shoulder of giant’s here—but couldn’t find a simple one sentence definition. Here’s the best quote, though it has some jargon:

IMAGE 1 - Strategy TextBook

Businesses have two challenges with this. First, having a “unique” capability is tough. Hence, most entertainment conglomerates for the last thirty years looked and operated mostly the same. (Start with a movie and TV studio, add a broadcast channel, then some cable channels, with failed forays into internet “stuff”.) Since it is tough, most companies don’t know or can’t express what their competitive advantage is.

In fact, one of my favorite “corporate America” stories is about competitive advantage and lack thereof. Fresh out of business school, I was participating in our business unit’s annual planning process. We were setting our plan for the upcoming year. When you learn using the “case study” method in b-school, well, 8 times out of ten it’s basically “competitive advantage” boot camp. You’re always studying the innovative companies who had a competitive advantage. Unless it’s the cautionary “failed business” case study, which meant they didn’t have a competitive advantage, and the company who did have one ran them out of business. (See Walmart and K-Mart.)

During this planning process, I foolishly asked, “Well, should we explain what our competitive advantage is?” The answer, was, “Uh, no. We don’t need to do that. We don’t need to have a competitive advantage to do our annual strategy.”

Fair enough! My boss was right. She didn’t really need a strategy to make an annual plan. We were going to spend lots of money making TV shows and movies regardless. What does strategy have to do with it? 

Not to mention, making annual plans is easy; doing strategy is really tough. It takes hard work and sometimes it requires admitting your strategy is either 1. bad or 2. non-existent. Moreover, even if you have a competitive advantage, it may not last, meaning you need to start all over again in a few years. Instead, most companies, leaders and groups just don’t talk about it. Maybe your corporate overlords or investors won’t notice you don’t actually have a strategy.

Keeping in mind most businesses don’t have a strategy, or they have a bad strategy, let’s ask:

What could be ViacomCBS’ competitive advantage?

This was the angle into SuperCBS that got me really excited last week. (Since ViacomCBS hurts my eyes to read, I’ve nicknamed them SuperCBS.) After digging deep into what “size” meant for my weekly column, I started musing on SuperCBS’ potential strategy. Mostly, I was dunking on their lack of a strategy. But as I reread the words, it felt a bit hollow.

It’s really easy to point at a company, find a bunch of different problems with their plans, and point out the flaws. If the company fails, I look smart, and can point at the column with a smug satisfaction. Even if they don’t fail, but merely fail to become the undisputed market leader than the column looks smart.

It’s much harder to look at that same company and imagine them as a beautiful strategic butterfly ready to emerge from the Porter’s Five Forces cocoon and fly into the world with a new competitive strategy that will help them acquire customers, grow marketshare and become an in class leader in entertainment. 

If I had to bet, I’d argue that 9 out of 10 entertainment companies–from telecoms to media to entertainment to tech–don’t really have a strategy. (The GAFA’s do, but subordinate business units may not.) This is the best bet to make for SuperCBS. But let’s pretend for the day that they really do have a strategy. I’ll start by listing the potential competitive advantages I see. I ended up with five. I’ll discuss the logic behind them, the potential upside and the skeptical viewpoint. As a bonus, I’ll recommend a merger or acquisition that could be needed to complete the strategy.

(Two cautions before we start. First, this is my “gut” analysis. I haven’t actually stacked all the options up with proposed financials, so I haven’t finished my thinking yet. And to that point since “strategy is numbers”, I’m going to throw a few in for every option, but these are pretty high level numbers. If I were doing an actual strategy, I’d demand a lot more rigor.)

Competitive Advantage: TV Advertising Oligopolist

Why? 

A fact in Brian Steinberg’s recent article really stuck with me: A combined CBS and Viacom could control up to 20% of TV advertising. This got me thinking that “advertising”  could be a capability that lays the basis of a new competitive advantage. This would pair well with Viacom’s recent acquisition of PlutoTV, an ad-supported video service. (Call that either an AVOD or FAST.) The logic here is, if you’re already great at selling advertising, lean into that capability and build it out. Become the ad-supported behemoth of the new TV landscape.

Upside? 

Well, if you’ve seen all the news articles where ad executives beg, plead and beseech Netflix to sell ads, you can tell they want to deliver Millennials advertising. Can CBS step into that role instead? Maybe. (Again, it’s a myth that CBS is only old people. It’s really popular with Millennials too. Even on the coasts!) So there is customer demand, and that will translate to advertising. Here are eMarketer’s estimates for digital and traditional TV advertising revenue:

In other words, SuperCBS currently has 20% of a $70 billion pie. (I found other similar estimates to eMarketers too.) But 40% would be even better! (Again, when thinking competitive, the goal isn’t a small slice, but the biggest slice.) And 40% of a $140 billion pie is even better. Of course, you know where this is going…

Skepticism?

Is the future of advertising digital or linear? Pretty clearly digital, and Google and Facebook have a tremendous head start, with Amazon as a third. Even if you just wanted digital video, Youtube is much farther ahead. (I’ve seen estimates ranging from Youtube owned $4 billion of digital video market in 2014 to $15 billion now, which is the highest estimate I saw. Though, I’m pretty skeptical they’re $15 billion of an alleged $17 billion pie…) 

I’d add even the ad-supported sphere will be extremely crowded and competitive. Roku is a well-placed competitor here. Or Hulu and ESPN+, depending on how many ads they keep selling. Plus, Amazon is getting into the game with IMDb TV and there are a bunch of other FASTs following them. 

Not to mention, you don’t start with ads, you start with customers, who you then sell ads against. The advantage of Netflix—and the reason Madison Avenue wants to work with them—is they already have 60 million subscribers in the US watching tons of TV. CBS All-Access hasn’t show it can deliver that yet. (Though PlutoTV is allegedly growing.)

Also, this is is a fairly US-centric approach, which limits the overall upside. Let’s pause on this last point. Does the strategy of entertainment conglomerates have to be global? Clearly Netflix and Amazon see global domination as a competitive advantage, but maybe by focusing on one country/region, smaller distributors can carve their own niches. I don’t know that I’d buy that, but I could see it.

Future M&A Needed?

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