Tag: Netflix

Most Important Story of the Week – 21 February 20: Youtube Offers HBO Max…and an “All Update” Column

As I stared at the list of stories I wanted to put in my weekly column last week, I couldn’t help but notice that they all connected back to some previous article I’ve written before. So here’s an “All Update” column, starting with a distribution story that hits on the most important trend of the streaming wars.

Most Important Story of the Week – Youtube TV Will Offer an HBO Max Add-On

A contrarian may see this as just another minor move in the distribution landscape. Equivalent to Disney+ finally getting distribution on Fire TV devices. And I didn’t make a big deal about that. 

Well, this is bigger. 

Google/Youtube is moving its troops onto the “key terrain” of the streaming wars. As I wrote back in November, the rise of “digital video bundlers” (or DVBs) is the trend to monitor when looking for who will “win” the streaming wars. The bundlers will, potentially, control the fates of the streamers. And hence have the best chance to capture the most value in the digital video value chain. The Youtube partnership with HBO Max could cause a cascade of strategy moves.

First, this is Youtube getting into the “streaming bundling game” versus just the “vMVPD” game. The distinction is subtle, but important. In the “virtual multichannel video programming distributor” game, the vMVPDs are mostly mimicking traditional cable bunde\le. So Youtube, Hulu, Sony Vue (rest in peace), DirecTV and Sling are mostly offering a bundle of traditional channels in a new package. This has only worked out so-so well so far.

Now that Youtube TV is going to offer HBO Max, they aren’t just about linear channels. While this isn’t their first streaming service they offered—they have the AMC owned niche streamers like Sundance Now, Shudder, and Urban Movie Channel—this will be their biggest streamer add-on. And the broadest offering so far. Likely this won’t be their last move either. Could CBS All-Access be next? Or even Disney+?

If so, then the line between vMVPDs and “channels” businesses will blur further. Here’s my quick take on how the potential DVBs are shaping up:

Screen Shot 2020-02-24 at 2.14.25 PMYoutube also needs this since right now Google is lagging on the device front. While the Chromecast works very, very well, Google can’t monetize it. You can’t download apps to it, just stream from another device. This will mean they need to lean on Youtube/Youtube TV even more to bundle their offerings.

Second, this is a smart move for HBO Max. May is rapidly approaching and scanning the other Live TV services and Channels, I haven’t seen a lot of announcements about where/who will distribute HBO Max. On the one hand, AT&T claimed that if you subscribe to HBO you’ll get HBO Max. But how that will work in practice remains to be seen. Does that just include linear offerings? Or only AT&T owned offerings? Does it include Amazon and Apple? That’s being negotiated right now.

AT&T’s goal, like Disney+, is to get HBO Max out via as many distribution channels as possible. Frankly, to make your money back, this makes sense. (Though it also shows that the power is mostly with the distributors, not the streamers.) Youtube is the first step.

Third, this impacts how the other vMVPDs will respond to HBO Max. Does Hulu—which offers HBO—automatically offer HBO Max as well? It would make sense, but that would then be a game changer for Hulu, which doesn’t offer any other streamers yet. And if it’s offering access to HBO’s streamer, why not sell Disney+ subscriptions and/or access right along side?

So Youtube could be the domino that starts a chain of OTT offerings.

Fourth, Netflix. 

(Legally I have to mention them every week) 

There is a careful balance for each streamer between reach—being on the most devices—and controlling the customer relationship—in both user experience, data and owning the credit card data. Netflix is on the extreme of one end; as the most successful streamer, they don’t care about reach and want to own everything about the customer relationship. 

HBO Max is clearly willing to give up some of that with Youtube TV for the reach. Disney, with Amazon for example, gave up some data to get Disney+ on Fire devices. Disney+ though, is NOT in Amazon’s channel business. Because they don’t want Amazon to own that relationship.

If I were Netflix—and I don’t think they quite understand this—I’d be worried that the distributors are going to offer increasingly compelling user experiences sans Netflix. Be it Youtube or Roku or Hulu or Amazon Channels or Apple Channels, customers are going to increasingly find themselves using one ecosystem. While switching between Disney+ and HBO Max and Netflix isn’t that difficult, it’s still a small barrier to entry. 

But little things can add up. And if folks only use Youtube TV to get 60% of their TV viewing, then that could rise to 70%. Then 80%. And Netflix could be the piece on the outside looking in. (Alternatively, some streamers like CBS All-Access and Peacock could never even get a look.)

Is it guaranteed to happen? Obviously not. But if Youtube TV “becomes TV”, then Netflix can’t. And only one of those two companies is banking on “becoming TV” to support its stock price.

Last note: Youtube TV’s price point is still uncompetitive. It is somehow the only remaining Live TV bundle offered at $50. As a result, it’s boosted it’s subscribers from 1 million last year to roughly 2 million this year, as it announced in its latest earnings. The key question is how much they lose every month. $1? $5? More? The higher the number, then the more Google is using revenue from one business to enter another using predatory pricing. That’s not good business necessarily, but market power. It stifles innovation in the long run and should worry us.

Entertainment Strategy Guy Update – ViacomCBS’ House of Brands 

So did CBS let us know what their strategy is? Scanning their last earnings report, not really.

They could be a content arms dealer. Mentioned it. They could lean into streaming. Mentioned it. They could lean into live TV. Mentioned it. They could be a leader in advertising. Mentioned it too. They want to be all things to all people

So that’s the downside case. They still don’t have one strategy. But if we’re looking for bright spots, at least they are making some smart moves. They plan to expand their streaming offering. Here’s their pitch:

Screen Shot 2020-02-24 at 10.45.03 AM

Ignoring the misuse of the term “ecosystem”, if they execute the “House of Brands” strategy it may provide a better user experience than some other streamers. And it will work better than trying to launch BET+ on its own and Smithsonian on its own and so on. In general, broad services have the advantage over niche platforms, and CBS already has a “broad” advantage like their fellow legacy media conglomerates. As I wrote in August, you could imagine a version of Disney+’s brands…

disney-plus-layout

..with ViacomCBS brands like BET, Paramount, MTV, Comedy Central and Paramount instead. (If I were better at Photoshop, I’d have done it.) Is that better than Disney? No. But it’s a clearer offering than if Netflix tried to offer something similar for its library of Babel offering. (Still probably behind HBO Max and Peacock though.)

I said back in August that trying to offer “the perfect bundle” is their best strategy. I happen to like their three tiers: Free is a great entry price; CBS-All Access can compete with Disney+, Peacock and HBO Max while Showtime goes for HBO and Netflix. That seems to be our three tiers right now. 

Notably, though, I don’t think they can be a streamer and a “content arms dealer”. If you sell genuine hits like South Park, Sponge Bob and Yellowstone to competitors, there won’t be enough left for your service. Given that they can’t survive without a viable streamer, they need to focus on that strategy. 

(For my past articles on SuperCBS, click here, here or here.)

M&A Update – Apple Looks for a Library/MGM on the Sales Block

After it’s nine original TV series—plus or minus 2—there isn’t a lot else to watch on Apple TV+. Which is why I thought it was bonkers launch without a content library for customers. The biggest library on the block is MGM’s and a few months back the Wall Street Journal reported Apple was indeed in talks to acquire the former major studio (and its library).

Yet it didn’t happen then. Still, as Alex Sherman comments in his look at M&A in 2020, it’s probably more likely that MGM gets sold than not. It’s long been rumored that its private equity owners are looking for an exit. So why hasn’t it happened? My gut is that between the PE folks desire for a sizable return and the strings attached to their library—most of it is rented out for the next few years—it gets hard to find the right deal.

(Related note: In the Wall Street Journal article, the Pac-12 was also in negotiations with Apple that apparently didn’t go anywhere. I remain skeptical that going to one distributor like an Apple will be worth it for the Pac-12, but we’ll see. Here are my big articles on the Pac-12 and what that implies about the future of sports here.)

