Tag: TV

Most Important Story of the Week – 29 May 20: All the Complications of the AT&T and Amazon Show Down

Since May kicked off, I’ve been back to writing two articles per week and have had my highest traffic month since launch. So thank you to all the readers and supporters. If you want to stay on top of all my writings, the best method is to either subscribe to my newsletter (at Substack) or through the WordPress application.

Meanwhile, onto one of the more fascinating stories of the year…

Most Important Story of the Week – HBO Max and Amazon Stare Down

Well, HBO Max launched.

If you’re comparing hype, it feels way less substantial than Disney+. Or even Apple TV+. But that’s to be expected. Disney+ was a brand new thing by one of the most powerful brands in America; HBO Max is a retread of a brand most people already know. Meanwhile, while Warner Bros has always had big films and series, but they aren’t associated with their parent company.

Since the HBO Max that launched this week is mostly the service promised last fall, I’m going to focus on the issue we’re all obsessed with: 

HBO Max didn’t launch on Amazon’s devices.

Technically, Roku devices too. But Amazon is the fascinating topic to me, since their negotiating position isn’t just about devices, it’s also about operating systems, content rights, and profit sharing. Let’s try to explain why this negotiating is too contentious, and so critical for AT&T to get right.

The Issue: Operating System vs Device

The core issue of the streaming wars is who gets to aggregate content and who gets to bundle that aggregated content. The aggregators are the streamers, in this case. Think Disney+. HBO Max. Netflix. Prime Video. Previously, they were the linear channels. And formerly ESPN, Disney Channel and HBO.

Bundlers figure out a way to offer access to streamers. In some cases, this is via device. Fire TV. Roku. Apple TV. Sometimes this is via an operating system. Like Apple Channels and Prime Video Channels. Maybe Hulu and Youtube in the future. Formerly, this was the MVPDs like Comcast, DirecTV and Spectrum.

Notice that Amazon has both a device and an operating system.

The trouble is their operating system is a lot like their streaming service. Specifically, if you subscribe to HBO through Prime Video channels, you can access your content via the Prime Video application. This way a customer using Amazon Channels can seamlessly go from Prime Video shows like The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel to Game of Thrones and The Sopranos. Honestly, you couldn’t tell the difference between where the content comes from.

From Amazon’s perspective, if HBO is already included in channels, then so should HBO Max. They signed a deal several years back to make this happen, so why not continue since every other HBO customer (mostly) gets HBO Max with HBO?

Because AT&T learned enough over the last few years to know what matters when launching a streamer. When HBO was mostly a cash play, Amazon was found money. Since HBO was also a key piece to Amazon Channels–clearly their biggest seller– Warner Bro negotiated fairly beneficial deal terms. The partnership worked, as Amazon felt free to leak that 5 million folks subscribe to HBO through their Channels program.

The difference between distributing on Fire TV devices and within Amazon Channels–and the fact that Amazon bundled those discussions together–basically shows how much AT&T stands to lose.

The Key Negotiating Deal Points

  1. User Experience – This issue more than any is what AT&T wants to control. Prime Video has been around for years, and it still gets the most “blah” reviews as a streaming platform. When AT&T sends its content to Prime Video–as it has to for the Channels program–it essentially gives up control for how it will be branded and leveraged. Try as you might to negotiate this, it’s really hard to manage as a third party. Especially a deal point like, “Make your service more user friendly.”

I would add, the other piece is building value in the eyes of customers. If a customer has to go to HBO Max’s application every day, they learn to value the content on that experience. In someone else’s streaming service that just doesn’t happen. It devalues the HBO brand overall. 

  1. Pricing – I haven’t negotiated these type of deals in a few years, but if terms are roughly similar to then, which I believe they are, there is a big monetary difference between a channels revenue split–which is a monthly recurring payment–and a device “bounty” where the device owner gets a one-time payment for signing up new customers. The latter is an enticement to have the device owner market your platform; the former is a deal tax primarily. But they work out to dramatically different financial outcomes for a streamer. A 30% fee in perpetuity can be awfully expensive.

But that’s not all the revenue Amazon wants…

  1. Advertising – This issue came up with Disney+’s negotiations as Amazon wants a cut of advertising revenue from the apps on its platform. On the one hand, this is bonkers as Amazon will have very little to do with creating value from those ads. On the other hand, in the old MVPD world, cable channels shared advertising time with MVPD operators. (That’s how local ads made it on old school cable networks.) Given that AT&T has dreams to launch an ad-supported version of HBO Max, this is likely a huge sticking point.
  2. Content – Andrew Rosen thinks a big hold up is that Amazon wants Warner Media content for IMDb TV’s FAST service. I’m not sure AT&T would ever consent to this, but not long after Disney+’s deal was closed the same group licensed Disney-owned shows to IMDb TV. Consider the market power that when AT&T is trying to negotiate for a device deal for its streamer, Amazon is essentially demanding that some of the content for that service wind up on a competing streamer. Such is Amazon’s market power, that a deal term could be forcing a studio to sell it content. (As I wrote on Twitter, the echoes to Standard Oil are remarkable.)

 

  1. Data – AT&T also wants the customer data. If you don’t control the user experience, you don’t control the data either. They basically go hand in hand. For as much as I love data–look, it was the first theme of this website–I do think “data” has been a bit overhyped in the business sphere. Data is an asset, but it isn’t actually cash. It is something that can generate more cash, but only if you use it properly. Still since it goes hand-in-hand with user experience, they’re tied together.

The Major Streamers Don’t Allow Bundling

That’s really the issue for AT&T. Netflix, Hulu/Disney+ and now HBO Max see themselves as bigger than just content in someone else’s streaming application. Heck, even Prime Video content isn’t available in Apple Channels!

And when you think about it, the ask by Amazon is kind of crazy. It’s not just asking to sell rights to HBO’s content, it’s asking for that content to essentially be bundled with the rest of its content. Which seems a lot more like a retransmission issue than simply allowing an application on your operating system. The best tweet which summarized this for me came from The Verge’s Julia Alexander:

Screen Shot 2020-05-29 at 12.18.15 PM

Exactly. Thus, the whole debate is fairly simple: AT&T considers itself a major player. And won’t allow itself to be bundled. 

Who is right?

First off, no one is right or wrong. The worst thing in the world is to pretend like negotiations between two businesses are about fairness or justice. Or that the needs/wants of customers matter. (If you want the needs of customers taken into account, government regulation is your only hope. And entertainment should be heavily regulated!)

Still, who is more right in holding to their position in this negotiation? AT&T.

When in doubt, ask who is creating value. AT&T has decades of valuable content, is spending billions making more and will have to spend hundreds of millions more to market that content. In other words, they’re doing all the work to launch a streamer. Amazon is a gatekeeper asking for a fee/toll/rent to allow it’s application on its platform. 

Not to mention AT&T bears most of the risk, unlike Amazon. To maximize that investment, they need to distribute and own that customer relationship. So they’re right to hold, and it will be fascinating to see who blinks first. 

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

A few other stories filtered in over the last week that competed for the top spot. A few were generally interesting, but just couldn’t compete with the HBO Max drama.

DAZN Shops Itself

A report from the Financial Times says that sports streamer DAZN is looking to raise money, which could mean anything from selling itself to finding a strategic partner to simply selling equity. Of all the newly launched streamers, DAZN has the toughest road to travel. Sports rights are extremely expensive, meaning they cost almost as much as the value they bring in. As much as I’d like an “indie” sports streamer to survive, DAZN needs cash to compete with the tech giants of the world.

Quibi Programming Strategy Reset

Less than two months in and Quibi is already revamping its programming line up. The plan is to focus more on what is working, which is apparently content that appeals to older, female viewers

Is this too aggressive of a pivot? Maybe. This is the perennial problem with data driving content decisions. Quibi is looking at what is working on their platform, and using that to make future content decisions.

But does that make sense? If your two best shows happened to appeal to that demographic, then it will make it look like that’s your best customer demographic. If you use that data to make more decisions, then you’ll no doubt appeal more and more to older, female viewers.

Do you see how this is a self-reinforcing algorithm? And how that can limit your potential audience.

Want to see how this applies to Netflix? Well, they too made originals, but they also put originals on the top of their home screen. This drove usage, because anything on the top screen gets clicks. But then Netflix made more originals using that data, in a self-reinforcing loop. Hence, why some of Netflix’s content feels so similar or appealing to the same demographics.

Disney World and Universal Studios Plan Summer Openings

July 15th is the planned date for Disney World to reopen at half capacity with tons of restrictions. Universal presented plans as well. This is both expected and seemingly on track for the next stage. My tentative prediction is that as thinks open up, folks will return to old habits and behaviors quicker than currently anticipated. If testing continues to ramp up, we could find this surprisingly normal looking.

Peacock Originals Slate on July 15th

When NBC released their plans for Peacock, my initial reaction was Peacock wants to be the most broadcast network of the streamers. This review of Peacock on Bloomberg essentially describes that as the mission statement. And this made me happy because, in full disclosure, I think broadly popular content has mostly been missing from the streaming wold.

