Tag: Viacom

Disney Has Almost Caught Up To Netflix in the Streaming Wars: Explaining the EntStrategyGuy’s US Paid Streaming Subscriber Estimates- Part I

(This is the last article in a three part series estimating how many US paid streaming subscribers there are in the US. Read the numbers here, and the second half of the explanation here.)

I’ve become a pinch frustrated with media folks who don’t differentiate between the US subscribers compared to global subscribers. Why? Because it violates the number one rule of data, which is to compare things “apples-to-apples”. Meaning, one should compare the most similar numbers to each other. 

Not to pick on them because they do great work, but the wonderful Axios Media Newsletter (which reaches a lot more folks than I do) was guilty of this this week:

IMAGE 1 Axios - Total Subscribers

That looks at Netflix’s global numbers to HBO Max’s US only numbers. That doesn’t make sense, does it? Meanwhile, it’s compares Prime Video customers, who get it for free, to those genuinely paying for Netflix. And Apple TV+ can’t make the list since we know nothing.

So, as I wrote yesterday, I stepped up to provide some estimates for each of the major streamer’s US subscriber totals:

Chart - Updated Totals not title

And the chart. (With some typos fixed from yesterday.)

Table Abbreviated

If yesterday is the data shot, today is the analysis chaser, describing the details of what I did and how. Which is just as important. If you read yesterday’s article, you’ll learn some statistics. If you read today’s—and yes it’s long—you’ll learn about what is driving these numbers.

We have a lot to get to over the next two days. Here’s the outline:

– The rules I used to estimate US subscribers.
– The confidence levels for each estimate.
– The explanation for each of the twelve major streamers.
– The reason for this deep dive. (Mainly the need for “apples-to-apples” comparisons.)
– Finally, a chart with the ranges for each streaming estimate.

(As a reminder, sign up for my newsletter to get all my writings and my favorite entertainment business picks from the last 2 weeks or so.)

The Rules

In a quest to get to “apples-to-apples”, I had to figure out what type of apples we were dealing with. Here are the ground rules, in rough order of priority:

– First, US only. Global subscribers will come later.
– Second, subscription was the key. Free or advertising-supported services from Youtube to Pluto TV didn’t make the cut.
– Third, the goal is “streaming”, but I added “premium” channels too. Because frankly, lots of folks subscribe to HBO, Showtime and Starz directly. Ignoring that provides less context than more. So the premium companies made the cut. The linear channels paid through a cable bundle did not.
– Fourth, the goal is to focus on who “would pay” for a service. In other words, for Apple and Amazon, to try to figure out who would pay for those services if they suddenly cost money.
– Fifth, I had to draw a line somewhere or I’d have too many subscription services. I decided to focus on “major” services, which I defined as 2 million customers and above.
– Sixth, some services are very cheap as well, so I’m assuming roughly a $5 per month price point as the cut off. Yes, there are tons of discounts that get applied, but this is a good starting point.

My Confidence in Each Prediction Explained

Last year when I calculated how much money Game of Thrones made for HBO (a lot!), I realized I was dealing with a few different types of information. And I needed some categories to describe them. So I came up with this:

IMAGE 2 - Confidence Table

A fact is something a company has confirmed in a specific report or statement. Or in some cases ratings numbers and what not. Those are numbers we can believe in. Leaks are also from companies, but usually anonymous. They are fine, but always be careful with leaks. Companies are very self-interested and their PR folks—who are still good people—will mislead you. Specifically, with data that reinforces how well they are doing and hides any bad news. (The definition of bias.)

Estimates are predictions I am confident in. Usually it means I’m taking a few specific numbers and applying good models to them.

A guess, on the other hand, is usually when I have to estimate too many things. At which point my confidence in the estimate starts dropping. Which doesn’t mean educated guesses are bad, just uncertain. (Magic numbers are briefly explained here.)

Analysis: How I Determined Each Number

Enough preamble to the meat of this article. In order of the table above. 