Entertainment Strategy Guy Update – What about the Oscars?

Are the Oscars just an increasingly unpopular TV event or a portent of the eventual declines all feature cinema? Probably just the former. The global box office hit an all time high last year. Instead, as I’ve long suggested, the Academy needs to nominate more popular films to bring in a bigger audience. (And not just via a popular film category.) Here’s an updated table on how unpopular the nominated films were in general:

Screen Shot 2020-02-24 at 2.15.17 PM

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So while there was a slight rise in “unadjusted box office”, the trend is still downward from the 2010 recent peak. (Adjusting box office for inflation shows an even worse decline.) Hence, the ratings were down again.

A related question is whether this push for Oscar nominated films makes sense for those producing the films, such as the streamers. As two recent articles show, Oscar nominations lead to box office revenue. And presumably Netflix viewership. The only caution? Well, the cost of those increasingly expensive awards campaigns may not pay back even that amount of Oscar revenue.

(For my articles on Oscars and popularity, click here, here or here.)

Entertainment Strategy Guy Update – Netflix Originals Aren’t Permanent

Over in the United Kingdom, the Netflix “Original” Happy Valley  is going to be departing the platform soon. This shouldn’t be a huge surprise for business watchers, but I have the feeling that customers won’t quite understand it. If originals are original, then how can they leave? Well, it depends more on how Netflix paid for it (rent it, lease it or buy it) then whether they call it an original. What’s On Netflix has a good article on this here.

(For my articles on what an original is, read my definitions from back in May. Or read my article at Decider from last month which also explains the difference.)

Most Important Story of the Week – 7 February 20: Why Timmy Failure Launching on Disney+ Spells the Death of Mid-Budget Films

With the Oscars airing on Sunday, it seems appropriate to join the crowd asking, “What will happen to the mid-budget theatrical film?” This seems to always come up this time of year as folks–usually critics–bemoan that Hollywood doesn’t “make these types of movies any more”. But what types of moveis? And for whom?

So let’s dig in.

Most Important Story – Why Timmy Failure Launching on Disney+ Spells the Death of Mid-Budget Theatrical Films

If you’re looking for the canary in the coal mine for mid-budget films–again, hold on a moment for a definition of that–don’t worry about the Oscars or Sundance. Instead, look at this:

Timmy_Failure_Mistakes_Were_Made_Poster.jpeg

Disney, not Netflix, is the place to watch for the future of movies. If even Disney abandons theaters, then all hope is lost. (They won’t; the economics don’t work as I’ve written before. Many times.) But just because Disney will keep major franchises in theaters doesn’t mean mid-budget films have the same hope. 

The traditional narrative goes that fortunately, even as mid-budget films abandon theaters Netflix will swoop into save them. Sort of like Disney+ with Timmy Failure. 

But will they? I don’t know. So let’s explore this issue fresh. I’m going to ask a few questions to myself to figure it out. (Consider this a mini-extension of this series on releasing films straight to streaming.)

Definition: What is a mid-budget film?

As a business writer, I tend to find a lot of articles about Hollywood tend to play fast and loose with definitions. Take, for example,  “independent film”. Most indie films are made or now distributed by giant studios. Which is hardly independent! Instead, we use “independent” as a catch all for “prestige” or “award-contending” films. This makes data analysis tough.

Defining “mid-budget films” has the same challenge. I can probably tell you what is too high to count, anything over 9 figures in production costs. And too low. Anything below $10 million.

But a range of $10-$99 million in production costs seems too big. And likely some films around $75-100 million are still big budget films, just slightly cheaper than others. If I had to pick a number, I’d say production budgets of $40 million is what most people are thinking of as “mid-budget”, with a range of $20-50 million. (This isn’t an exact science.)

What does the narrative say?

If you search for articles on mid-budget films, you’ll find critics or reporters saying they are dead, dying, returning or thriving. So it depends on how you define mid-budget, what you consider success and really whether or not a mid-budget film (Get Out, Knives Out) has come out recently or not to provide an anecdote for the author. 

Instead, let’s turn to…

What does the data say?

Well, I don’t have it. Why not? Because no website tracks production costs in easy to download tables. Or in ways that I trust. Wikipedia usually has estimates, but those are often unreliably sourced. Since I don’t have a data set to manipulate, I can’t figure out the answer for myself.

Sleuthing the internet, I did find one data based article by Stephen Follows. I’ve used his data before and I love this work. He used IMDb data and the answer turns out, like it often does, to be complicated. The number of “mid-budget drama” films is actually fine. He tracks the percentage of films that have production budgets between $15 and $60 million and he finds virtually no change in the percentage of mid-budget films. 

He did find, though, that drama budgets have been declining. And so have budgets for romantic comedies, action films or comedies. This–combined with lack of box office success compared to franchises, sequels and remakes–does support the thesis that mid-budget films are dying. Of course, data can only tell us what happened. For what will happen, I’d argue we need to turn to the models.

What do the models say?

Well, they do sort of make the case that studios should make fewer “mid-budget” films. By models, I mean this distribution chart of box office:

Chart 2 Movies AgainIf you learn nothing else from the Entertainment Strategy Guy, learn “logarithmic distribution”. That’s the shape of the table above. In other words, a few films earn outsized returns whereas everything else fails. On its own, though, the performance of films doesn’t quite tell the whole story.

Instead, the key is the correlations between budgets and performance. Blockbuster budgets and campaigns (which means franchises, sequels and remakes) are highly correlated with higher box office. Again, look at my hit rate from my recent Star Wars series:

Table 7 PErcentage with buckets

Unfortunately, I don’t have the data to compare blockbuster franchises to comedies, dramas or rom-coms. If I did–this is based on my personal experience–I’d tell you that those other categories don’t have as high of ceilings as fantasy, sci-fi or super hero films. They just don’t.

This means—and this is what I mean by using the model–that you may as well make your comedies and dramas for as cheap as possible to get the greatest return on investment. But if this is the case, why did we have so many mid-budget films in those genres in the 1980s, 90s and 2000s?

What are the forces hurting mid-budget films?

I see three major forces, and they aren’t the ones usually mentioned (which is just “streaming!”:

  1. First, the death of home entertainment. Physical home entertainment had some of the best margins in the revenue stream. The rule of thumb in the 90s was a film could make it’s production budget in box office, then home entertainment could pay for the rest. While DVDs aren’t completely dead, like music they are way below their peak.
  2. Second, the decline of median incomes. Subscribe here to read my Ankler guest post, but my theory is that the stagnation of American income has stalled theatrical revenue growth.

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  1. Third, the blockbusters are getting bigger. This is because digital distribution in theaters means that a theater can now expand a movie to every available theater if its a huge, huge hit. So when Avengers: Endgame came out, it set a record for the number of theaters showing it, which means all the mid-budget films got crushed. Counter-programming sometimes works, but often doesn’t. 

The multi-billion dollar question, though, is can streaming offset all those forces? In other words, can streaming revenue replace the lost mid-budget theatrical movie. 

How does all this impact Disney/Disney+?

Which brings us to the House of Mouse. And Timmy Failure, a film very few of us probably heard got released. Unless you went to Disney+ this weekend. As with any film, I like to use “comps”, meaning a comparable film. In this case, not only can I find a kids movie that Disney released for families, I can find one about another Tim:

The_Odd_Life_of_Timothy_Green

They both are mid-budget films (Failure was $40 million; Green was $25 million), both based on preexisting IP, both targeted at families. But one went to theaters and made $53 million; the other went straight to Disney+ last week. Hmmm.

Or take films about Alaska featuring canines and aging A-List actors. Togo was a Disney film costing $40 million and it went straight to Disney+ last December. Meanwhile, Call of the Wild comes out at the end of the month. The difference? It cost $109 million.