As Peacock prepares its first set of originals for July 15th launch, are we getting a broadly appealing set of shows, or are we getting another rebound of peak-TV/prestige content? Looking at the list of shows–a Brave New World remake, a David Schwimmer comedy and an international thriller–I’m worried it’s more of the latter. However, they do have Psych 2 special. So we’ll see.

Data of the Week – Nielsen Top 100 Broadcast TV Shows

Twice a year, Michael Schneider uses Nielsen data to look at the top shows and then networks for the previous TV season or year. Here’s the 2019 season edition, which feels so bizarre in today’s coronavirus times. I’m mainly looking at it for the next set of shows to come to streaming channels. Look for 9-1-1 to one day get a pay day on streaming.

Entertainment Strategy Guy Update – Apple Content Moves

Apple Snags the New Scorsese Film from Paramount…

This could have been my story of the week, but for HBO Max launching. Dollar wise, it’s relatively small. Just $200 million or so among friends. 

But not with Netflix? What went wrong!!!

Likely the price tag and performance of The Irishman scared off Netflix. As I wrote in multiple outlets last December, Netflix doesn’t have the monetization methods to get a return on $300 million budget films. (That’s what I expect Netflix ended up paying for The Irishman.) Toss in all the controversy about theaters, maybe some DiCaprio nervousness about back end, and I think Apple TV+ with Paramount theatrical was the logical choice.

Is this good for Apple TV+? Sure. It will get a ton of new subscribers to check them out. Without a library, though, how long will they stay? Speaking of…

…and Fraggle Rock from Henson Company

Bloomberg reported last week that Apple was looking at licensing library content. Well, their first “big” purchase is Fraggle Rock’s library to complement an upcoming reboot. Then there was controversy in the entertainment journalism press about whether Apple had changed strategies or not. (Which would directly contradict my column from last week.) Apple PR went to multiple outlets to leak that “No, no, nothing has changed.”

My guess is both scenarios are true. If Apple can’t find a library to buy, they’ll say their strategy hasn’t changed. If they do? Then they’ll happily announce it.

Meanwhile, is Fraggle Rock a game changer? I doubt it. Kids need lots of content to go through. Almost more so than adults. Frankly, Apple TV+ doesn’t have it.

My Unasked for Recommendations for Disney Streaming (2020 Edition)

Do you remember last year before Disney+ launched and I had this series of recommendations for how they could catch up to Netflix? They were…

1. Go dirt cheap on the prices. [Check]
2. Schedule weekly releases for adults [Check]
3. Bundle with other streamers [Check]
4. Get all your key library content on board. [Check]
5. Give it for free to all theme park attendees [No]
6. Release weekly ratings. [Hell no.]

You might have trouble finding that article. Why? Because I never actually finished it and published it. If I had, I could keep pointing back to it for how right I was. 

(Instead, I published an article worrying that Disney+ wouldn’t have the Marvel films or half the princess movies. Oops.)

Given that last week was a bit of big news for Disney+, I think it’s worth providing Disney another round of unasked for recommendations. Rebecca Campbell—the new head of streaming—definitely doesn’t need my advice, but everyone else might find it interesting to know what I would do if I were offering my strategic advice.

I’ll focus on streaming here, with the knowledge tha the entire Disney enterprise has a had a bad few months. It’s almost the perfectly designed disaster to hurt Disney’s business. But given that forecasting the course of a pandemic is pretty uncertain, I’ll wait to opine on Disney’s business model for a pinch.

Recommendation 1: Add a local streamer to your “bundle” overseas.

This was the “a ha” that got me to finally write this article. Two weeks ago, I called my biggest story of the week Disney’s decision to pause international growth plans for Hulu. In these cash strapped times, Disney is worried about the costs of Hulu internationally. Some of this is marketing, some is product, but most of it is likely licensing claw backs. Or foregone licensing revenue. 

As I wrote two weeks ago, I’m not sure a streamer built around the FX stable of content will be a huge winner internationally. American TV shows don’t travel as well as folks think, and really “prestige-y” type shows travel even worse. (This isn’t a uniform pronouncement. Some of the Fox TV studios shows will travel. Like How I Met Your Mother. Just not all.) The Fox movies will have some appeal too, though a lot of the best have been pulled for Disney+ already.

The challenge is that if Disney doesn’t launch Hulu internationally, it will lag Netflix for potentially ever.

What to do? 

Well, keep bundling. The bundle with ESPN+, Hulu and Disney+ has already been successful in America. Likely internationally it will have some appeal. That’s a no brainer.

Even better, though, is to add a local streamer to each bundle. If that’s Hulu’s biggest drawback—lack of local content for adults—don’t opt for the expensive proposition of licensing it all, just partner with a local streamer. Essentially make them the fourth pillar in a country-by-country bundle. Especially if ESPN+ isn’t launched globally for sports. 

Even though we in America don’t realize it, nearly every country has a local streamer trying to fight the streaming giants like Amazon and Netflix. Disney could look like a hero by bundling that content with its other shows. Hulu then gets to come along for the ride. And overall, my gut is this strategy would be cheaper than trying to license local content territory-by-territory. 

Consider this too, an extension of what’s already working. Disney+ was tied closely to Hotstar in India. (Which Disney got in the Fox deal.) They’ve also partnered with local companies for distribution deals like with Canal Plus in France. My pitch is to just take that strategy even further with more bundles in more territories. Even if it means giving local partners most of the benefit in the short term, in the long term this will help with adoption.

Recommendation 2: Seriously, give away Disney+ to anyone going to a theme park.

Let’s re-up my biggest recommendation from last year. It’s super expensive to go to the Disneyland or Disney World. Disney+ is very cheap. So just combine the two and if you buy two tickets to a theme park you get 3 months of Disney+ for free. Those free trials are worth it.

(Yes, parks are closed. They won’t be forever.)

Recommendation 3: Add another “F-BOSSS” Level TV Series. My pitch? Modern Family

Back in January, I coined the acronym “F-BOSS” for the big TV series that were being clawed back from Netflix or secured for multi-hundred million dollar licensing deals. (Friends, The The Big Bang Theory, The Office, Seinfeld, Simpsons, South Park) Now that the biggies are off the table, the smaller series are coming off the board too.

Disney, for its part, has mostly moved 21st Century Fox TV series to Hulu. Like How I Met Your Mother. However, 21st Century Fox has a big one coming up that isn’t as big as those others, but could be. That’s Modern Family. Which just ended its last season.  Back in 2013, Fox licensed it to USA network for a big sum. I looked but can’t see when that deal comes off the board. But when it does, either Hulu or Disney+ is its all but guaranteed landing spot. 

Of the two, I’d say that Modern Family should go to Disney+. This isn’t a no brainer by any means, but that’s because of how hard it is to fit content onto the Disney+ brand. The challenge is Disney+ content needs to be both family-friendly, but also adult-appealing. That’s a hard balance to strike.

I considered some of the older “TGIF” series like Home Improvement (distributed by Disney back in the day, and made by Touchstone, which is owned by Disney). Disney should get that series to Disney+, but it probably isn’t a game changer. It is too old to move the needle. (So they shouldn’t’ buy out whatever rights is keeping it off streaming early.) (The other series on TGIF like Full House or Family Matters aren’t worth it even to license from Warner Bros.) I considered some of the Fox animation series, but they feel too edgy. (It’s still funny The Simpsons made the cut when you think about it.)

This makes Modern Family the key choice. It’s got lots of episodes (250) for folks to binge—the main requirement—and both customer/critical acclaim. (High viewership for a long period of time and multiple Emmy wins.) It does touch on some politics, but overall isn’t controversial enough to cause too much hot water with family groups. (It’s on syndication nationally and on USA Network right now.) So for me, this is a big content priority.

Side Note: About the “Big 5” Pillars

I’m not sure they have a name, but the “Five Big Pillars” is what I’m calling these:

Screen Shot 2020-05-26 at 5.06.44 PM

These pillars are both a blessing and a curse for Disney+. Blessing because these pillars have shown that they can launch a streamer. Hence, Disney getting to 50 million subscribers and beyond. It’s an incredibly strong brand defined by these five pieces.

The curse is that they limit what Disney can do going forward. Already, The Simpsons is above the pillars in most applications because they don’t fit one of the four categories. Same for some of the Fox films like Ice Age. Is it Disney? No, but it’s somewhere on Disney+. 

But really the limitation crystallized for me in Disney passing on the Studio Ghibli content, that will appear on HBO Max tomorrow. Studio Ghibli movies are great, but where would Disney put them? I’m not sure they know either, and not saying it’s the only reason but they passed on it for licensing.

If Disney does add a big piece of additional content, like a Modern Family, they may need to rethink these five pillars. 

Recommendation 4: Provide a major product improvement

I probably use the Disney+ app more than other streaming app. My daughter isn’t allowed to use the iPad unsupervised, and we watch one short film before the bath. So I’ve scrolled the app a fair bit. Meaning I know it’s limitations and positives better than any other (iPad) application. (I caveat “iPad” because I don’t know if they are problems on other operating systems.)