Netflix

While Netflix discloses a lot of information compared to its streaming peers, on its US numbers it has become frustratingly vague. At the start of this year, Netflix decided to split the world into four territories to better show how its business is doing globally. Which meant for years we knew US subscriber numbers, but now those were bundled with Canada. Fortunately, they provided three years of data. Here you go:

IMAGE 3 - Netflix Subs over Time

In other words, US customers are about 90.3% of the UCAN total. That means we can estimate fairly well the current US subscribers based on the UCAN number. About 66 million US subscribers. Even though these numbers are so tight we probably don’t need it, I made a range for the estimate, and call this my 90% confidence interval:

IMAGE 4 - Est US Subscribers

(If you’re wondering where these numbers come from, I collected every Netflix subscriber number from here to olden times for this article. An update is coming next week as my “visual of the week”.)

Disney

Disney isn’t one service, but three. Two of those services aren’t globally available, which means we know for certain how many US subscribers they have. (ESPN and Hulu.) 

What about Disney+? Well, we have our first tricky estimating process. To figure it out, I looked for some historical data. To start, here’s my historical growth chart:

IMAGE 5 - Chart Disney Subs

That helps, but not perfectly. The best way to estimate Disney+ subscribers is to use some correlated variable we do know, and assume the subscriber numbers are related to that. For example, if a country is 25% of the worlds population, then you assume they are 25% of the Disney+ subscriber total. The problem is that no one variable is perfectly correlated. You could use population, but some countries are wealthier than others. You could use GDP, but it doesn’t quite account for size. Broadband and mobile penetration are also potential options. Ultimately, I decided to compare all the countries by population.

Yet this has a big problem for Disney+. The big wild cards are India and Indonesia. While most of Western Europe and Japan have similar economies to the US, India does not. Fortunately, Disney leaked that they have 18.4 million or so (a quarter) of their subscribers from India. So that means we now have to parse out how many of the 55.3 million or so are from the US.

In this case, I looked at various populations of the countries Disney+ has entered, compared to the total size.

IMAGE 6 - Disney Population Numbers

In other words, if countries adopted Disney+ simply by population, Disney has 40% of the population, so would have about would have 22 million subscribers. That’s too low. When Disney first announced numbers in December of 2019, they’d have already been at 21 million subscribers using the population method. So did Disney+ only gain 1 million customers this year? With The Mandalorian season 2 and Hamilton? Probably not. So I made a sensitivity table, which netted me this:

IMAGE 7 Sensitivity Table

Looking at it, the 54% of non-Indian subscribers having Disney+ is the most likely number. Or better phrased, between 25-35 million of all Disney+ subscribers are in the US. Any lower or higher feels unrealistic. And yes, I wish I had a more scientific way of triangulating this. Frankly Disney has released so little US data, and the data they have released has so many confounding variables that it’s probably the best we can do.

(Also, for the first of several times this article, if you want to disagree, feel free to do so in the comments or on Twitter and explain why.)

About The Headline “Disney Has Almost Caught Up To Netflix in the Streaming Wars”

Yesterday, I also included the total unique subscribers by company, because I do think that is the best way to compare companies. (See the table above.) 

Logically, if Disney could get to 50 million Hulu subscribers and 50 million Disney+ subscribers, and each was paying $10 a month—and those are numbers that are only possible 3-5 years in the future—then it would be hard to say they aren’t “beating” Netflix, if Netflix stays at around 65 million subscribers, but at a say $16 price point.

To be clear, I’m not predicting that happening. But that scenario is one of the possible futures. The fact that Disney has nearly caught up to Netflix with its three streaming services in terms of customers matters since it’s just starting out, even if average revenue per user is lower right now. (And yes, I only counted the “bundle” customers once for my summary yesterday. I assumed that all the ESPN+ growth, 6.5 million customers, since Disney+ launched was due to the bundle, which is a conservative assumption.)

HBO

HBO releases US subscribers and the number that have turned on HBO Max, which they call activations. The number of folks who would subscribe to HBO Max (if linear HBO disappeared entirely) is somewhere between those two numbers.

I’ll defend my lumping premium subscribers with streamers now. Frankly, I’ve never understood the logic of not comparing HBO linear subscribers to Netflix subscribers. Yes, one is direct-to-consumer and the other is sold through MVPDs. But ultimately, the customer is what matters. And HBO customers are very loyal. If the bundle goes away tomorrow, some customers may not continue subscribing to HBO, but more will. (And still do, frankly. HBO passwords are as borrowed/shared as Netflix, especially when Game of Thrones was on.)