What do I take from all this? Well, when it can, Disney is deciding that mid-budget films are going straight to streaming too. Even it has started to skip theaters. If you want to know why this is the most important story of the week, here you go. 

What about Netflix?

Who started skipping theaters altogether? Netflix. That’s why there are so many articles about how they’ve killed theaters and/or changed cinema for good

This narrative is both obviously true and frankly also unknown. On the one hand, yes they clearly decided to launch a stream of mid-budget films from their Adam Sandler films to their summer of rom-coms to Bird Box. 

On the other hand, are those mid-budget films? In some cases, I think their budgets may actually be more equivalent to low-budget films, especially the rom-coms. In other cases, say any film with A or B-List talent, I think they may blow past my $50 million threshold. (As we know The Irishman did.) So how many “mid-budget films” Netflix actually makes we don’t know. 

For a good take on this as well, and partly the inspiration of this series, here’s The Netflix Film Project on a recent Netflix mid-budget film, The Shadow of the Moon that no one is talking about. It’s cool they made a mid-budget film…but if no one sees it did it matter?

Which brings us to the crux of the issue. So Netflix is making mid-budget films? Are they working for them? Or for Disney?

The Implications (and huge worry) for Mid-Budget Films Direct to Streamers

Is anyone watching mid-budget films on Netflix? Or Disney+?

We have no idea.

A point I’ve made over and over and so has half of the journalists covering Netflix. 

But I’ll say this. My models that show that you may as well either make huge tentpole movies or small films that cost nothing has the exact same logic on streamers. If you’re going to spend $50 million making a film, you may as well spend $100 and quadruple your viewership. Or decrease spending to $10 million and get about the same viewership for a quarter the cost. What you don’t want to do is get stuck in the middle. 

As long as profit and making money don’t matter, then mid-budget films are fine to draw in talent. Why not? It’s not like Wall Street cares. If that changes though, it’s hard not to see mid-budget films as the first casualties in the content budget.

In other words, if you want mid-budget films, don’t hold your breath for streamers to be your savior. They are now, but the forces that decreased the budgets of theatrical mid-budget films (they didn’t die) are coming for streaming. At some point.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

Hulu’s Big Week

Meanwhile, the biggest “event” news story was the departure of another CEO from Hulu, with the consequences that Hulu is now reporting in to Kevin Mayer at Disney. The Disney consolidation of Hulu is nearly complete and combined with Disney+ this gives Disney their both shot at disrupting Netflix globally.

When will that happen? Sometime in 2021. Disney is going to roll out Disney+ internationally, learn it’s lessons, then roll out Hulu (backed by FX content) next year. Which is a smart strategy.

Earnings Report Summary – Disney+ gets to 28.6 million subscribers.

This week’s buzziest story was all about the Disney earnings report. But, like Netflix, it’s really a tale of two numbers for me. The headline number is the Disney+, ESPN+ and Hulu subscribers, which were all up in big, big ways. Obviously, this was driven by their aggressive pricing and discounts, but it worked:

Screen Shot 2020-02-04 at 1.44.49 PM(Yes, Disney+ is available in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. Even if you subtract 25% from the Disney+ total, it’s still likely Disney has more “subscribers” than Netflix by the end of the year if not the next quarter.)

If I had a caution, and it’s the same one I have for Netflix, it’s that these costs are being born by Disney in the terms of declining free cash flow. Disney in 2018 Q1 made $900 in cash; in 2019, that dropped to $292 million. In other words, they are on track to lose $2.4 billion in free cash flow this year. Just like Netflix! 

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Pay attention to this story as HBO and NBC join the money losing crowd this year.

Data of the Week – Youtube Earnings

I’ve long had the wish that Google would disclose Youtube’s financial numbers. Well, it must have been my birthday because I got my wish. The headline numbers are that Youtube makes $15 billion dollars a year, has 2 million Youtube Live Subscribers and 20 million Youtube Music and Premium subscribers. In other words, Youtube is the behemoth we thought it was. 

M&A Updates – 2019 Off to a Slow Start

That’s the headline of this Financial Times article and it matches the broader feeling of the landscape. I still think the fundamentals mean that M&A will likely stay slow for the foreseeable future in entertainment. (My series on M&A provides a good long term look at M&A in entertainment, without some of the hyperbole you see.)

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EntStrategyGuy Update – Checking Back in with Luminary/The Ringer

When a company launches as the “Netflix of Podcasting” you have my attention. In a negative way. I was skeptical folks would pay more than Disney+ for access to a few exclusive podcasts. (And I’m also skeptical of companies founded by the children of billionaires with access to capital.) Sure enough, Luminary has lowered their price

The biggest worry, though, has to be Spotify’s continued gobbling up for podcasting companies, the latest being Bill Simmon’s The Ringer for $250 million.

Lots of News with No News – Super Bowl Ratings Are Slightly Up

The ratings for the Super Bowl were up year over year for the first time in five years. Why is this not “news”? Because any one year’s ratings can be noisy, and despite being slightly up are still in line with the historical average. My recommendation? Check out Wikipedia for the charts that tell the best story:

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So while I’d love to tell you this means the Patriots are bad for ratings, I can’t in good faith do that. (Though I was glad I didn’t have to watch them again. Sorry Boston fans.)

Most Important Story of the Week – 24 January 20: Why is Facebook Unfriending Scripted Originals?

The Los Angeles region, and the entire basketball universe, is reeling from the death of Kobe Bryant, the legendary Lakers basketball player. If you’re looking for the “Hollywood” connection, I have two. First, the Lakers and “showtime” basketball have always been an influential part of the entertainment ecosystem in Los Angeles. A place to go to see and be seen. Second, Kobe was an emerging film producer who won an Oscar. His contribution to his passion for film was tragically cut short.

As a long time Lakers fan–read here for some insight on this–this death is shocking and hurts.

Most Important Story of the Week – Facebook Watch Decreases Investment on Scripted Originals

This news is two-fold for Facebook Watch. First, two big series–Limetown and Sorry For Your Loss–were not renewed for subsequent seasons by Facebook. Still, cancellations happen. When you pair that news with reporting from Deadline that Facebook is generally pulling back from scripted original content, well you have a new story. 

Mostly, though, this story seemed to pass by in the night. But it’s the perfect story for my column because the significant doesn’t seem to match the coverage. 

So let’s try to explain why Facebook may be pulling back on scripted originals. And we have to start with the fact that Facebook is a tech behemoth. Facebook resembles the cash rich fellow M-GAFA titans (Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Amazon) that throw off billions in free cash each year. Really, companies minting free cash have three options to do with it:

Option 1: Give it back to shareholders.
Option 2: Invest it in new businesses.
Option 3: Light it on fire.

Well, as Matt Levine would note, Option 3 is securities fraud so don’t do that. Of course, we could just change it to…

Option 1: Give it back to shareholders.
Option 2: Invest it in new businesses.
Option 3: Enter the original content business!

They’re the same thing anyways. Companies come in with grand ambitions, realize the cash flows in don’t match the cash flows out, and they leave the originals business (or dial back their investment). Facebook follows on the heels of Microsoft and Youtube in this regard. Heck, even MoviePass had started making original content at some point. 

The key is how the original content supports the core business model and value proposition. With that in mind, let’s explore why Facebook Watch is leaving the original scripted business, floating some theories, discarding others and looking for lessons for other entertainment and tech companies. Since I’m not a big believer in single causes, I’ll proportion my judgement out too.

Theory 1: Ad-supported video just can’t scripted content.

If this theory were true, woe be to the giant cable company launching a new ad-supported business!