So it’s time for Disney+ to roll out a new feature that doesn’t upend the entire user experience—folks hate that—but provides more functionality. My pitches?

– Make the Disney animated shorts their own section. And make it easier to scroll and search for new shorts to watch.
– Add a “Sing-a-long” version. And make it easy to find the songs to watch as their own thing.
– Fix the “additional content” to be more like a DVD-bonus features. 

Side Note: Disney Needs to “Proof Read” Its Content

If you’re a heavy user of Disney+, you notice little things. My guess is they are mistakes that are the result of automating the entire process. Which is key for a streamer to get launched, but sometimes a human touch can fix the errors. Meaning someone would need to manipulate the metadata to make sure the service is as accurate as possible. For example…

– The timing for the length of short films includes foreign language credits. Which means a Pixar short appears to be 9 minutes long, but four minutes are credits. That needs to be updated.
– A shocking amount of ratings claim that a given Disney short features tobacco use. (The only authentic one is Steamboat Willy.) I have no idea why this is the case.
– Some content still only has one version. For example, Mickey and the Beanstalk is only included in Fun and Fancy Free, when that version features a nigh unwatchable ventriloquism scene. So on one hand, they have this content. On the other, it isn’t the best version of it.

Recommendation 5: Get NFL Sunday Ticket on ESPN+ somehow.

NFL Sunday Ticket is the killer app that gets ESPN+ mandatory adoption. Will this be pricey? Yes. Will Comcast and AT&T still want pieces of the NFL? Yes. Is the least likely recommendation? Yes.

The NFL is the sports straw that stirs the content drink. As it is, ESPN+ doesn’t have enough reasons for folks to subscribe. Plus, Sunday Ticket keeps from cannibalizing linear views as Disney can pitch to MVPDs that it is just adding Sunday Ticket as DirecTV did before. 

Most Important Story of the Week – 22 May 20: Apple Caves and Buys a Library

Some weeks, you barely have any news to cover. Then, other weeks the deluge comes. Buzzy stories. Executive movement stories. Sneaky scoops. And then Barstool drama.

To help settle the issue, I polled the audience. Everyone wants to talk about Joe Rogan at Spotify. But that’s a $100 million dollar deal. When I look for big moves, I mean big. For new followers, that often means adding up the potential dollar figures involved (and if they’re long term/speculative, discounting them for the cost of entertainment capital, about 8%). So a big streamer potentially dropping billions fits that bill.

If this week’s column has a theme, it’s that many of the biggest moves in entertainment are NOT about adding value for customers. I see that with two big tech titans in particular. That contrasts with a third, Netflix, who is doing right by customers. 

This is good for me, since I’m going to praise Netflix repeatedly. I’m a Netflix bear because the stock price makes no sense. Strategically, though, they do a TON right, with a few key mistakes. The world isn’t black and white and neither should be my Netflix coverage. On to the analysis.

Most Important Story of the Week – Apple (Almost) Caves and Buys a Library

I should bust out my Nikki Finke “Toldja” air horn. (Are there new folks to entertainment who don’t get this reference anymore? Showing my age.)

Anyways, my consistent strategic complaint with Apple has been the lack of library content. To just quote myself:

My theory of the case is pretty simple:

It is BANANAS to launch a streaming platform–and charge $10 a month for it–without library content.

It might be unprecedented. We’ve had subscription services launch without original content. (Netflix, Hulu and Prime Video in the early days; some movie platforms too.) But we’ve never had a service launch the opposite way. All originals–and not even that many–but no library? Truly, Apple is zagging while others zig.

Besides the rumored $10 price point, that was dropped to $5/free with purchase, the rest of that column from last August is spot on. Here’s right after they announced the price and most journalists went nuts on the hype:

The counter is that customers value a discount, so a stated price gives it a stated value. Maybe. But the content offering is so sparse—and could be such a dud at launch—that a discount of nothing is still nothing. If you really have no plans to add a library to make this a business that can stand on its own, and it truly is a loss-leading business, just make all the losses explicit and don’t charge for it.

Want another one? Here’s my take in Decider just that last month after Tim Cook told us that for sure they wouldn’t get licensed content:

Screen Shot 2020-05-22 at 8.58.49 AM

The news this week out of the Bloomberg leak machine is that Apple is in serious conversations to acquire a licensed content. And maybe a library. (How could Tim Cook lie to us like that back in February? Remember, executives lie ALL THE TIME!) 

Apple is finally on the licensed content train. What do we make of this?

M&A May Not Solve This Problem

At least not this year. Most libraries worth owning are locked up in multi-year deals. The time to buy MGM/Sony was in 2016. Then, when they launched Apple TV+, all the licensed content would be ready. Now, if they buy one of those two studios, they either have to buy out all the current licensing deals–which is what Disney+ did–which could skyrocket the costs or they have to wait a few years. Hence, the licensing deals to get whatever is there onto the service quickly.

There is Always a Lot of Content Available, but…

We’re not going to run out of content. That said, the top content is still the top content and more and more of it is locked up into multi-year deals at the soon to launch streamers of Peacock and HBO Max, or Hulu. For a good look, this article by Mike Raab uses a few categories to determine a pretty good list of the top shows of the last few decades.

Apple basically has to pick from the last column on the “Potential Libraries”. And already South Park and Seinfeld are off the list. (For a look at quick value, here’s my article talking about FBOSS top series here.)

Screen Shot 2020-05-22 at 9.11.41 AM

Source: Mike Raab on Medium

Does Apple stay prestige and get Mad Men? Broad with That 70s Show? I don’t know, but I doubt it stands up to the potential Hulu, Peacock or HBO Max licensed juggernauts. 

Does Licensed Content Matter Compared to Originals?

Yes. This comes up on Twitter. It absolutely matters. I don’t have time to prove it, but trust me.

Apple TV+ Still Doesn’t Solve Any Problems for Customers

I said this was the theme of the week, and I’ll start with Apple. It’s still tough for me to figure out what Apple is really doing that adds value for customers. Especially with Apple TV+. They’ve just launched another streamer that does mostly what every other streamer does. And they’re losing mountains of money simply to seize market share.

Some of you, will offer this I’m sure: But EntStrategyGuy, it’s free!

Remember, offering something free isn’t the same thing as creating value. Instead, it’s capturing value via predatory marketing pricing. It’s the sign of a non-functioning market. (My primer on value creation is here.)

Contrast this to Netflix. When Netflix started streaming, it really was creating value. Library TV was undervalued, so it streamed it on-demand whenever customers wanted. That is a huge value add. Then in 2012, they started losing money to grab market share. But at the start, Netflix clearly solved problems for customers.

Other Contender for Most Important Story – Joe Rogan Moves to Spotify

To understand the importance of Joe Rogan moving to Spotify, I have two analogies, each with a current story. And I’d call it the “malevolent” versus “benevolent” views.

The “Benevolent View” Talent Gets Paid: Joe Rogan to Spotify; “Call Her Daddy” Deal Terms

The analogy for this is Howard Stern in 2005. In that year, he moved to Sirius XM for a whopping $500 million deal that he subsequently renewed.

In a lot of ways, this current story is no different. Spotify is launching a new product, and is signing up top, top talent for it. Rogan is the 2010s Howard Stern. And note the difference: Stern got $100 million per year whereas Joe Rogan got $100 for 3 to 5 years. (It’s unclear the length.) Earlier this year, Spotify paid $250 million for all of Bill Simmons’ company in perpetuity.

That’s what I also see in the other big podcast story of the week, which is the “Call Her Daddy” drama. For those not familiar, the two hosts of a podcast on Barstool called “Call Her Daddy”–Sofia Franklyn and Alexandra Cooper–started negotiating a renewal. It didn’t go well. The shocking part is that the head of Barstool went public with the dispute, revealing deal terms in the process. Some of them are eye popping for podcasts, in the millions of dollars for two podcast hosts. So Barstool is doing well.

All these cases have something in common, which is they show just how much power talent has in entertainment. What Andrew Rosen has been calling the “curse of the mogul” from the book by the same name. In other words, when cash flow is mostly due to specific talent, the benefits flow to that talent who can help you capture them. (It’s worse when the financials are more apparent, like advertising driven content.)

This is the “benevolent” view. Spotify wants to make money from podcasting, so it’s hiring people to get it there. I don’t complain about studios or networks paying for top talent. That happens all the time in the TV industry. HBO wouldn’t pay John Oliver his millions if he show also went up simultaneously on every other channel. Some exclusivity is needed to justify owning channels and producing content in the first place.

But…

The “Malevolent” View

Let’s stick with the radio example, and compare it to the current situation. In the case of top talent for FM/AM radio, all the providers are competing with each other in the same distribution format. So if one radio channel pays it’s top talent more to woo them to its station, they’re simply taking market share from someone else, who can pay likewise.

That’s the Barstool/Call Her Daddy kerfluffle too. In this case, the talent just wants to get paid more. The option, though, is to go to another podcasting service. But they’d still be distributed in all the same places, just taking more of the revenue.