As for the range, it’s between the activations and the total subscribers. So I provided both numbers. I’ll take the top of that range as my estimate (for now), but you can choose somewhere in the middle.

(If you want more details on HBO subscribers over time, check out my visual of the week from a few weeks back.)

Viacom-CBS

If I was going to count all premium subscribers for HBO, it only made sense to do so for Showtime as well. Fortunately, Viacom-CBS has leaked quite a bit of details to the press over the years, and their financial report provides specific numbers fort total streaming subscribers. (For this project, I searched for every number I could find.) For example, in September, sources told Joe Flint of the Wall Street Journal that Showtime had 27 million total subscribers, including 7 million OTT. (That’s a very useful leak, if accurate.)

Meanwhile, in their latest earnings, Viacom CBS told us that between CBS All-Access and Showtime they have 17.9 million OTT subscribers. Assuming that ratio has held constant since the summer, then CBS All-Access has about 11 million subscribers. We can confidently estimate that. If you want an error range, since Viacom has said that subscribers are about evenly split between CBS All-Access and Showtime, the low would be 50% of the about 18 million subscribers and the high is the opposite end of that, or about 12.5 million subscribers.

However, unlike Disney, I didn’t try to disentangle ViacomCBS bundled customers at the company level. While Disney’s growth could easily be attributed to their bundle, it’s much less clear how many dual CBS All-Access and Showtime subscribers are out there.

Most Important Story of the Week – 21 Aug 20: The Apple/SuperCBS Bundle Arrives

The biggest story of the last two week’s is “Apple v Fortnite”. Yet, for the second week it hasn’t made this list. Like the AT&T-Warner Bros. merger or the Disney-Fox merger, this is a seismic event we can tell will change things in the moment. However, that “moment” will last months, not years. It is potentially the story of the year, and we’ll get to it. Just not today.

(As often happens, I wrote a couple thousand words on it. So I decided to save it for my “Intelligence Preparation of the Streaming Wars” series.)

In the meantime, let’s return to a favorite theme: bundles!

Most Important Story of the Week – The Viacom/CBS Bundle Launches on Apple

Apple is offering a new bundle of SuperCBS channels. (SuperCBS is my name for ViacomCBS.) Instead of paying $10 for CBS All-Access and $11 for Showtime, Apple is offering them together–if you subscribe to Apple TV+–for only $10. So get CBS All-Access and the tech giant will throw in Showtime for free.

(Apple is also exploring a “super-sized” bundle of TV, music, news, gaming and more, but will likely provide details in a few weeks.)

For those of us predicting a return to bundling (read me here, here or here), this move isn’t that surprising. The previous high point of bundling was Disney’s decision to bundle Disney+, Hulu and ESPN+ last fall in the United States. And then in their earnings call Disney announced plans to include Star/Hotstar as another bundle globally.

Let’s unpack the ramifications of the bundle. Why it exists. How this bundle happened. Why this bundle in particular. And why this bundle is NOT the future.

Why Bundle? Because The bundle is a Terrific Deal, for Customers and Companies.

That’s a controversial opinion, surely. (Especially on certain entertainment podcasts I listen to weekly.) 

But the math is fairly inescapable. For companies, getting into a maximum number of households is usually worth a slightly worse per subscriber cost. So if AMC–the channel–can be in 85% of households, each paying $1.50–that’s better than being in 10% of households each paying $10. Or take ESPN: right now nearly every cable household pays over $6 to get it. Yet, if everyone cut the cord, ESPN would struggle to get probably 25% of households for the same price, not to mention quadrupling the price. (Moreover, the additional subscriber has zero marginal costs, so maximizing it makes sense.)

Hence, bundles help companies maximize revenue. It’s a classic economics chart weighing prices to buyers and maximizing the value.

The lower prices also help customers. The criticism of the bundle was the simplistic complaint, “Everyone has 500 channels they can subscribe to, but they only watch 20.” The problem is no one watches the same 20 channels/shows/streamers. In cable times, a viewer might watch Friends on NBC, 60 Minutes on CBS, Sports Center on ESPN and NYPD Blues on ABC. But another viewer subs out History Channel for Sports Center. The bundle gives each customer the same low price. (In streaming, if you want to watch Stranger Things, The Handmaid’s Tale, The Mandalorian, The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel and Watchmen, you need a bundle of streamers.)