Let’s make the best case for this take. The working theory is that folks just don’t want to watch advertising anymore, so they just can’t get behind a video service like Facebook Watch that is only supported by ads. With the launch of Peacock, I saw this hot take a bit on social media. 

Of the theories, I’d give this the least likelihood of being true. From AVOD to FAST to combos (Hulu, Peacock, etc), advertising is alive and well in entertainment. Despite what customers say about hating advertising, they end up putting up with quite a bit. It’s not like Youtube is struggling with viewership, is it?

Judgement: 0% responsible.

Theory 2: Scripted content is too expensive (or doesn’t have the ROI).

If this theory is true, woe be to the traditional studios getting into the scripted TV originals game.

This is the flip side of the above theory. It’s not about the monetization (ads versus subscriptions) but about the costs of goods sold (the cost to make and market content). What I like about this theory is, if you’re honestly looking at monetization, it’s not like entertainment has seen booming revenue in the US. If anything, folks pay about what they always have.

So what’s fueling the boom in original content? Deficit financing and super high earnings multiples.

Worse, deficits are financing a boom in production costs as everyone is fighting over the same relatively limited supple (top end talent) so paying increasingly more. Consider this: in 2004, ABC spent $5 million per hour on it’s Lost pilot, up to that point the historical highpoint. Most dramas cost in the low seven figures.  Now, word on the street is that Lord of the Rings, The Falcon and Winter Soldier and Game of Thrones could cost 5 times that amount. Meanwhile, each of the streamers, I’d estimate, would have double digit shows that cost $10 million plus. Did revenues increase five times over the last fifteen years? Nope. 

Thus, Facebook may just be on the cutting edge–with Youtube–of realizing that scripted originals aren’t the golden goose Netflix and Amazon make them out to be. It’s not that they can’t make some money on them, just not nearly enough to support the skyrocketing budgets.

Judgement: 25% responsible.

Theory 3: Facebook Watch needed more library content.

If this theory is true, woe be to the giant device company that launched a streaming platform sans library.

The best case for this is that after you come to watch a prestige original, you need to find something else to occupy your time until the next original comes. That’s library content. While I josh on Netflix for lots of things, I do absolutely believe that Reed Hastings is right when he says he’s in a battle for folks’ time. But I’d rephrase it slightly in that you’re also battling for space in people’s mental headspace. When they decide to watch TV, they then pick a service to watch. Library content’s purpose is to keep permanent space in people’s mental headspace. Having loads of library content makes it more likely that you’re folks’ first choice to find something.

The problem is Facebook Watch doesn’t have this. Fellow ad-supported titan Youtube clearly does. It’s purpose was videos first and foremost, so there is always something else to watch. Netflix has it. Even Amazon has it. Facebook has socially generated videos, which aren’t the same ballpark as scripted video.

Judgement: 20% responsible.

Theory 4: Social video can’t support scripted content. 

Read More

Read My Latest at Decider – Should Netflix Become A Content “Arms Dealer”?

In the olden days, the real value in a TV show was the long tail selling to syndication. A network, say NBC, would pay for the first run, but then constant reruns would make the true owner, say Warner Bros, all the profit. When streaming came, say Netflix, that was another source of cash.

The question, of course, is what about Netflix? Could they sell their shows to other platforms or channels? Why or why not?

My latest at Decider explores that very question, using Grace and Frankie as the example, given that it’s launching its most recent season today, which happens to bring them to 96 episodes. (As always they crushed it on the key art.)

Along the way I explore or provide the data for…

– The various content deals of the last year or so
– Past streaming to syndication deals
– The relative popularity of Grace and Frankie compared to the “big six” streaming deals.
– Calculate a broad guess at how much G&F would be worth in licesning.

And for the second time, I’m going to give my readers a special offer. If you want to download the Excel file I used to run the calculations—it’s definitely not that complicated, but some have asked for it—click here. (Click on the link.) I also have all my citations in there, and my Google Trends images for completeness.

Here’s all I ask: if you download it, subscribe to my newsletter. That’s the best way to help out the website. 

(As the year progresses, I’m debating monetizing my writing by releasing more of these Excel docs via a Freemium model. If that interests you or you’d pay to support my writing, send me a note to let me know.)

Read it and let me know what you think.

A Netflix Data Dive: What does their “annual” top ten lists reveal about their biz model?

Last December, I unveiled my theory for how big organizations use PR. Big entities—be they corporations, governments, non-profits, even news outlets—share their good information and actively hide bad information. It’s like the iceberg principle on steroids. Especially with digital companies like Netflix:

Slide2

(By the way, in government, the CIA is the absolute best at this. They have feature films like Argo win best picture, then have the gall to go on cable news and say, “You never hear about the good things the CIA does.”)

With this in mind, let’s draw some insights on Netflix’s (kinda) annual tradition to release a top ten “something”. In 2018, they released their top “binged” things. Now they’ve released for both film and TV across three lists in their most prominent territories. Sure, Netflix doesn’t give us much to work with, but I’ll interrogate these numbers to death in the meantime.

The Facts

Before the analysis, though, some facts to keep in mind. Whenever you see data, you should ask the “5Ws” of journalism. Most problems with data come from folks measuring it differently. (If you’re curious, I’ve tried to explain how to understand digital video metrics, and the distinctions, in this big article, which is one of my more popular.) If a news outlet buries these details, you should be skpetical.

– Who: Subscribers
– What: Watching 2 minutes of a given title
– When: During the first 28 days of release
– Where: Country-by-country. I’ll focus on the US, but they released it for a few major territories.
– How: Separated into content types, with all releases, by film/TV, scripted vs documentary.

Here’s a chart, with some additional details of the Top 10 Movies:

Top 10 tablesThat just leaves the why…

Thought 1: If this is the best “datecdote” Netflix could offer, that’s not great

Really, that’s what you think when you see a list that specifically changes the criteria from their previously announced metrics. Netflix had spent all of 2019 giving investors the “70% completion” metric for all their datecdotes. For this release, they dropped it down to “2 minutes of viewing completion”metric.

Using our iceberg principal above, what would the 70% threshold have told us that Netflix didn’t want to know? There’s clearly a narrative they’re deliberately trying to avoid.

Further, why not give us the “most binged” shows again as they did in 2018? Whenever someone changes the data goal posts, you should be very cautious. Yes, you see this all the time in Hollywood when development execs want to greenlight a project. If the numbers don’t look good, they change the measurements to get their greenlight. And yes, this happens all the time in business too. If leaders don’t like the numbers, change the measurements.

But it’s a bad habit.

Thought 2: This new metric doesn’t tie to Netflix’s self-stated goal for monetization.

If you’re looking for more red flags, this is it. In the last earnings call, CEO Reed Hastings said they care more about time on site than anything else. So why not give us that? They have the hours viewed data…they even could have limited it to new releases. (Which would have excluded Avengers: Infinity War, Black Panther, Friends and The Office.) What does the hours viewed tell us that customer counts don’t?

Or take the emphasis on acquiring and retaining subscribers. When Netflix execs speak at conferences, they downplay traditional viewership to focus on how well films bring subscribers to the platform, or keep them there. Clearly completed films would correlate more with sign-ups than only 2 minutes of viewing. (This also jives with my personal experience.)

Thought 3: Netflix Avoided Total Hours Because of Kids Content

I think Netflix avoided “total hours” for two reasons. Let’s start with kids content. Kids rewatch the most content. They don’t watch The Incredibles 2 once, they watch it a dozen times. That gives kids films an edge on viewership hours. Narratively, you don’t want to emphasize how valuable kids content is right after Disney+ launched. As Richard Rushfield has written, something like 60-70% of Netflix viewing may be on “family titles”. That’s a huge win for Disney+ if true.

It also means that if hours on site are the key metric—again as Hastings said in the last earnings call—then kids content seems even more valuable.

Insight 4: Licensed content still made it on.