Not so for the Stern example. Sirius XM’s goal wasn’t just to get ear balls on its service, it was to take over radio. (Indeed, it merged with XM in part because they couldn’t replace all terrestrial radio.) They didn’t succeed, but if they had, the goal would have been to use that newfound power to crush suppliers.

Spotify isn’t just trying to get podcasters to help it make money. It wants exclusive podcasts. Why? So that it can take over the podcasting market. And then when it does, it can use that power to crush suppliers. How do you beat the “curse of the mogul”? Be a monopoly. Then talent has no other choice.

Some of you don’t believe me, so I encourage you to read Matt Stoller’s latest newsletter on this. (He’d written about Spotify before.) The example he uses brilliantly is what Google and Facebook did to local news. Before, if you wanted to advertise on The New York Times, you had to pay the Times. Now, you can advertise to NY Times readers when they leave the site. For cheaper.

That’s essentially the Spotify playbook here. (Once I read Stoller’s take, I couldn’t get it out of my head.) Now if you want to advertise to Bill Simmons or Joe Rogan’s audience, you had to do that on their podcast. In the future, Spotify can serve those ads to anyone else when they are listening to something else. Is that good for podcasts individually? Obviously not. You lose your “exclusivity” value when Spotify can sell your customers elsewhere. Ask local newspapers and their massive extinction event how much dynamic advertising via Google/Facebook has helped their businesses.

By the way the New York Times example is very telling. This week they stopped allowing third party data because they know how bad it is for them overall. Owning the data is the key to monetization. Spotify knows that and that’s their goal. Except…

The Reality: Spotify’s Quest to Take Over Podcasting Is Not Guaranteed

If your goal is to become the monopolist of podcasting, getting Simmons and Rogan is a great start. 

That said, the theme of the week is customers. What is Spotify doing that helps customers? I keep hearing about “dynamic ad targeting”, but I skip ads all the time. If I can’t skip ads on Spotify, and I can on iTunes, I’ll use iTunes. Especially if only a handful of podcasts are exclusive to Spotify. Meanwhile, will Spotify police ad reads for podcasts that premiere on its platform? How could it even do that?

So the problem is that Spotify isn’t solving for any customer pain points. Maybe their UX is better than iTunes, but it’s worse than many other podcast applications. 

Worse, they’ll likely cause pain for their suppliers. Meanwhile, there are enough big media companies that will never go exclusive to Spotify. It just won’t be worth it at one third or less of the audience. So if ESPN, NPR, WNYC, Wondery, etc are all on every other platform, the edge just isn’t there for Spotify. That’s my gut thinking.

(Last point, Luminary is also continuing to prove that subscriptions won’t work for podcasts. It also proves that having a parent in private equity/finance is great at funding news business ventures.)

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

We have more stories. Let’s go quick to wrap things up.

Kevin Mayer Moves to Tik Tok; Rebecca Campbell Takes over Disney Streaming

Say it with me, “We can’t judge executive hires in the moment.”

That doesn’t mean we don’t try. We do all the time. But we’re pretty rough at forecasting executive hit rates.

Still, I want to give a moment of credit to Kevin Mayer and what he can do. His skill set is dealmaking. And that’s what Disney+ needed to launch. Yes, the Mandalorian was a huge hit, and credit to the creative team for that. But Disney+ needed to launch on every potential device. And it did. And Disney needed to claw back rights for all of Star Wars and Marvel and Disney and Pixar movies, which it did! Mayer was the driving force behind these deals. 

Will that skill set help at Tik Tok? Maybe. We’ll see what they acquire. It’s an interesting hire for sure.

As for his replacement? I won’t pretend like the coverage in the trades gives me a clue. Campbell has lots of TV and international experience, but not a lot of development experience. I can’t guess either way.

Netflix Is Helping to Cancel Inactive Accounts

Which really is the right thing to do by customers. It can definitely engender good will. And I’ve long praised Netflix for making it very, very easy to cancel.

That said, some credit goes to Wall Street. Every so often, Wall Street decides they like free cash flow negative business propositions with huge growth. Like Netflix. If Comcast could lose $3 billion a year in pursuit of growth, can you imagine what it could build? Same for Disney. 

If Wall Street collectively changes its mind that losing money is a bad thing–say when subscriber growth stalls–we may see different behavior at Netflix if it isn’t reward.

M&A – STX mergers with Eros

Since STX launched, their goal has always been global. (This New Yorker read is a case study in a confused business model, which even then talks about getting China money.) In total dollars, this is small, but it reflects who in a global buying market even US studios need global power.

Fake Data of The Week – Datecdotes Spread!

Thanks to Andrew Wallenstein for flagging our latest datecdotes. On Hulu, Solar Opposites is huge! On Apple TV+, Defending Jacob is huge! How big?

Screen Shot 2020-05-22 at 9.37.19 AM

Some quick takes on that:

– Damn, Outer Banks is crushing this quarantine in America.
– Sorry, Mythic Quest fans. That show is not. Still.
– Rick and Morty is doing worse than I thought.
– Sure, Solar Opposites is probably doing well. For Hulu. And when I’ve looked at THe Handmaid’s Tale before, it does worse than you’d guess.
– Defending Jacob is probably Apple’s best launch since their premiere, but they have a long road to haul still.

Netflix is a Broadcast Channel – Implications, Insights, Strategic Impacts and Criticisms

My most popular article of the year is clearly this buzzy headline titled,

“Netflix is a Broadcast Channel”

Why? Since Netflix is the sexy topic in entertainment—a titan of digital subscriptions—my article probably got some clicks because it’s an “aggressively moderate” take on Netflix. (A lane I’ve decided to lean into as heavily as I can.) Most headlines go the opposite direction. 

If your thesis is that Netflix “will become TV”, I basically say, “Uh, not really.” Netflix won’t become TV, they’ve become a broadcast channel. Take a look for yourself.

Image 1 - EstimatesBut that last article was missing, in my mind, the most important part of any in-depth analysis. Which is all the implications from the data. Today’s article will fill that gap. I’ll start with the implications and strategic impacts of this data look. Then, I’ll discuss some potential criticisms of the approach.

Implications

Implication – Netflix is a Broadcast Channel…So They Can Launch Shows

That’s the upside take. A show like Love is Blind or Tiger King doesn’t just become a hit, it becomes buzzy sensational show that seemingly everyone is talking about. When you’re a broadcast channel, your top shows can do this. Fox can launch The Masked Singer or Lego Masters that still gets a lot of coverage. Or NBC can have This Is Us.

This is why being one of the top players provides so much of an advantage to incumbents. When you do put out something good, it is immediately amplified. This is why Netflix can drive so much of the conversation, while Amazon/Hulu seemingly can’t. (No matter how many times Bosch super fans recommend it.)

IMAGE 3 - Total Viewing Q4

Implication – On the other hand, Netflix is *only* A Broadcast Channel

If I took this list of broadcast Primetime ratings, you’d likely shake your head and say, “Hmm, decline of TV is right!”

Image 11 Anonymous 1

Image 12 - Anonymous 2Honestly, did anyone else know that Altered Carbon season 2 came out? Me neither. Talk about a season 1 to season 2 decline. (Read my take here for why this is important here.) Obviously, the difference is growth. Netflix and Amazon are growing, whereas linear TV is decaying.

But we can learn something from these ratings. They explain why even some “buzzy” Netflix shows can stay anonymous in the conversation. Take Outer Banks right now. If you polled a majority of Americans, I bet they have never even heard of it. Which is fine for Netflix. If you polled a majority of Americans, another big chunk wouldn’t know that The History Channel has a successful show in The Curse of Oak Island. 

In other words, even being a successful broadcast channel in today’s day-and-age is just enough to launch some shows. The rest fade quickly, even for streamers. And even “hits” can be unknown by most of the population.

Implication – Amazon Prime Video is a Cable Channel

That’s just what the data says to me. Besides their most recently launched show—Hunters, about Nazi hunters in New York—every other show is pretty old. In other words, based on their ratings they’re a decent cable channel. The question is if providing one decent cable channel is worth the potential billions Amazon is spending. 

(Side insight: Hulu is a cable channel too.)

(Side insight: How many Amazon series are about Nazis? The Man in the High Castle. Hunters. At this point, I’m worried Hitler will show up in The Lord of the Rings.)

Implication – The Broadcasters Aren’t That Far Behind and Netflix May Be Losing Marketshare

Which could be good news for all their streaming services. The folks at Hub Research do some pretty good surveys on a quarterly basis and one slide in particular caught my eye. 

Hard not to see how valued the broadcast channels still are. Which begs this question: Is Netflix worth more than ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC put together? Moreover, can all the new streamers based around those broadcasters compete to take more Netflix market share? I think it’s possible. If not likely.

Meanwhile, as Netflix has told us before, they are 10% of TV viewing in the United States. (From earnings report in 2018 and 2019.) Here’s my Tweet from when I first saw the Bloomberg article:

Yet, this analysis only has them at 5.9%. While the difference is likely chocked up to different measurement systems, it could be a trend. We’ll monitor.