(What about how high prices are for the cable TV bundle? Well the problem there is the word “cable” not “bundle”. As local monopolies, cable providers for years had insurmountable barriers to entry, so they could raise prices without fear of cord cutting. Streaming is changing that.)

Thus, bundling is coming. But how?

How This Bundle Happened, Part 1: This is still a “Same-studio” bundle

This is fairly key, because it means the costs are fairly easy to allocate. The challenge comes when you try to get two different companies to bundle together. Then each has to ask the other who has the  more valuable channels and how they should split costs.

(Imagine a super bundle with Disney, Warner Media, Viacom CBS and NBC Universal in the same package. Now try to imagine the leadership of those companies trying to figure out how to allocate revenue. They’d probably kill each other before they settled. Ergo Hulu.)

That’s why Disney was the first “bundle”, because all the money ends up in the same place. Meaning it is up to Disney to decide how to allocate the value of the bundle and how to allocate investment and content and what not. The same thing is happening here, since CBS can decide how to attribute subscribe value between Showtime and CBS All-Access simply for accounting purposes.

How This Bundle Happened, Part 2: Apple is likely taking a big loss.

This math is fairly inescapable, and fascinating given that Apple is currently at loggerheads with Fortnite over the related issue of “platform tax”. Here’s the math for Apple offering Showtime and CBS All-Access separately:

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.02 AM

That’s a good deal for Apple, assuming lots of folks sign up for both. Now, here’s the same situation with the platform tax.

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.17 AM

Uh oh! Suddenly, this is a really bad deal for CBS All-Access. They lost half their revenue. So what’s the solution? Apple and ViacomCBS met somewhere in the middle. But a middle closer to ViacomCBS making money (since that’s their priority) and using customer acquisition into Apple TV+ to justify the costs.

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.36 AM

Notably, this is still a bad deal for Viacom CBS. They lose nearly a third of their value. So let’s run a final scenario, where Apple limits CBS losses to say 20%. 

Screen Shot 2020-08-21 at 10.18.44 AM

Now you could make a case for both sides. For Apple, they could tell themselves that losing $2 per month is worth it to bring people into the “Apple TV” ecosystem. (In this case, a device ecosystem. Terminology is important!) For Super CBS, they “only” need to add about 20% extra subscribers to make this deal worth it for a bundle. (Implying that the number of bundled subscribers exceeds the amount who subscribed to CBS All-Access and Showtime separately at the previous prices.)

However, there is even a world where Apple is paying the full-freight of $5 to CBS to keep them whole. Meaning they lose a whopping $60 per customer per year on this bundle. I don’t think that’s the case, but I can’t count it out either.

(The caveat that’s worth mentioning is that CBS has discounted CBS All-Access in lots of places. I get it free, for example, through a 24/7 sports subscription. So the $10 price may not be paid by anyone, sort of like how few folks pay full price for Hulu or Disney+.)

Why This Bundle Happened, Part 1: ViacomCBS Still Isn’t Owning the Customer Relationship.

The other big theme of both May and June has been that certain traditional studios have decided that owning the end-to-end customer relationship is very important. Which is absolutely correct! The rise of “direct-to-consumer” implies you’re going direct to the consumer. Which is what Disney, AT&T and Comcast now understand.

SuperCBS hasn’t learned that lesson yet. Clearly.

Instead of insisting that customers pay them directly, they’re letting Apple handle that. Instead of owning the user experience to collect data, they’re letting Apple collect that. Instead of controlling the customer relationship for marketing purposes, Apple gets that. This isn’t too surprising for CBS; they already let Amazon do all of that too! And Roku too!

Why This Bundle Happened, Part 2: CBS Can Offer a Good Bundle

Of the best content streamers, then, CBS was the best that also hasn’t learned the lesson of DTC. Seriously, check out Mike Raab’s lay out of the major players and look how much good stuff CBS owns:

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Thus, if Disney, HBO, Netflix and Peacock won’t play ball, then CBS is the best suitor available. Hence, it’s the first bundle on another digital video bundler. (DVB, explained here.)