Netflix also likely avoided the 70% completion metric because they wanted to downplay licensed content as much as possible. Netflix films have a dramatic marketing edge because when new seasons premiere, they get home page, search engine tinkering and top of screen treatment. This doesn’t necessarily drive completions—if shows aren’t good people don’t finish them—but it does drive 2 minute sampling. 

Still some licensed content made the list, even as it was deliberately curated out. Specifically, three of the top ten films and one of the top ten series. I’d argue this is bad for Netflix; even as they tried to weed out licensed titles a few prominent Disney films made the list.

This is more impressive than it seems because the biggest Disney films weren’t even released in 2019. Specifically, Black Panther and Avengers: Infinity War were 2018 releases. Meanwhile, Netflix was stuck with The Ant-Man and the Wasp—one of the lower grossing recent MCU films—and Solo: A Star War Story. Then the rest of the incredible Disney 2019 slate didn’t make it onto Netflix. 

Thought 5: Focusing on 28 days ignores films and shows with longer legs.

Licensed titles, especially big blockbuster films, also have longer legs than new releases. Don’t you think Avengers: Infinity War had some rewatching going on in the run up to Avengers: Endgame’s release? Absolutely. By focusing on 28 days as the time period, it narrows the window for licensed films to rack up viewership. (They also had a fairly crowded January 2019, with three Disney feature films being released in the same month.)

Thought 6: International Originals Still don’t play in the United States.

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Most Important Story of the Week – 10 January 20: The Most Important Question of 2020

Welcome back to my weekly column. My attempt, usually, to select the story in the business of entertainment that will end up being the “most important” for leaders, strategists and companies. Not the story that is the most buzzy or interesting—though it usually is—but the story that will have true importance.

Having stepped back from writing for holidays—and mostly disconnected from the web—I’m busily digesting a stream of year-end and decade-end articles. Which I promise I’ll get to either here or in the newsletter. Instead, this week, I’ll talk about the question I’ve been thinking about for the new year.

The Most Important Question for 2020: What is the Same and What is Different?

At family gathering this holiday season, a relative used a phrase that has stuck in my head:

“in the new economy”

It’s actually so common to use nomenclature like this, that I think bolding that singular word is important to highlight its truly revolutionary implication.

Embedded in the idea that we have a “new” economy—and you could call this digital disruption, the technology revolution, or any of dozen other buzz words—is the idea that something has fundamentally changed in how the economy works. Not just that the situation is changing. That always happens. But that the economy is different; there was an old economy, now there is a new one. And fundamentally they are different.

Let’s key in on that word “fundamentally”. This doesn’t mean on the surface. But a deeper level of core fundamentals. Imagine if we had a “new physics”. Would that be the equivalent of Albert Einstein replacing Newtonian physics? Not really. Einstein didn’t dispute Newtonian physics, he provided a model that explained more than Newton’s version.

When it comes to the new economy, we’re not refining, but overturning! Futurists hyping the new world say that something has changed in the model itself. It’s as if we woke up one day and suddenly Plank’s constant had changed values. As if the speed of light raised or lowered its speed limit. As if the hydrogen molecule suddenly had a different atomic weight.

For us to truly have a “new” economy, it means that technological changes have invalidated or upended fundamental principles of economics. As if net present value, charging more for products than they cost to make, and creating value for customers are somehow no longer applicable to the business landscape.

My challenge when writing about the streaming wars is that I’m temperamentally conservative by nature. Despite futurist claims to the contrary, while things change and evolve, I don’t think they overturn core, fundamental economic principles. Technology and globalization change the situation and require adaptations, but economics is still economics. Strategy and business are still strategy and business.

But…

I do think the perceptions we are in a “new economy” illuminate the greatest challenge for business leaders (and myself) in 2020, the year the streaming wars become a hot war. Even if the fundamental principles of business, strategy and economics haven’t changed, well a lot else has. The key challenge for strategists is figuring out what has changed and frankly what hasn’t. In my opinion, the broad media—meaning everything form mainstream trades to social conversations to podcasts—does a great job at hyping all the change, and a much worse job at explaining core economic principles/fundamentals that still matter. (Even if they can seem to temporarily hibernate.)

A theory for what really divides the bears and the bulls on Netflix.

If the streaming wars have a psychological battleground, it’s debating Netflix’s future. You have the bulls on one side who see no end to the upside; and the bears fiercely contesting them on the other. Mostly on Twitter, but also spilling into the business and trade press.

Partly, the debate is so fierce and competitive because of this question. My theory is that how you feel about Netflix boils down to how you feel about what is different and what is the same in business, economics and entertainment. We don’t really disagree on the facts, we disagree on what they mean.

Take what is different. On-demand content. This is something no bear can argue is not a fundamental change to how TV is consumed. The idea of having a programming executive filling in a grid every week is gone. That part of the business has irrevocably changed. (Well, maybe. The rise of ad-supported streaming means someone or algorithm needs to program live TV!)

Take what is the same. Losing money is bad. This is something that even the bulls know needs to change for Netflix. The question is how much money they can lose and for how long.

Everything else is up for debate. This is what makes the debate and coverage of Netflix so difficult. On one hand, Netflix is a binge-releasing, algorithmically driven, streamer up-ending business models. Disruption! On the other hand, they are still just making a bunch of TV shows and movie and distributing them to customers who pay by subscriptions. Traditional!

How you feel about Netflix is about these edge cases and asking, is this the same or different? Is skipping theaters revolutionary, or foolishly passing up revenue? Is binge releasing content revolutionary, or needlessly avoiding building anticipation? Does Netflix’s data really help them program the channel, or do they still have teams of development executives doing the same jobs they always have, just with bigger check books? Or lots from column A and B?

The Streaming Wars

I could apply this to the entire streaming wars. What do you think has fundamentally changed in the entertainment business? Technology, certainly. Digital distribution means new ways to send consumers content. But the business models themselves…are still business models. And the same rules apply.

Sure a bunch of traditional entertainment companies are launching their own (money losing) streaming platforms. They need to catch up with Netflix and Amazon and the others who disrupted their business. The question for streaming, really, is what is truly revolutionary, and what isn’t. At the end of the day, collecting subscription revenue from customers is something cable companies and premium channels have been doing for decades.

Anyways, welcome to the new year! We’ve got a lot to explore, understand, explain, discover and more and I’m happy to have you along for the ride.

Other Candidates for Most Important Story of the Week

College Humor Laying Off Employees

The demise of the early generation of video websites such as College Humor and Funny or Die is, in my opinion, directly tied to the rise of Facebook and Google as an advertising duopoly. Potentially advertising share that should be going to publishers is getting captured by them. In total, this decrease in competition is bad for customers and consumers in the long run. And the whole economy, really.

Twitch Doesn’t Make a Lot of Money

Priya Anand of The Information is out with the scoop that Twitch—Amazon’s live TV service—made a whopping…

$300 million 

In 2019. And only $230 million in 2018. 

Those numbers are…bad. For context, just CBS TV network earned $6.1 billion in 2018. Just CBS. You can imagine the rest of cable TV and even Youtube. Likely Twitch isn’t profitable for Amazon, which means that five years in Amazon has only gone further into the $1 billion whole. Assuming just a 15% cost of capital, for tech that’s not bad, and they’re going to need to dramatically scale to make back the investment. That’s my gut thinking on the deal.

The challenge for observers of digital platforms is that we don’t hear the details of companies like Twitch, just gaudy user numbers that have been and are inflated by bots, fake views, and a host of other issues. As a result, advertisers clearly don’t trust the platform and there really isn’t as much money being made as it seems like it should.

I’d be especially worried for those hyping esports leagues. (Which is subtly different from folks making money by being celebrities on Twitch.) Most esports leagues have gaudy projections and financial numbers. But if all of Twitch can only generate $300 million per year, that’s a small pie to split a dozen or so different ways.