Strategic Recommendation: Understand Segments Better

My favorite strategic frameworks of all strategic frameworks is the 4C-STP-4P marketing framework. Specifically the middle part where business leaders evaluate “Segment-Targeting-Positioning”. My read on the landscape is that a lot of the streamers are targeting the same segment: coastal elites.

Looking at these Nielsen ratings, though, there is a big untapped segment. Overly-stereotyped, I’d call it the “middle America” segment. (A real segmenting would need more data than this cursory look.) They’re still watching broadcast TV. But as the streamers spend more and more money competing for the same segments (Hulu, Netflix, Prime Video, Peacock and HBO Max all arguably are), it gets more and more expensive. Peacock made the most noise about being broad, but even their originals are light on typically broadcast shows. Same for HBO Max.

Implication: The decay is super real in linear TV

To pull off my analysis, I collected 4 years of annual Nielsen ratings. (Collected every year by Michael Schneider of Variety.) Despite adding more and more channels tracked every year, the ratings are declining as you’d expect:

Screen Shot 2020-05-13 at 11.40.42 AM

And that decay looks like it’s accelerating. Of course, this complicates the “Covid-19 will accelerate all changes” thesis, since the rate of decay was already growing. Meanwhile, as I mentioned last time, if you add streaming and linear, you get to 94 million, so the folks watching TV is growing with population. This makes me trust the Nielsen data more. 

Content Implications: Original versus Licensed Battles

The biggest open question—the debate point that riles up the most folks online—is whether or not Netflix’s original content strategy is working. Does this Nielsen data settle the issue? 

Hardly.

First, as Andrew Wallenstein pointed out on Twitter, when it comes to TV series, the Netflix “Originals” win hand down. 

Or do they?

As I wrote in my weekly column, some Nielsen data came out about the top ten licensed series on Netflix in the first quarter. (Here’s a “What’s On Netflix” article on it.) The gist is that licensed shows are still the most consumed TV series when you account for the entire quarter, not the most recent day’s viewing. As Kasey Moore points out, That 70s Shows has never made a Netflix top 10 list, yet it was third in total viewing. Clearly, new shows get lots of viewers initially, but series with lots of episodes drive more total viewership.

Second, when it comes to movies, the picture is out of focus. The top film in early March was Spenser Confidential. The top film in May, so far, is Extraction. So original films can claim the top spot and not let it go. (I’m writing a deeper dive on Hard R action films on Netflix for another outlet.)

That said, unlike the TV series, a bunch of licensed movies make up the rest of the Nielsen list. And have continued to do so. This makes me a little nervous for Netflix’s strategy. Especially considering that they launch something like 20 original movies every month. Their hit rate for those movies looks low, and licensed films are leaving the platform. (Also, kids films do show up on this list, which I’ll discuss later.)

Content Implications: The Decay Is Real

This is something I mentioned last time, when trying to calculate how much additional primetime viewership happened. (I made an estimate for every series not on the Nielsen top ten.) Netflix Originals drop quickly out of the top ten after premiere. Usually within two weeks or so from launch. The oldest show on this list is Locke & Key. This isn’t because folks are consuming all the content, but because they’re switching to something else. (Unless Netflix top ten lists exclude TV series that are older than one month from release, but I don’t know that for sure.)

Justification: Everyone Should Estimate Netflix

I can hear some silent critics out there. “Hey, EntStrategyGuy, you’re just guessing here, right? This is an estimate? Not facts.” The answer is yes, this is an estimate.

Of course, when you hear someone in the media commentariat opining about Netflix, they’re making estimates too. I’m thinking specifically of hyperbolic talk about Netflix on podcasts by so many reviewers or opinion makers. They’re making estimates of Netflix’s size, power and reach, just not explicitly. 

But because they don’t have an actual estimate, they use their gut. And often that gut goes wild. By some of the discussion, you’d think Netflix was 100% of TV viewing in the United States.

Meanwhile, there is a strategic rationale for making this type of estimate. Especially if you work in a strategy or content planning or marketing or any role in the business of studio, production company, streamer or network. If you don’t know how well your competitors are doing, you can’t properly plan. Unfortunately, I’ve seen more firms that don’t make well grounded estimates than firms doing proper competitive analysis.

So I fill in the gap. For free!

Evidence/Arguments Against My Thesis

Here’s is another great public service I provide that separates me from some other media analysts: I’m willing to criticize my own work! How rare is that?

Kids viewing vs Non-Kids Viewing

A huge variable this analysis doesn’t/can’t account for is kids viewership. Kids are such a small portion of the audience that they won’t crack Nielsen’s time specific viewership. This has historically been true on broadcast and cable too.

Yet, as others like Richard Rushfield have speculated before, a huge portion of Netflix viewership is kid driven. Even has high as 60%. Traditional TV, I don’t believe, has ever seen viewership percentages that are that large. Which could throw off the entire comparison I’m making.

All of which would imply that my argument that “Netflix is a broadcast channel” is too generous. I assume that Netflix’s percentage of all streaming TV viewership is the same as its percentage of all primetime viewership. If Netflix over-indexes on kids viewership, then it’s percentage of primetime viewership would go down. 

Without more data, though, we can’t know either way.

Or the Reverse: Netflix Has Higher Primetime Viewership

This is another argument I saw. Basically, some folks thought Netflix actually does better with adults so the day-part to primetime analysis doesn’t make sense. I couldn’t find any any data to support that, but the great thing about my estimates is if you want to tweak them, you can.

How Do Sports Impact This Analysis?

It does and doesn’t.

(This great comment from the excellent sports mind Steve Dittmore asking this question:

Yes, a TON of broadcast ratings are due to sports. Here’s the top 15 highest rated shows in broadcast from last year:

Screen Shot 2020-05-13 at 12.11.49 PM

It’s a lot of viewing. 26 of the top 50 shows in primetime were sports. And you can see the orders of magnitude higher viewership for something like the Super Bowl. Unfortunately, I don’t have the specific Nielsen data to answer this question for Steve.

On the other hand, Netflix doesn’t have sports. Which means it will never get these ratings in the first place. That’s a potential advantage fro DAZN or ESPN+ to get mindshare for Netflix. (In other words, it’s hard to become TV without sports or news.)

This Data is Out of Date From a Pre-Coronavirus World

True and sort of irrelevant as far as I can see. If you told me a vaccine was delivered by aliens tomorrow, and you wanted to know how viewership would look post-lockdowns, I’d rather have data from before the lockdowns started than during them. It’s more representative of what a viewership world will look like after the fact.

Also, why certain industries are gaining during lockdowns, it appears as if the market leaders are actually gaining less than their smaller competitors. In shopping, Target, Walmart and Shopify users are up more than Amazon. And it looks like Disney+, Hulu, linear viewing and Prime Video are up more than Netflix in terms of overall growth.

Netflix is a Broadcast Channel: Comparing Streamers to TV Channels in an Age of Nielsen Data

One of my big frustrations with the “debate” over Netflix is how little we know. That’s a gripe I share with a lot of folks. 

One of my big frustrations with coverage of Netflix is how seldom folks try to step into the gap and estimate data points for Netflix. In this gripe I’m mostly by myself. I understand that some journalistic outfits can’t do this. They can only report facts or estimates from other established firms.

But I won’t settle. If Netflix won’t tell us how many folks watch their programming, then I’ll take things into my own hands. (See Ted Sarandos’ latest on Reliable Sources. All he said was “Viewership is ‘up”.) I just need enough data to make my estimates reasonable.

And guess what? Over the last three months I think I’ve collected enough. 

Normally, at this point I’d launch into a bit of a strategy lesson. I mean, it’s right there in the name of this website. Instead I’m getting right to my results. I’ll put my “Bottom Line, Up Front”, what this is, why it’s a good look and then how I calculated it. Then in my next article, I’ll analyze some implications from all this data, and finally my strategic lesson for folks out there.

Bottom Line, Up Front  – My Estimates for Primetime Viewing

The breakthrough for this project came from three summaries of viewing. All came from Nielsen, which means the measurement system is “apples-to-apples”. Even if you’re measuring subtly different things, at least having the same person measuring is better than multiple different measurement systems. 

Here’s my prediction of the top 20 “channels/platforms”—across both linear and streaming—in Primetime (8-11pm) in the United States, as measured by “Average Minute Audience”. 

Image 1 - Estimates

To be clear, this is the “average minute audience” during primetime in 2019. The best way to explain “average minute audience” is that it is the average number of people tuned in or watching during primetime. It can be different people who tuned in for only part of a show in traditional linear TV. Notably, it does include delayed viewing of shows, so it’s better described as “shows that debuted during primetime.”

Why use “average minute audience”? 

First, because it isn’t subscribers, which is the numbers we most often see reported. (And duly covered by me, for example here or here or here.) 

AMA is pretty damn useful because it captures actual usage, not just folks who are subscribed to a service, but don’t use it. While AMA can have wild swings—for example live sports skew ratings heavily—over 365 days it absolutely evens out. In other words, it’s a pretty good sample of the average amount of usage.