The Future: More Deals, But Not Like This (vMVPD 2.0)

Do you remember the halcyon days when Youtube TV first launched? It was the most disruptive of disruptors in TV. Instead of paying $80 or $100 dollars for a cable subscription, Youtube only cost $35! That’s how you become a low cost distributor. 

That was only 3 years ago. Now the price has almost doubled to $65 per month.

What happened? Well, again, when customers buy a bundle, they want all the channels. (Again, no one watches the same 20 channels.) So Youtube had to keep adding channels to keep adding subscribers. Moreover, Youtube TV wasn’t going to offer old-fashioned “low entry price that later raises”, so they just pretended the price was very low.

Importantly, Youtube had zero cost advantage. Youtube was losing money on every subscriber to grab market share. This is why, when I saw plenty of analysts praise Youtube TV, I thought they were bonkers. If you let me lose $5 per subscriber, I can grab lots of market share. But I haven’t solved any problems. Or created any value.

I think some of that is definitely at play here. Apple hasn’t solved any pricing issues, they’re sacrificing short term revenue for long term subscriber acquisition. Which could be a good strategy–though anticompetitive–but it isn’t sustainable. It won’t be sustainable until Apple can prove that the sheer volume of customers it brings to the table exceeds the profits the streamers are losing. 

Hence, this current bundle is the “vMVPD 2.0” scenario. It’s a bundle, but we won’t know if it will work until Apple and CBS are pricing at cost. That will happen eventually, just not soon.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

Fortnite v Apple – The Fight Escalates

This week, in an effort to prove they aren’t using their size to crush smaller competitors, Apple is threatening to destroy Fortnite’s second business of making game engines in addition to destroying its current video game business. (The Unreal video game engine powers many, many video games.) In other words, if you don’t buy our coal, we’ll keep you off our train tracks. It’s a tactic pioneered by Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan and Gates. Now Tim Cook is employing it too.

As I said above, the ramifications for this fight will definitely impact the streaming business. But since we’ll have to follow this saga for years, I’ll save longer thoughts for a future article.

Theaters are Finally Reopening (and Some Films Too)

AMC Theaters is reopening this week at reduced capacity (30% I saw reported) and reduced prices on opening day (15 cents per ticket!). I actually think theaters will be able to match demand to supply since they’re at reduced capacity for the near term. The wild card, as always, is how the disease/containment progresses.

The other wild card is content, and we seem to have hit the moment where studios have decided to release movies regardless of theaters. So Unhinged made it to theaters. Bill and Ted is following. And then Tenet. Some will have PVOD/TVOD components.

Frankly, this makes sense and I think for a film like Tenet, folks would be willing to see it in theaters even if it’s weeks after its “release”. My logic is that Covid-19 has temporarily changed what it means to “release” a film. It’s not like consumer demand will decay if customers who want to see Tenet in theaters literally can’t because their home town theaters are closed. (And some will wait and avoid PVOD.) The studios will make less money than before, but more than if they had waited indefinitely. (And probably more than Disney will on Mulan.)

Boom in Video Games?

Video games are definitely having a lock down moment, though as things reopen, this will likely revert to lower levels, though probably not to the same level.

The question I can’t answer is this: How much of this is due to children?

It seems fairly key. Mainly because the “day job” of children has been the most disrupted. Instead of going to school, they spent April to June at home. Hence, a boom in video games and Netflix. (The latest Nielsen Audience report said Netflix had a rise in viewership that I partially attribute to kids.) Even with schools reopening, classes can run only from 1 to 3 hours, if the programs work at all. Which leaves a lot of time for kids to spend on entertainment.

I’ve seen some speculation that this will create a new generation of video game addicts. But will it? It’s not like kids just discovered gaming because they’re playing on their phones. Nintendos, Segas, Playstations and X-Boxes have always sucked down hours and hours of kids time. Usually it competed with school filling 6-8 hours a day. We’ll see.

Data of the Week – Amazon is “Doubling” Everywhere

If you go by the news, Amazon has “doubled’ their video performance. First, Amazon Video streaming doubled according to Amazon CFO Brian Olafsky. Then they leaked that their AVOD audience reach, through IMDb TV, has doubled as well to 40 million users.

Caveats abound. 

For Amazon Video, the good news is Olafsky said it was total hours that doubled. The bad news is we don’t know what it doubled to. 100% growth during lockdown is great, but what does that bring us to? Also, the caveat is this is global, not US, so it’s even harder to track where the growth came from.