Data of the Week – Scripted Series Grows to 532

According to FX’s John Landgraf. To get a sense of all these titles, and the deluge of reality and children shows, I recommend All Your Screen’s running tally. The NY Times has a good visualization of FX’s data. Also, Variety used their insights platform in December for a similar look. My one other caveat is I’ve never seen a good clarification on whether or not this includes  international originals, which I feel is slightly misleading, as those TV series were always being made, just not in the United States. 

Lots of News with No News

The Golden Globes

The Ankler probably blew up this annual awards show best. When nominees can and do invite the entire voting body to their house for a birthday part, well, that’s tough to take the results seriously. Meanwhile, as a driver of buzz, the Globes success. It does generate publicity for the streamers, the question is whether the juice (buzz) is worth that squeeze (awards campaign costs). 

As for the Oscars, if the Globes, guild award and BAFTAs are a sign, I think we’re still on track for a moderately unpopular Academy Awards best picture field. Not the worst, since Joker and Knives Out did well, but not as good as it could be if they had nominated the deserving super hero movie of the year, Avengers: Endgame.

Quibi, Quibi, Quibi

Quibi had a big presentation at CES, which was covered everywhere. Besides a specific launch day and confirmation on price ($5 with ads and $8 without), I’m not sure there was a lot of other news here.

Should You Release Your Movie Straight to Netflix? Part I: The basic maths

Since 2019 started, there has been a debate among the entertainment biz literati (you know who they are):

Should you keep releasing your films in theaters, or go straight to streaming?

I first saw this in January when some folks on Twitter argued Disney should release Star Wars films straight-to-streaming now that Disney+ was coming. (My rebuttal here.) Then, when Booksmart flopped, I saw this debate take over Twitter. In short, why bother looking bad releasing in theaters, when you can go to Netflix and get 40 million views?

The Booksmart-esque examples kept coming. Late Night’s flop brought Amazon to the debate. Then Brittany Runs a Marathon. It got so bad, Amazon got out of the theatrical release business altogether. (So the big-for-Amazon Aeronauts abandoned traditional theatrical in exchange for a “four wall” strategy like Netflix.)

Meanwhile, this question is on every company’s mind. Netflix doesn’t do theatrical runs; Amazon just left the business; Apple is figuring out what it wants to do; Disney, Warner Bros and Universal are leaning into theatrical, except when they aren’t as Disney did with Lady and the Tramp. Paramount is an arms dealer at its finest. Let’s not sugar coat how important this question is. It’s literally a billion dollar question, per company! 

Getting this question right is business strategy at it’s finest: so who’s making the right call?

Judging by the online narrative, the Netflix supporters say Netflix. Most “arguments” for going straight-to-streaming seem to rely on personal experience, first, and Netflix’s stock price, second. Hardly ever do I see the piece of information I love most: numbers. (Strategy is numbers!)

Before I finished my series on The Great Irishman Challenge, I would have had trouble relying on anything more than qualitative/narrative explanations too. Without a model, testing assumptions or quantifying the financial impact of these strategic implications would have been little more than guesswork. But since I have it, I think I can try to quantify some aspects of this debate better than I’ve seen before. 

This debate has so many components, arguments and counter-arguments, that as I wrote my response, it was fairly jumbled. To organize my thinking, I’m deploying a “question and answer” format. Which I think helps. Still, before I get to that here’s my…

Bottom Line, Up Front

While very small films or historically poor performing theatrical films—think documentaries or foreign language films—may benefit from going straight-to-streaming, the vast majority of “studio films”—larger than $5 million production budgets, will make much more money for their producers by having theatrical distribution. (On average.) The “strategic” benefits of skipping the theatrical window don’t exist in practice as much as theory. So much so I call it the “straight-to-streaming trap”. 

Question: If you only had two words, why should movies avoid the “straight-to-streaming” trap?

Avengers: Endgame.

Q: Okay, explain.

Well, it made $2.7 billion (with a b) dollars in theatrical box office. Of course, Disney doesn’t keep all of that in revenue. Depending if it is US or international, Disney keeps 35-50%, and less in China. Still, I’d estimate Disney kept about $1.1 billion (and even that is low considering how powerful Disney’s bargaining power is with studios).

Assuming a $350 million production budget and a $200 million marketing budget, after just theatrical distribution, Disney has $550 million in gross profit to split with talent. In just one window! That doesn’t factor in toys, DVDs, electronic rentals or future streaming/cable value. Just one window netted over half a billion dollars. 

I honestly can’t fathom a scenario where Disney would have made more money by ignoring theatrical. (Again, that was my thesis back in January about Star Wars, but these are equivalent franchises.) That’s like having a barrel of oil and not refining the entire thing.

Q: Excuse me, oil?

Oil. Every year, one of the best things I read is The Economist’s Christmas Double Issue. Two years ago, they had a graphic about how a barrel of oil is refined into its component parts. Here’s the link for subscribers, but they had the whole thing on Google Images:

Image 1 - Economist Oil 20171223_XMC600_weblarge.png

In short, a barrel of oil is sort of like the not-quite-true aphorism that the Native American’s used every part of the buffalo. (Which was taken to another extreme by American meat packing at the turn of the century, who used every part of the pig/cow. Read Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle for details.)

871878e86165ef98858ea0235551942d

(Source: The Far Side cartoon. How is that not a piece of IP up for sale?)

As oil companies heat a barrel of oil, the raw material separates into different types of chemicals that are then used for everything from gasoline to diesel fuel to sulphur to countless other compounds. This is necessary because different size oil molecules have different uses. The goal for the oil company when refining oil is to extract as much value as possible from the oil they spent real money bringing out of the ground.

I love this analogy for theaters. Each window is a heavier as in greater gross margin type of oil. Netflix is essentially skipping the heaviest molecules (theaters, home entertainment) for the lightest (digital streaming). Long term, that means a lot of lost potential revenue.

Q: And can we quantify that?

Yes, and that’s what I spent a chunk of November doing. Here’s the “financial revenue” waterfall I’ve been using for theatrical films. Actually, here’s how it’s looked historically:

Image 2 - Financial Waterfall Historically

And here are my recent assumptions:

IMAGE 3 - Financial Waterfall Now

In other words, if you skip theaters, there goes 35-40% of your revenue. (While box office isn’t rising, as a percentage of feature film revenue, it is increasing because home entertainment is shrinking. By next year, it may be 40% of a film’s take.) If you skip home entertainment, that’s another big chunk of revenue. And frankly, it makes sense that theaters make so much money because it’s more expensive to go.

Q: The gross margins are higher for theaters than streaming? Do you have numbers for that?

Frankly, these are the numbers that any discussion about Netflix and Amazon have to start with. You can end up where you want, but if you ignore these numbers you’re likely using fuzzy math to justify your preexisting conclusions.

So let’s take each window into rough “per person per film hour” revenue in the United States. Just to make it explicit. Theaters have an average ticket price of call it $10. (It’s slightly lower, but I like to round my numbers.) Since each person pays that to see a film, it’s a $5 per person per film hour for the average two hour film.

Now, compare that Netflix, where the average subscription watches 40 hours of content per month. (According to past leaks/surveys.) Since a US customer pays $12, that’s $0.30 per hour. But since more than one person can watch, we can assume 1.5 customers share that viewership. Which takes it down to $0.20 per film. Which leads to this crucial note on potential revenue:

The streaming window is 8% of the total revenue of the theatrical window per person.

As I said above, theatrical is much, much more lucrative for studios than streaming. (The specific way to calculate the value to Netflix of a film is different than the usage version above—see here for those—but this is to show the potential size difference for different windows.)

Q: So let’s ask the obvious: have you quantified how much Netflix could have made releasing films in theaters this year?