I’d add, the business rationale for tracking both usage and subscribers is because they are a chicken and egg problem. If you have lots of subscribers, but they don’t use the service, they’ll quit being subscribers. And if you have lots of usage, that ends up getting more subscribers. (Meanwhile, coronavirus is going to screw all this up as the old models of usage to sub growth will be pretty inaccurate during this time of crisis.)

Here’s a fun example. Who has more subscribers, CBS or Netflix? Well, CBS obviously. Through all the linear cable channels. (If you count those as subscribers, and they do pay a monthly fee, even if they don’t know it.) But since usage is declining, so is linear channel subscriptions.

How the relationship between usage and subscribers evolves overtime will have a big impact on how the streaming wars progress. We have subscriber numbers for the most part; AMA balances it out nicely in the interim. (Though if I had a preference, I’d just prefer total hours consumed by streamer and linear channel.)

The other main reason I used it? Well, it’s the data I have. So you use what you have.

Methodology

How did I pull off this feat of estimation? Let’s go step by step through it.

First, gather your sources. 

One. Every year Michael Schneider releases a roll up of every channel by average primetime minute audience. This means for the 3 hours of prime-time (8pm to 11pm) he averages how many folks watch by every single channel. That gave me this chart of the last four years, since he linked to his past columns at IndieWire: 

IMAGE 2 - Top 25 Channels

Two. In February, Nielsen released their “Total Viewing Report” for 2019 Q4. They then released some juicy nuggets about streaming and Netflix’s share of viewership. Covered in every outlet possible, here’s the pie chart from Bloomberg converted to a table:

IMAGE 3 - Total Viewing Q4

Three. In another scoop, Michael Schneider in Variety got the weekly Nielsen streaming data on a show-by-show, top ten basis, which we hardly ever get:

IMAGE 4 - Nielsen Originals March

Second, make an estimate between the first two sources.

This actually just becomes a math problem. To start, I calculated the total viewing of primetime shows each year. You can see on the top line of the 2016-2019 chart that I calculated total viewership year over year, and it’s decline. With Nielsen’s estimate that streaming is 19% of viewership, we can combine these two estimates:

IMAGE 5 - Total Viewership

Once we have that, we can just multiply the percentage of streaming by percentage of viewing. Assuming that the percentage of prime-time viewing on Netflix is on average the same as broadcast and cable channels—which seems reasonable—we get this updated table:

IMAGE 6 - Updated Implied Total Viewership

That gave me the table above, which I’ll post again because I love it so much…

Image 1 - Estimates

Third, make some margin of error.

See, Netflix has in the past estimated they are 10% of TV viewing. So I wanted to give them their due and put the number out in case that’s closer to reality. So that number made it in as the “high case”. In this case, Netflix would surge past CBS and NBC to 9.4 million AMA on average. 

Of course, I’ve also heard that Netflix has something like 60% of their viewing is kids or family content. While this doesn’t show up often in their season data, you see this in their film viewing. So if I were estimating total Netflix usage, I’d consider lowering the primetime ratio down a bit, say to 4%. This would mean that Netflix severely under indexes on primetime viewership because it is essentially a kids TV platform. This would make Netflix’s primetime AMA around 3.7 million.

I’d call those two numbers our high and low case for Netflix in 2019. So 3.7 million to 9.4, with a like 5.5 million average AMA.

Fourth, sanity check your estimate.

This is where Michael Schneider’s latest Nielsen scoop in Variety comes in. In his latest scoop, he got the top ten ratings by “average minute audience”  from the first week of March for both Amazon and Netflix across a range of originals and films. 

We can use these weekly snapshots to evaluate our previous estimates. Because if the top ten had multiple shows in the high 8 digits of viewership, then obviously way more people are tuning in nightly than *just* 5.5 million per night. And since I unveiled this article, well you know the math doesn’t add up. First, here are Nielsen/Variety’s charts, converted to Excel so I can “math” it.

IMAGE 7 - Raw Tables

If we add up each of the 30 Netflix data points, we get 34.8 million AMA. Which is way higher than my 5.5 million per night. But…this viewing was spread out over 7 days. Someone could have watched multiple series each night. On a streamer, there isn’t a constraint on viewing. Since this is 7 days of data, at a 5.5 million AMA we’d have expected about 38.8 million. That’s pretty close to the 34.8 we actually had. This is why overall I think my methodology is pretty accurate.

But I have some huge caveats.

First, this is seven days of around the clock Netflix viewing. Which is way more than what Michael Schneider was tracking in his “top channels” run down which is strictly a primetime measurement. (8pm to 11pm) So if we’re trying to balance the books, we’d need to draw down the Netflix numbers to account for non-primetime viewing. Try as I might, I couldn’t find a good data source showing Netflix viewing by time of day.

Second, you could also point out that these 30 shows weren’t the only things available on Netflix. What about all their hundreds of other shows?

Good point. So here’s a table of the Netflix shows whose data we do know.

Image 8 - without additionsWhat should jump out at you right away? The logarithmic distribution of returns. In other words, in the content game, the winners aren’t just a pinch better than the others, but they are orders of magnitude bigger. We see that starkly here. Of just these 30 pieces of content, a plurality had less than 500K AMA and a majority had less than 1 million.

But we know that’s far from all the content Netflix has. They’re a machine churning out, according to Variety’s estimates 371 new TV series in 2019. That’s in addition to a hundred plus original films. 

Why does this matter? Well, I made my own estimate of the rest of Netflix’s viewership based on these trend lines. Here’s how that looks:

IMAGE 9 - with additions

In other words, even though Netflix has hundreds of other shows, they don’t really impact the ratings after the launch. Likely the majority of series launched on Netflix last year average a ratings-wise insignificant number of views. (Say 10-25K per week. Or less.) If you have 300 shows earning 10,000 views a week, that’s only a 3 million AMA. Which would bring the estimates above right in line.

In other words, after my sanity check, I think my nightly AMA number for Netflix looks pretty good. Arguably the primetime only numbers would bring it down—meaning I was too high—but the other not included shows would bring it back up. And likely still a majority of adults watch Netflix at primetime, regardless of anecdote about binge watching at all hours of the night.

So that’s my data estimate of the day. But what does it mean for Netflix? 

Next Time and My Data

Let me be honest: if you unleash me on a data set like this, I generate way more insights than just this one article. In my next article, I’ll run through some implications and provide a piece of strategic advice. 

Also, I built a fun Excel for this. It’s not super complicated and you could go get all the data yourself if you wanted. But like I’ve done a few times before, I’m going to give it away. The price? You have to subscribe to my newsletter at Substack. It goes out weekly if I don’t have a consulting assignment; once or twice a month if I do.

Email me from the email you subscribe to the newsletter with, and I’ll reply with the Excel. (Email is on the contact page.)

Most Important Story of the Week – 21 February 20: Rumors! Bob Iger and Apple TV+ Edition

Sometimes, you really don’t need to overthink your weekly column. Thank you, Disney, and really Bob Iger, for making this easy.

Most Important Story of the Week – Bob Iger Steps Down

Bob Iger stepped down from his role as CEO of Disney on Tuesday, but will remain as the company’s chairman of the board. What else do we know for sure?

– Iger said he’ll stay on in an active role to guide and manage content.
– His replacement, Bob Chapek, has had roles throughout Disney, from studios to merchandise to theme parks.
– Iger has long been speculated to want to retire, but kept staying on, first to see the 21st Century Fox Acquisition, and then to see the Disney+ launch.

Everything else is speculation. And there was plenty in the aftermath of this genuinely surprising news. The question for this column isn’t what happened or why or what fun rumor to promote, but what it means for the strategic landscape

The Entertainment CEO Hype Cycle

I occasionally write about CEO departures, but usually not as the most important story of the week. Why not? Well, frankly, most CEOs are “average”. Their company is moving along before they get there, and will mostly continue after they leavd. (Unless, of course, you’re a CEO reading this. I think you’re above average. Definitely. This is about all those other CEOs.)

This is especially true for lower level executives. For example, Discovery hired a new DTC boss from Hulu, Hulu promoted a new president, and CBS rearranged programming execs at All-Access, but neither will get a mention in my “other contenders” section down below. (Again, unless you’re a lower lever exec. You’re above average. Definitely. It’s all the other ones I’m talking about.)

To be clear, this isn’t because CEOs aren’t important. It’s more a comment that I don’t think anyone is really good at accurately judging who is good or not. Especially via the Hollywood trades. When a new head of a studio is hired, one or multiple trades/important papers (roughly, Variety, Hollywood Reporter, Deadline, NY Times, LA Times, Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal) writes a long in-depth article based around an interview with the executive. Their strengths are highlighted; their weaknesses minimized.

This makes sense. If you want to get Jen Salke to join your executive roundtable, you better talk her up right after she takes the job.

Then comes the downfall. Kevin Drum mentioned this on his blog a few weeks back and I’d call it the “candidate hype cycles”. UCLA political scientists have called this process in elections the “discover, scrutiny and decline” cycle. 