The AVOD audience is even more suspect. When Amazon Advertising says “reach” is up, that could mean a dedicated video viewer, or an ad running on the background of some Amazon page the user can’t even see. (We call that “Facebooking” given their epic misdirection on the performance of their videos.) Moreover, Amazon was touting “integrations” which means partners are expanding Amazon’s reach, not IMDb TV by itself, which was the story I saw most reported. 

So Amazon Video–in all its forms–is doubling. But we should be pretty skeptical for what that means.

Lots of News with No News – Ron Meyer Leaves NBC Universal

The strange part of this sordid saga, as I see it, is that Meyer was still employed by NBC-Universal. The ultimate survivors, he transitioned through countless leadership changes as NBC/Universal was passed from GE to Vivendi to Comcast. Yet, the news of the last few months has barely included Meyer since all the energy is in streaming.

On Content Arms Dealers, Aggregation and the Perfect Bundle: What Is/Should Be ViacomCBS’ Competitive Advantage?

Let’s get right into Part II of my a quest to find SuperCBS’ competitive advantage. (Reminder: SuperCBS is my nickname for ViacomCBS.)

Competitive Advantage: Become a Content Arm’s Dealer

Why?

I’ll be honest, I didn’t come up with this on my own. I first read it on Twitter by Rich Greenfield. Then I heard it from Matt Belloni and Kim Masters on The Business. The logic goes, with 140,000 episodes of television and 3,600 movies, the combined ViacomCBS has the content people already need for their libraries. Moreover, they’ve been making TV and film for decades. So as new entrants like Amazon and Apple struggle to make good shows, CBS already knows how to do that. They boast 750 shows currently in production or ordered. 

Reading their press release announcing the merger makes one even more inclined to consider this position. They clearly think their advantage is content production. Most of the facts from above came from that announcement.

Upside?

Quantifying the upside here is fairly difficult because you need to separate how many shows SuperCBS will sell to its linear channels, its digital outlets and then other folks. Or what happens to their movie output deals. (For instance, Paramount is already making some films for Netflix.) Instead, the main opportunity is feeding the hunger for content from people like Apple, Amazon and Netflix. They’re buying lots of shows to air globally. It’s a sellers market. You should be able to make money off that.

However, as they grow, Netflix has pioneered the trend of controlling more and more of a show’s distribution. In return, the streamers like Netflix pay something like 130% of the production budget of a show to have its rights for 5-10 years. Except that Netflix then takes a 30% distribution fee, and can cancel a show at anytime, while keeping the rights in the near term. This means you essentially are selling your content for exactly what you make it for, which is a zero margin business.

Skepticism?

The reason that there is even a debate between “distribution versus content” (content is king!), is that everyone wants to be a distributor. The way you make money, the conventional wisdom goes, isn’t to be a content producer, but a distributor. As soon as the FCC relaxed rules on the amount of owned content aired on broadcast channels, all the broadcast channels went to majority self-produced content. As a result, many independent TV producers went out of business by the end of the 1990s

TV Value Chain

In the TV or movie value chain, the worst place to be (besides being a customer?) Is to be the producer in the middle. They’re squeezed on both ends. The creatives demand increasingly higher payments to work on the shows or films. (Creatives like JJ Abrams, Shonda Rhimes, Ryan Murphy or Benioff & Weiss are the rare commodities in this market.) Meanwhile, the distributors insist on huge margins for simply putting out your content. (The traditional film distribution “fee”, for example is 25-30%. The streamers have similar fees.)

Sure, the TV producer “owns” the content, but if they can’t sell it anywhere else, where does the extra money come from to pay for overhead, studio lots and, eventually, shareholders?

Worse, the biggest upside TV producers had is potentially disappearing. That was syndication revenue, which was a monster. Shows like Friends, The Simpsons and, now, The Big Bang Theory are worth billion dollar pay days. But it required making hundreds of shows to get those handful of hits that could be sold into syndication. (Netflix doesn’t let a lot of shows get that far anymore.) If the bundle falls apart, syndication goes too. Will streaming be as valuable as syndication? I’m skeptical long term.