Rightey-oh I have. Let’s talk upside. I took a selection of Netflix’s most noteworthy/expensive films, and asked Twitter for ideas for some quick and dirty “upside” comps for them. (I focused on the most recent films as possible, and matching rating/genre primarily.) Here’s the list I settled on:

IMAGE 4 - Netflix Film Comps

There’s your headline/nut graph/lede at the end of the article: if Netflix released its 10 (arguably) most valuable films from December 2019 to December 2020 (with Bird Box sneaking in), it could have made $750 in additional cash flow to the bottom line in just theatrical box office. If Netflix had to throw in $50 million per film on this list in additional marketing (which feels high), that’s still $250 extra million.

I’d add this list isn’t a ridiculous list of comps. A Quiet Place is definitely the same sized hit that Netflix is portraying Bird Box, so that number is reasonable. Meanwhile, I put in a couple of films well under $100 million in total gross and a lot of other solid doubles. 

So why hasn’t Netflix looked at this revenue and jumped? I’d argue sloppy financial thinking. And changing their strategy has PR implications. Others, though, would argue it’s about exclusivity for their platform. (Presumably some folks would see it in theaters, but not on Netflix.) 

To keep this article from going too long, I’m going to continue the Q&A in my next article. Essentially, I’ll lay out and debate the pro-straight-to-streaming arguments in their own place.

How The Irishman Lost $280 Million: The Great Irishman Challenge Part IV – The Results

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

The biggest uncertainty in The Great Irishman Project was figuring out how well the film did with viewers in the first place. I was all set today to parse Nielsen’s estimates from last week, but doing so meant tons of estimating based on a very limited data set. So I waited.

Specifically, I had a suspicion that Netflix would feel forced to tell us something. They couldn’t let Nielsen drive the narrative for their most high profile picture of the year. Sure enough, we got the results today, as Ted Sarandos spoke at the UBS Media conference:

26.4 million subscribers watched 70% of The Irishman in its first week.
40 million are projected to watch in the first 28 days.

Huzzaw! Now we can be a lot more confident in our estimates.

Here’s today’s plan. First, I’ll given you the “Bottom Line, Up Front”. The results and my model. Second, I’ll discuss a few specific estimates and inputs I still had to make. Third, I’ll answer what I assume will be the most commonly asked questions or criticisms of my model. In Q&A format.

(Also, look for my write-up in The Ankler if you’re subscribed.)

Bottom Line, Up Front: Netflix will lose $280 million The Irishman

As I wrote in Part I, the goal was to make a scorecard, and here it is:

IMAGE 20 - Irishman Profiitability

For the full model, here you go:

Image 21 - Irishman Full Model

In other words, if this were a big budget tentpole from Disney or Warner Bros–whose flops have extremely public numbers–I think Netflix would have to write down the costs for “only” getting 40 million viewers in the first four weeks. This film was extremely expensive, and it’s already decaying fairly rapidly in viewership. Even with a bump from a Best Picture nomination, Netflix will lose money on this investment.

The Model Details

Even having built the model ahead of time, I had to make some assumptions. Here they are.

Determining US versus International Split

One of the big assumptions of my model right now is that international viewership is much less valuable than US viewership. I do this based on their reporter lower international “Average Revenue Per User” and higher churn rate overseas (from what I’ve been told/researched). As a result, the more US customers for a film (for now) the better it is financially for Netflix.

We have two data points to triangulate the split for The Irishman. First, we can look at historical box office trends of mobster films. According to all the films listed as “Mafia” in The-Numbers database, about 61% of box office comes from domestic versus international box office. For example, a film like American Hustle did $150 million in the US/Canada vs $107 million in the rest of the world. Black Mass from 2015 was even more weighted to the US: $62 million vs $36 million rest of world. (The Departed did $132 million US to $157 million rest of world.) This would imply viewership was skewed to the US.

Second, Nielsen provided their estimates that 13.2 million people watched The Irishman during its first five days of release. That’s almost exactly half of the 70% completion Netflix claims. If we assume this would increase with two more days viewership, again we get closer to 55-60% of viewership being in US/domestic.

I decided to use 62.5% US viewership for Netflix. This is pretty beneficial to Netflix, but makes sense. In all, since US viewers pay more on average for longer, this change benefits Netflix.

Changes to Best Picture Bump

My initial model assumed 25% more folks would watch on Netflix if The Irishman is nominated for Best Picture. I decided to bump this up to 25% first window revenue, since that’s a more accurate reflection of the box office bump. (That’s also a benefit to Netflix’s bottom line.)

Adding in Box Office?

I wanted to add in box office revenue, but Netflix hasn’t released any since this film wasn’t released in the traditional theatrical system. (Netflix rented out theaters and then collected the revenue themselves.) Given the limited number of theaters, I think leaving this out won’t drastically impact the bottom line. 

Frequently Asked Questions

I imagine a lot of folks have a lot of questions about this analysis. Let’s try to answer what I imagine are the most common.

What is the best case for Netflix?

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The Great Irishman Challenge – The Specific Assumptions for The Irishman Part III

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

Tomorrow, we start to get data for the Great Irishman Challenge. Well, we don’t, but it will hit screens everywhere as Netflix releases it and presumably places it front and center on everyone’s Netflix homepage. One of our goals with this project is to set our criteria ahead of time, this way we aren’t back-fitting the results to our preconceived notions about Netflix. 

Now that we have our models for valuing film explained and re-explained, it’s time to fill in the specifics. Today, I’m going to lay out what we know about The Irishman before it launches. I’ll update some assumptions on the model and revenue streams from some feedback. Then I’ll describe two key inputs for the streaming model—Customer Lifetime Value and Attribution of Subscribers. Plus, I’ll touch on how I plan to triangulate popularity after The Irishman launches, which may evolve as we get more data or potential partners. Finally, I’ll talk about the benefits for this model and how I plan to draw insights from it in December.

Assumption 1: Production Budget

Discussing with Richard, we think this is high. Super high. A pretty good summary of this is Jeff Sneider’s take on his Collider podcast a few months back (episode 11 specifically at minute 54):

“I’ve seen [The Irishman budget] figures from $125, $140, $150, $160, $175, $200 million for The Irishman. If you go on Deadline you can read an article that says the budget is $140 and then two hours later another writer is under a completely different impression and says it’s $200 million. No one is on the same page on the budget for this film. And let me tell you what that means. It means the budget is way f***ing higher than any of you are imagining.”

Gosh, that type of cynicism about PR efforts exactly matches my own. If you hear tons of different numbers that can’t seem to decide how much something cost, well the likeliest option is that it was WAY WAY WAY more. At a minimum, this is a $200 million dollar film. And I’m going to do some scenario modeling up to even $300 million. Which means I’ll split the difference and call it a $250 million dollar movie.

Is this ridiculous? Not so much when you think about it. Consider, what does it cost to get Martin Scorsese, Robert De Niro, Al Pacino and Joe Pesci (out of retirement) on a film set? Especially if you’re buying out all the backend, which Netflix had to do since there aren’t any second window revenue opportunities here. (Which is cool too because it simplifies my model.) If I told you between those four it cost $100 million in talent costs, would you blink an eye? Is $150 million too high? I’m assuming $125 million in talent costs.

Then we can add in the extra production costs. This was a very long shoot. (I saw 300 days somewhere.) And then it was as VFX-intensive as some Marvel movies due to the de-aging process, which also required extra work because initial versions didn’t work. (Sneider lays out this situation with great details in his podcast.) This film required a VFX push to get finished in time for launch at the New York film festival, meaning it ran up tons of overtime. Does that sound like $125 million in costs? Absolutely. If not more.