Image 1 - Hype Cycle

Well, the same thing happens with CEOs. They start, get tons of hype, and inevitably either fail or retire quietly. We could call it “hype, status quo and departure”. Like a politician, they have two paths at the end: If they get fired, you bury them; if they retire you celebrate their run.

Meanwhile, we never hear the bad things until they get fired or leave. For example, The Information revealed that Amazon hired Mike Hopkins was hired due to concerns about shows being late, over budget and, presumably, not that popular. Which would speak poorly of Salke, but again I’ve never seen a trade report that.

Every so often a CEO comes along though, who never loses the hype cycle. 

Value Over Replacement CEO

In the knowledge economy, the best workers aren’t just a little more valuable than their peers, but multiples better. The returns aren’t linear, but logarithmic. This applies to CEOs too; the best CEO isn’t just a little better than their peers, they are miles and miles better in terms of return on investment.

The best way to think about this, as I’ve written before, is the “Value over Replacement” concept from baseball and basketball. In basketball, this is LeBron James. His dominance is so much that singlehandedly he gave Miami and Cleveland championships and may do the same for the Lakers. As a result, he’s worth much more than any other player.

Let’s put this in a chart. Imagine every executive is ranked on a zero to 100 point scale. A fifty is the “average” employee or student or basketball player or CEO. The top is the 99th percentile employees, the one delivering outsized returns. The 1% are the folks who don’t just do average work, but actively damage your organization.

(And by the way, this is how I categorize every person I work/worked/could work with. At business school, since we did so many group projects, I was constantly scouting for who would help deliver outsized returns. Which made getting good grades easy. And yes this doesn’t apply to you if I worked with you. You were way above average. It’s about everyone else.)

This is how the chart would look. The percentiles are on the right; the returns on the left.

IMAGE 2 - VORCEO Chart

The question for Disney is…where is Bob Iger on that chart? Where is Bob Chapek?

The Disney Challenge

As I said above, I’m pretty brutally honest about where executives are on that “value over” chart and so often I’ve seen that when one executives gets replaced, despite all the internal worry, it usually ends up being about the same. So 95% of the time, say, if a CEO leaves a big company, since they were probably average, and their replacement will be average, everything will go on just the same. (Just usually paid more. See next section.)

Iger, was, though, firmly planted in the top 99%. Here’s Disney’s performance the last 20 years compared to the S&P 500. (He took over four years in to this chart.)

Image 3b DIS vs SP with Label

That’s an elite performance. And if like me you think stock performance isn’t the be-all-end-all, well, all the other narrative stuff from the acquisitions to the box office dominance to the pivot to streaming reinforces this. Iger was an elite CEO, which is a statement. Being top 1% of CEOs is supremely rare and valuable.

The challenge for Chapek is that no matter how good he is or isn’t, odds are he isn’t a 99% CEO. Just run the numbers: if we can’t predict how a CEO will turn out, then we have a “uniform distribution” meaning each outcome is equally likely. Therefore, Chapek has about a 1 in hundred chance matching or exceeding Iger’s performance. (That’s obviously why the board tried to cling to Iger for as long as possible.)

The Disney Nightmare Scenario

Does this mean the “end of Disney’s run”? Absolutely not. The situation Chapek is walking into is about as strong as you can get. Just being average means the company will be fine. If he’s slightly above average they’ll keep growing.

But every company has upside scenarios and downside scenarios, and the downside scenario feels a little more likely for me. If Chapek turns out to be worse than “average”, and there’s a fifty percent chance of that, then the company could regress.

But it could pair with four other potential risks:

– First, Lasseter turns out to be have been crucial for animation. (Like Frank G Wells was in the 1980s.) Arguably, since Iger moved Lasseter to Disney Animation, that side of the business rebounded. (Why might this not be true? Read Kim Master’s take here.) We’ll find out in about 1 to 2 years if this is true.
– Second, something happens to Kevin Feige. He runs the Marvel golden goose, If another company poached him, that would be “sub-optimal”.
– Third, streaming ins’t profitable and cord cutting accelerates. This your regular reminder that for all the value in parks and merchandise, uh, networks (specifically ESPN) actually powered Iger’s rise.

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– Fourth, the studios run out of creative energy on all the non-Marvel, Star Wars and animated films, having mostly coasted on remakes of classic Disney films. 

Those five risks could, to be clear, could not happen. And probably not all together.

But if I’m a Disney competitor, I’m happy with this news. I’d be optimistic that my studio/network/streamer has a chance to catch up to Disney. It’ll still be tough, but the chance is there.

Other Thoughts

– Is there another shoe to drop?
I have no idea. And based on all the reporting and speculation either way, I don’t think anyone knows anything. So your guess is as good as mine, so I’d guess status quo.

– What about the dual bosses structure?
I’m a little more concerned about this. Dual CEO structures are tricky. Sometimes a minor change like this can actually muck things up, more than the previous boss retiring and just exiting stage left. But we’ll see.

– Was Iger really that good?
Yes. I love hot takes as much as anyone. I’m one of the few folks who think that Plepler leaving HBO and then joining Apple could be the most overhyped stories of the year. But even I can’t with good conscious argue against Iger’s run.

That said, the context was also tremendous. While we rightfully praise Iger for his acquisitions, we sometimes forget that the real income driver in the 2000s was ESPN and it’s sky high sub-fee. (Look that chart just above!) Take that revenue/operating income from Iger and arguably he doesn’t have the cash for Marvel or Star Wars.

– If so many CEOs are average why do they get paid so much?
Bad oversight. Most corporate boards are fairly poor at actually identifying the value their CEOs generate. This is mostly to do with institutional structures. Even though they have average CEOs, they don’t realize it and pay them above average.

Data (?) of the Week – Apple TV+ Ratings?

In a few different conversations, I’ve been hearing that Apple TV+ is underperforming expectations. Honestly, even that isn’t strong enough. The ratings, the rumors imply, are so low that most observers wouldn’t actually believe it.

The challenge is to separate out the rumors that end up being completely false from those based on a nugget of truth. And fortunately, I spent some time doing this in a completely different field: military intelligence.

In intelligence, the hardest part is to manage “human intelligence”, meaning people. Specifically people who are usually betraying their country or allies and providing you information. The goal is to run a “source” who is well placed, so that they can provide a track record of accurate information. That builds trust.

Still, you only trust them so far. Even if one source tells you something, you always want to confirm it. Multiple sources is always better than one source. And ideally from multiple types of intelligence. So a good analyst pairs signals intelligence (tapping phones) with human intelligence (people telling you what is happening) with imagery and other analysis.

I trust the rumor mill in this case. And I wouldn’t pass this rumor on if I only had one source. Like I said, I’ve heard this in a few conversations and from folks I really trust. I know they’re hearing this from folks on the inside. (None of my sources come from Apple directly, in full disclosure.)

Still, that’s just human intelligence. Can we triangulate this? Sure. Take this “open source” intelligence from Bernstein Research via Bloomberg. According to their research, via analyzing Apple’s earnings report, fewer than 10% of eligible Apple customers signed up for Apple TV+, or about 10 million folks.

My rumor is about viewership specifically, but the two are correlated. If you only get 10 million folks to sign up in the first place, the available folks to watch the shows is just smaller. Similarly, if the content isn’t resonating or buzzy, then you won’t get folks to sign up. 

Moreover, the rumors I’m hearing are about recent viewership. As in since the new year started. The key driver there is, of the folks who signed up, how many hung around? Well, when in doubt, Google Trends…

IMAGE 5 -GTrend NFLX vs Dis vs ATV

In other words, this look at Google Trends implies that Apple TV+ has never quite had the brand resonance as either Netflix or Disney. Notably, this is just using search terms, which tells a slightly different story than this Google Trends look, by topic, which shows a Disney+ decline. Google Trends is just one measurement I use, and it can have some quirks that don’t capture the true underlying awareness.

For Apple TV+, I still think the name is clunky. Which may hurt it in Google searches. So let’s look for specific shows instead. In the rumors, I’m hearing that Apple is seeing a big decline since the launch. So look at this chart:

IMAGE 6 - G Trend without Mando

In other words, the decay is real. It’s a little slower than Netflix or Amazon series, because the weekly release still generates news stories when the series concludes, which you see in The Morning Show, but the decay is there. Worse, the new shows aren’t launching nearly as well as the initial batch and accompanying marketing spend.

And how do the Apple shows do compared to, say, The Mandalorian?

IMAGE 7 - G Trend with Mando

They disappear entirely.

This matches other metrics that are publicly available. Say what you will about IMDb and Rotten Tomatoes, but the volume of reviews actually is fairly predictive of viewership. Not everyone leaves a review, but more viewed shows tend to have more reviews. Which makes sense. You can see the decline in popularity in Apple shows recently in reviews too:

IMAGE 8 - Ratings Data

Here’s my whole table if you want to see the by show look:

IMAGE 9 Ratings TableMaybe Amazing Stories comes out in April and completely arrests this slide. But Apple will have to rely almost entirely on paid marketing to get the word out since usage of their app seems to be low. Moreover, the biggest challenge is just that Apple TV+ won’t have a lot of shows for the rest of the year, if the lack of announced shows is to be believed. Here’s that table converted to chart form:

IMAGE 9 Count of Shows by Year

And that’s assuming a lot of the renewed shows make it by the end of 2020, which I bet doesn’t happen.