Making matters even worse, companies like Netflix are moving to owning more of their shows, so they can keep these margins low. (Netflix can say, “Don’t like our deal? Well, we have Benioff & Weiss, why do we need you?”)

Future M&A Needed?

MGM and/or Lionsgate. 

If you’re selling content, having valuable libraries will only help you deliver on that value proposition. To go with the arms dealer analogy specifically, MGM is like adding a lot of AK-47s while Lionsgate is a few additional heavy tanks. MGM can bring you Gone With the Wind and The Wizard of Oz while Lionsgate has Twilight and The Hunger Games. Those aren’t bad additions to a streaming library!

Competitive Advantage: Become a Distributor

Why?

If I could choose anyone to be in the streaming wars to come, it would be the folks who are distributing the content. My working theory is these distributors will be the best positioned companies to thrive. These distributors are stepping between the “pipes” to become the new multi-channel provider. The people not just selling their own subscription streamer services, but taking 30% off every subscription they sell.

The best way to make money in entertainment? Not even distributor, but distributor of distributors, taking a percentage without doing the hard work of making TV shows. So Amazon, Apple, and Disney won’t just be people owning streaming platforms like Prime Video, Apple Plus and Hulu, but also selling HBO, CBS All-Access and Starz. And taking 30% from each “channel” they sell you. (But not Netflix. No one gets to resell them.)

Upside

My quick math is that if you can get to 30 million US subscribers, with an $80 monthly bill, and take 30% of that, well that’s a $8.5 billion dollar business. Add an international business with 50 million subscribers at $40 a month, and you’ve added $15 billion to your top line. Not bad.

The non-monetary upside is considerable too. If my theorizing is correct, the new carriage wars are going to be about distribution on the new distributors. (Article on that here.) Say Disney and CBS are having a tough negotiation over CBS All-Access on Hulu. Well, CBS is in an even stronger position if they can also threaten to drop Disney+ from their distribution platform then if they have to argue just on the merits of CBS All-Access (and Showtime). So if you’re a streamer, owning distribution makes it easier to negotiate with other distributors.

Skepticism?

Read More

What Is/Should Be SuperCBS’ Competitive Advantage?

Competitive advantage is tricky. In a nutshell, it’s a business’ unique attributes that give it an edge. If you don’t like that definition, here’s the Wikipedia article. I looked in my strategy textbook to find a simple definition—again, I’m standing on the shoulder of giant’s here—but couldn’t find a simple one sentence definition. Here’s the best quote, though it has some jargon:

IMAGE 1 - Strategy TextBook

Businesses have two challenges with this. First, having a “unique” capability is tough. Hence, most entertainment conglomerates for the last thirty years looked and operated mostly the same. (Start with a movie and TV studio, add a broadcast channel, then some cable channels, with failed forays into internet “stuff”.) Since it is tough, most companies don’t know or can’t express what their competitive advantage is.

In fact, one of my favorite “corporate America” stories is about competitive advantage and lack thereof. Fresh out of business school, I was participating in our business unit’s annual planning process. We were setting our plan for the upcoming year. When you learn using the “case study” method in b-school, well, 8 times out of ten it’s basically “competitive advantage” boot camp. You’re always studying the innovative companies who had a competitive advantage. Unless it’s the cautionary “failed business” case study, which meant they didn’t have a competitive advantage, and the company who did have one ran them out of business. (See Walmart and K-Mart.)

During this planning process, I foolishly asked, “Well, should we explain what our competitive advantage is?” The answer, was, “Uh, no. We don’t need to do that. We don’t need to have a competitive advantage to do our annual strategy.”

Fair enough! My boss was right. She didn’t really need a strategy to make an annual plan. We were going to spend lots of money making TV shows and movies regardless. What does strategy have to do with it? 

Not to mention, making annual plans is easy; doing strategy is really tough. It takes hard work and sometimes it requires admitting your strategy is either 1. bad or 2. non-existent. Moreover, even if you have a competitive advantage, it may not last, meaning you need to start all over again in a few years. Instead, most companies, leaders and groups just don’t talk about it. Maybe your corporate overlords or investors won’t notice you don’t actually have a strategy.

Keeping in mind most businesses don’t have a strategy, or they have a bad strategy, let’s ask:

What could be ViacomCBS’ competitive advantage?