Assumption 2: Marketing Budget

The Irishman will have two marketing budgets. First, the initial roll out. I looked for estimates online and didn’t find a ton. That said, I’ve seen billboards, online ads and even commercial spots. Which screams definitely something, but less than a franchise tentpole roll out. I’d say it’s probably between $50-$100 million, and since I went high with the production budget, I’ll go low here.

(Also, to echo Richard Rushfield’s “see something; say something” if you know a better number for the marketing budget, shoot me a line.)

Then we have the Oscar budget, which is a little bit harder to disentangle. Already, Netflix has started their awards campaigning, but has specifically tied many of their films together, from A Marriage Story to The Irishman. We know from Richard’s reporting that Netflix likely spent over $50 million on Roma’s Oscar campaign last year. They look likely to beat that again. The question is, will they spend $50 million just on The Irishman, or split it with A Marriage Story? Both are getting rave reviews, and I think Netflix is desperate for a Best Picture win. I’m going to end up calling it about $40 million for The Irishman alone.

Assumption 3: Profit Sharing and other revenue streams

We have a few categories here, so let’s run through them.

Library Value? Yep. 

I added library value, assuming the retention model is the equivalent of the theatrical window. Meaning it sets the “price” of the film. Then, we can our theatrical financial model to value library windows. Meaning, the “value” to Netflix for the film after the initial release. To provide an example, Bird Box got most its viewership in the first month, but folks will keep watching it out on Netflix for years. That has a value, which is the “library” value. Using my theatrical model, I’m assuming library value of 25% of first window value. (Specifically, the 10% “digital” revenue for theatrical films is about 25% of the the free, cable, syndicated TV, pay TV and digital second window buckets.)

Box Office Bump? Yep.

If a Netflix film wins a Best Picture, or even gets nominated, that will result in boost in viewership. I’ve seen that for past film and TV series for major awards series. For most Netflix films, this isn’t worth a line in the model, but for this one it is. In this case, I’ll use a 25% threshold of the initial window for the Best Picture bump. This will have a “halo” effect on the library window as well.

Second Windows? None.

Since Netflix films are exclusive to the streamer, every other potential window from home entertainment to licensing to cable channels is a zero in my model. This simplifies our model.

Merchandise? None.

Mobster films don’t really sell a lot of merchandise. Especially brand new films without fan bases or cultural cachet. 

Distribution Fees? None.

Since there aren’t second window or merchandise revenue to shield from profit participation, I don’t need to model any Netflix distribution or marketing fees.

Talent participation? Some.

Initially, I didn’t have any profit sharing, but then I got a note that Netflix for super-duper-huge stars did put a bonus system in place for feature films. Basically, if you hit a certain viewership level, you get a 20% bonus in your paycheck. So I’ve updated the model with that assumption in place, assuming that 80 million views (or “one Bird Box”) is the threshold.

Assumption 4: Calculate CLV

It’s crucial have to a good estimate for customer lifetime value. These are calculated fairly often by other people (see estimates here, here, or here). My difference is I don’t factor in content costs because I’m trying to value the content itself. If I did factor them in, I’d be double counting content costs, and that’s a huge “no-no” in accounting.

So here are my inputs for CLV. First, blended average price per month comes from Netflix’s 10Ks. Customer retention estimates come from various sources, including Second Measure. Crucially, though, I have a much lower rate for international because I’ve heard the churn machine is very high overseas. Finally, I use other estimates of Netflix’s marketing spend for customer acquisition costs. All this leads us to:

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The Great Irishman Challenge – How to Calculate the Straight-to-Streaming Film Profitability? Part II

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

On Monday, I explained the grand plan of Richard Rushfield and I plan to estimate the value of future Netflix films, starting with The Irishman, out earlier this month in limited theatrical release, but coming to the world’s biggest streamer next Wednesday. For traditionally released theatrical films with normal second windows, we have a robust model we can employ. 

What about streaming only? Well, that’s where it gets tricky.

A lot of folks do some back of the envelope math for this, and this can be a useful way to look at the problem of valuing streaming. Take Richard’s approach from a few weeks, back looking at Disney films that had been in theaters after 3 weeks (when Netflix pulls them from streaming). Of all the films, Disney earned roughly $310 million after 3 weeks of theatrical distribution. That’s the equivalent, Richard noted, of 4.3 million customers subscribing for 12 months on Disney+. If that number seems big, it should be, which shows the value of theatrical releases for studios.

Could we just take that approach and just apply it to The Irishman? Unfortunately, it has some flaws, mainly double counting subscribers. We need a different method to employ in “The Great Irishman Challenge”. Unlike traditionally released films, in steaming there are a few ways to value a given title’s performance, and each method has its own pros and cons, ranging from crippling to merely difficult to over come. 

Which I’ll (re)explain today, along with describing which ones are fine, which ones are incorrect, and which ones I prefer. At the end, I’ll explain which one we’re using.

Four Ways to Value Streaming Video and One Way NOT To

I’ve previously valued streaming video in two articles. First, back in January, I looked at Disney’s decision to keep theatrical windows for Star Wars films. Second, back in May, I explained streaming video models in order to put a value to HBO’s Game of Thrones. Today’s article will explain all the models from those two articles and add a new method I figured out how to calculate last month. (I had employed this method at a previous employer, but needed a key piece of data, as you’ll see.)

For each of these methods, I’m going to assume that Netflix had a feature film that was seen by 40 million subscribers in the first 28 days, divided evenly between the US and international. The film cost $115 to make and Netflix spent $50 million to market it. As for box office? Let’s say it had $120 million in the US and $80 million globally.

Sub-Optimal Method #1: Multiply Customers by Month by Price

This is the most common method of “back of the envelope” valuations I’ve seen for Netflix films. Usually, you hear folks do a version of this on podcasts, and I’ve seen it for Lord of The Rings on Amazon a few different times. Also, you could do “customer years” the way Richard did above. Here’s how the model for this approach would look:

IMAGE 7 By Viewers per Month

The problems? First, this is one-quarter of Netflix’s subscriber base attributed to a film in one month, which would probably be one-third of their active users. In other words, if Netflix had two other properties getting similar ratings, then every other film released that month would “financially” be a net loser. Second, this approach doesn’t account for “customer lifetime value”, which is really the better approach to valuing customers, versus the one month or 12 month view. Third, this approach doesn’t distinguish between films and TV series total hours of viewing (because it is just subscribers) so it’s tilted towards films, which are shorter and easier to finish.

Still, you can use this to ballpark how long a film would need to make its money back. It’s just sub-optimal because of double counting.

Sub-Optimal Method #2: Attribute Customers by Usage

One of the interesting ways to look at content is to think about what percentage of viewership a title makes up of all the viewership on your platform. If 10% of all hours watched are your platform are Friends, that has to mean something. The challenge is knowing how much people actually watch on Netflix. Netflix has helpfully told us twice (twice!) that they stream about 100 million hours daily in the United States. That means I can calculate potential usage of a TV series or film! That would look like this:

IMAGE 8 by Usage

The problems? First, getting the usage data is really tough. For films, we’d have a pretty easy time, but for TV series, we really don’t know how many people watch how many episodes. And getting usage numbers for Amazon or Hulu may be nearly impossible. Second, it also doesn’t factor in “customer lifetime value”. Third, it over-weights TV library content because there is just a lot more to watch, hence it’s “usage” is much higher, if you can get that viewership data. 

Still, you can use this to compare the usage of various shows and movies. It’s just sub-optimal because it’s tilted to shows with much longer runs.

The Bad Method: Multiplying Subscribers by Customer Lifetime Value

I’ve seen this mentioned in places, though running them down is tough on Twitter. So this may be a strawman, but it’s worth pointing out in case it hits anyone to do. Twice, I’ve criticized valuation methods because they don’t use customer lifetime value. You may be tempted, then to just take the number of subscribers and multiply by CLV instead. Like this:

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