What Does this Mean for Apple’s Plans?

This week Tim Cook repeated that he’s not in the business of renting content. Apple TV+ is originals. That’s the brand.

This strategy doesn’t make sense. Netflix and Amazon had tons of licensed content to keep folks engaged while they built out originals. Disney+, HBO Max and Peacock will have loads of library content as originals ramp. Apple TV+ has none of that. So Apple needs to either ramp originals much more quickly than they are…or they need to rent some TV shows.

Here’s the analogy I’d use. Say about 25,000 people per night tune into Apple TV+. Using Michael Schneider’s annual look at cable channels, that means Apple TV+ is the El Rey Network. Which is bad. 

Would you buy a phone for the El Rey Network? Probably not.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

A+E Networks signs a big licensing deal with Peacock

The definition of a conglomerate should be any firm so big you forget they own half of another big company. In this case, A&E Networks is a legitimate cable business, but Disney quietly owns half. Instead of licensing their highly viewed unscripted originals for Hulu, Peacock got the rights. This is another bold move for Peacock. They are leaning into broad content, which I respect. (The History content pairs well with Law and Order and Chicago series.) Meanwhile, Hulu seems increasingly falling into the prestige lane. This leaves a gap for Disney: they need a streaming service that’s broad, but not genre like Disney+. It should be Hulu, but they’re not making the moves for that.

Discovery May Launch a Streamer

Discovery had their earnings, which were overwhelmed by the surge of news about stock market declines. On the streaming side, they’re contemplating launching a streamer in the US later this year, while happy with their other efforts. So continue to monitor for now.

The 2019 Star Wars Business Report Part II – TV: Baby Yoda Saves Star Wars

Star Wars did so well in TV this year, that virtually everyone knew which character was the “symbol” for 2020: Baby Yoda!

We know Baby Yoda conquered the social landscape, but how does that translate to Lucasfilm/Disney’s bottom line? Well that’s my topic for today. If you missed it, read Part I for my methodology and the performance of Star Wars films. As I was writing “everything else” I decided that each business unit deserved its own article. It’ll make each article smaller and easier to read, while providing regular content for the site. 

We got a lot to cover, so like the Jawas escaping Sand People, we’ll move fairly quickly.

TV Series

Whether it’s only because of one adorable (non-CGI) character, or the authenticity of this latest series, or just drafting off of the popularity of Boba Fett among Star Wars fans, Disney’s new streaming service launched with one of the top new TV series of the year in The Mandalorian. As always, here’s the Google Trends data:

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Other research firms back up this popularity. Parrot Analytics awarded The Mandalorian its “most in-demand new series”. The service TV Time saw The Mandalorian surge in interest as well. So it’s popular. It’s a hit.

This is a big change to my model. I’d assumed a Star Wars TV series would do well. Sort of like the Marvel TV series for Netflix well: lots of doubles and triples, but no home runs. Instead The Mandalorian is a home run with a chance for a grand slam, if its second season sustains what season one pulled off. (Which is no small feat. Lots of great season ones fade quickly. The Black List. Gotham. Mr. Robot. The Man in the High Castle. The Handmaid’s Tale. Every Netflix Show that didn’t make it to season 4.)

So I have a few changes to my model then. (Here’s my article on TV from last time.) First, I increased the value of what I called “the Jon Favreau series”. I calculated the value of the series as a percent of the production budget because, for Lucasfilm, they are acting as a producer here. And this is what I think the series would be worth, roughly, on the open market. (As for their value to Disney+, I’ll discuss that in my last article in this series.) However, hits are still worth more, so in the event of a blockbuster TV hit, I tripled the imputed fee from 30% to 90%. (Meaning it went from 130% of the production budget to 190%.) Also, I lowered the number of episodes to 8, but kept it at a little more than $15 million per episode. (Which is the consensus cost.)

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As a result, here’s how the value of The Mandalorian changed from being a “hit” versus being just “another TV show”. 

Table 3 - Mandalorian

Are these numbers reasonable? Probably, with just a pinch towards the high end. As you can see, if you take my “high case” as a “revenue per sub”, I basically think it’s worth $11.40 per subscriber. Which on it’s own is huge, but more a function of how few subscribers Disney+ has right now.

The next change was moving the Obi-Wan series back a year. And this brings up the biggest risk for Disney, which is getting these TV series out on time. Frankly, The Mandalorian has done a great job at releasing a season 1 and having season 2 ready to go later this year, only 12 months a part. However, the Obi-Wan series recently switched showrunners and won’t be out until 2021 at the earliest. As a result, I moved back a few of the series.

The last change I tried to make was to move my “imputed license fee” model to an “attributed subscribers” model. But I utterly failed. Why?

Well, I just don’t know enough about Disney’s finances. I took a guess at “customer lifetime value” of Disney+ subscribers, but the pieces we don’t know are too huge to make it reliable. For instance, we have no data on the average number of months we expect a customer to subscribe because it hasn’t happened yet! I also have a guess on marketing expenses per subscriber, but it’s all a guess. (We know revenues were $4 billion in the last quarter, so assuming 20% marketing expense on that, and you have about $800 million. But even that could be low.) About the only thing we know is that the average revenue per subscriber is $5.50. 

Moreover, trying to attribute subscribers is nearly impossible. Because we don’t know how many folks actually watched the Mandalorian, let alone subscribe to it. Also, given that Disney+ is growing so much, it too tough to attribute subs to Mandalorian versus all the other content. Unlike HBO or Netflix, this is far from a mature service to judge.

The final change I did make was to eliminate my “low case” model. Frankly, I think Disney would really have hurt the Star Wars brand to release anything less than five TV series over the next decade or so as they launch Disney+.

As a result, here’s my current base case model:

Base

You can see how I value kids content as well, which is I only count it as a production cost. If the upside for kids TV series is selling merchandise—which is a simplification, but not entirely wrong—than I’ll calculate the upside in the “toys and merchandise” article.

KidsAnd the “high side” case:

High

Money from 2019 (most accurately, operating profit)

So the The Mandalorian is huge. What is that worth? Well, less than you think, especially compared to the films. If the feature films are Executor-class Super Star Destroyers, hit TV series are regular old Star Destroyers. Still huge, but look at the size of Super Star Destroyers!

Thus, in my model, The Mandalorian, in success, is about a $95.5 million dollar profit engine this year. Which pales in comparison to Rise of Skywalker, but that’s because films just have much higher upside in success, due to multiple revenue streams. Next year will be a bit higher, though, because I think Disney will monetize The Mandalorian in more non-toy ways, potentially even via home video. 

(What about potential Baby Yoda toy sales? That will be covered in the “licensing” section. And yeah, Disney didn’t have any available anyways!)

Long term impacts on the financial model and the 2012 deal

As for the future, I’m not ready to change my basic model going forward. Repeating huge TV hits is a tough business, and with the wrong showrunner, the Obi Wan TV series could be as middling as anything. Indeed, that series is cycling through showrunners. As a result, through 2021 we’ll still only have one Star Wars TV series. 

However, the upside case is now higher for TV. If the Lucasfilm folks can generate just a few more hits, than they’ll be able to drive subscribers to Disney+ and a lot of potential value. The key is getting more huge hits. Even though costs would stay about the same in both my base case and high case, the revenue could jump from $5.6 billion to say the $8 billion over 8 years. 

Brand Value

In this case, we can tell that The Mandalorian helped revive any lingering doubts Star Wars fans had about the direction of the franchise. The buzz around Baby Yoda led to countless articles singing his praises. As a result, if you take my critical acclaim chart, you get this:

Screen Shot 2020-02-13 at 12.10.23 PMLook at that! The Mandalorian is the most critically acclaimed of any Star Wars property. (With the caveat that since it isn’t global, the overall number of ratings is fairly low compared to the films.) If you want to know how to make Star Wars, this is it.

Recommendations

I didn’t have recommendations on the film side, but TV really did have one for me. And that recommendation is one person’s name: David Filoni.

He’s been the showrunner on every Star Wars animated projected and he executive produced The Mandalorian. I’m ready to give him a heaping doses of credit for The Mandalorian given that his animated series are fairly well regarded by the fandom too. In other words, if Disney is looking for their Greg Berlanti, this is it for Star Wars.

From an operational perspective, I do think they should ramp up to one Star Wars series per quarter. This seems crazy, but the universe is clearly big enough to support that many stories. Especially if one is a kids series and then you have three adult series and/or limited series filling out the gap.

(And I’ll repeat it until I die to wish it into existence, but if you want a killer limited series, turn the book series Tales from Mos Eisley Cantina into a series. You can thank me later.)

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