This was the angle into SuperCBS that got me really excited last week. (Since ViacomCBS hurts my eyes to read, I’ve nicknamed them SuperCBS.) After digging deep into what “size” meant for my weekly column, I started musing on SuperCBS’ potential strategy. Mostly, I was dunking on their lack of a strategy. But as I reread the words, it felt a bit hollow.

It’s really easy to point at a company, find a bunch of different problems with their plans, and point out the flaws. If the company fails, I look smart, and can point at the column with a smug satisfaction. Even if they don’t fail, but merely fail to become the undisputed market leader than the column looks smart.

It’s much harder to look at that same company and imagine them as a beautiful strategic butterfly ready to emerge from the Porter’s Five Forces cocoon and fly into the world with a new competitive strategy that will help them acquire customers, grow marketshare and become an in class leader in entertainment. 

If I had to bet, I’d argue that 9 out of 10 entertainment companies–from telecoms to media to entertainment to tech–don’t really have a strategy. (The GAFA’s do, but subordinate business units may not.) This is the best bet to make for SuperCBS. But let’s pretend for the day that they really do have a strategy. I’ll start by listing the potential competitive advantages I see. I ended up with five. I’ll discuss the logic behind them, the potential upside and the skeptical viewpoint. As a bonus, I’ll recommend a merger or acquisition that could be needed to complete the strategy.

(Two cautions before we start. First, this is my “gut” analysis. I haven’t actually stacked all the options up with proposed financials, so I haven’t finished my thinking yet. And to that point since “strategy is numbers”, I’m going to throw a few in for every option, but these are pretty high level numbers. If I were doing an actual strategy, I’d demand a lot more rigor.)

Competitive Advantage: TV Advertising Oligopolist

Why? 

A fact in Brian Steinberg’s recent article really stuck with me: A combined CBS and Viacom could control up to 20% of TV advertising. This got me thinking that “advertising”  could be a capability that lays the basis of a new competitive advantage. This would pair well with Viacom’s recent acquisition of PlutoTV, an ad-supported video service. (Call that either an AVOD or FAST.) The logic here is, if you’re already great at selling advertising, lean into that capability and build it out. Become the ad-supported behemoth of the new TV landscape.

Upside? 

Well, if you’ve seen all the news articles where ad executives beg, plead and beseech Netflix to sell ads, you can tell they want to deliver Millennials advertising. Can CBS step into that role instead? Maybe. (Again, it’s a myth that CBS is only old people. It’s really popular with Millennials too. Even on the coasts!) So there is customer demand, and that will translate to advertising. Here are eMarketer’s estimates for digital and traditional TV advertising revenue:

In other words, SuperCBS currently has 20% of a $70 billion pie. (I found other similar estimates to eMarketers too.) But 40% would be even better! (Again, when thinking competitive, the goal isn’t a small slice, but the biggest slice.) And 40% of a $140 billion pie is even better. Of course, you know where this is going…

Skepticism?

Is the future of advertising digital or linear? Pretty clearly digital, and Google and Facebook have a tremendous head start, with Amazon as a third. Even if you just wanted digital video, Youtube is much farther ahead. (I’ve seen estimates ranging from Youtube owned $4 billion of digital video market in 2014 to $15 billion now, which is the highest estimate I saw. Though, I’m pretty skeptical they’re $15 billion of an alleged $17 billion pie…) 

I’d add even the ad-supported sphere will be extremely crowded and competitive. Roku is a well-placed competitor here. Or Hulu and ESPN+, depending on how many ads they keep selling. Plus, Amazon is getting into the game with IMDb TV and there are a bunch of other FASTs following them. 

Not to mention, you don’t start with ads, you start with customers, who you then sell ads against. The advantage of Netflix—and the reason Madison Avenue wants to work with them—is they already have 60 million subscribers in the US watching tons of TV. CBS All-Access hasn’t show it can deliver that yet. (Though PlutoTV is allegedly growing.)

Also, this is is a fairly US-centric approach, which limits the overall upside. Let’s pause on this last point. Does the strategy of entertainment conglomerates have to be global? Clearly Netflix and Amazon see global domination as a competitive advantage, but maybe by focusing on one country/region, smaller distributors can carve their own niches. I don’t know that I’d buy that, but I could see it.

Future M&A Needed?

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