Tag: Streaming

Is Disney Is Throwing Away Its Money Generating Machine? Thinking Critically About Deficit-Financed Business Units

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

An Introduction
Part I – Define the Battlefield
Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars
Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained
Aggreggedon: The Key Terrain of the Streaming Wars is Bundlin
The Flywheel Is a Lie! Distinguishing Between Ecosystems, Business Models, & Network Effects and How They All Impact the Streaming Wars

If Disney+ has done nothing else, it has given the Disneyphiles tons of extra documentaries to consume. Making of Disneyland here. Insights into props here. More behind the scenes here.

My wife and I have watched some of “The Imagineering Story” documentary and there was a tidbit in the first episode about Disneyland’s launch which has stuck with me:

Disneyland was profitable by the end of the first year.

To compare Disney to the company that led the introduction to last week’s article, if Amazon opens a “BezosLand” in Seattle, do you think it would make money in its first year? 

Heck no!

It would probably never make money. It would be created as a unique bonus for Prime subscribers who could attend for free. We would never find out how much money they make and if there were rumors BezosLand was losing billions every year, they’d leak to a few favorite journalists that the “data” makes it all up for them in selling more socks.

It feels quaint what Walt Disney did in the 1960s: He saw a way to create value—have amusement parks that were clean and cutting edge that emphasized decades old beloved characters—and when he launched it, he was quickly proven right. This is capitalism at its finest: for his bet he earned lots and lots of money. Shareholders still are benefitting from his foresight.

Far from being quaint, Walt Disney was actually on to something. For most companies making money is key. This is true even in the streaming wars. But we’ve lost sight of that fact because so many companies entering the streaming wars with plans to lose oodles of money doing so. 

This is part II of my three part exploration of “flywheels” in the streaming wars. Last time I defined my terms. Next time, I’ll use the principles of this article to look at a few other new streamers. Today, the lesson is all about why making money still matters, even in streaming. And Disney’s future is the case study.

Summary

– The best way to evaluate any business is still Net Present Value.
– Even in flywheels and deficit-financed business units, the goal is still the same: to invest money in net present value positive endeavors.
– The risk of a “flywheel” with a deficit-financed component is that you simply lose money, not start the flywheel spinning.
– Disney provides the case study in this: if streaming can’t/won’t make money, their flywheel of toys, parks and resorts won’t make up for it.
– Thesis: The best business model makes money at every point, not “flywheels” that lose money in one area to make money in others. This is actually the forgotten lesson of Walt Disney.

A Reminder about Net Present Value

Fortunately, the key to evaluating flywheels is the same as the key to evaluating all businesses: 

Net Present Value

Or NPV. The short hand for calculating “net present value of the discounted future cash flows”. That’s a finance-y way of saying that a company should invest in businesses that promise to make money. Again, we’re talking Finance 101 here. But it’s worth repeating because I’ve seen many businesses or ventures praised in the streaming world who likely won’t make money, even on a net present value basis. (They use narratives, not numbers. And strategy is numbers.)

Read my explainer for this concept here. (And no website can do it justice, you really should read your finance textbook to understand the details.) But for a reminder, since I use it a lot, 90% of NPV decisions look like this:

– You invest a lot of money at the start. (Capital expenditure)
– You slowly start to make some money. (Revenue)
– You still have some ongoing costs. (Cost of goods sold.)
– You subtract the two, and keep the remaining. (Profit)
– You take those future sums and account for the time value of money. (Discounting)

Since we’re talking Disney, here’s a look at my big series on how much they made from Star Wars toys:

IMAGE 2 - Discounted Star WarsThe problem I keep running into with streaming video is folks seem very willing to ignore these two core principles when evaluating the streaming wars. Most money losing/unknown streaming or digital video ventures are excused because frankly we don’t know. Since we don’t have the numbers—and it’s hard to calculate them—we use narratives instead.

If you take nothing away from this article, remember that even a flywheel can be evaluated on NPV terms. It’s components can, nee MUST!, be evaluated on NPV positive terms as well. Otherwise, companies run a huge risk.

“A License to Lose Money”: Explaining Deficit-Financed Business Units

Consider:

– Prime Video (money made unknown) isn’t around to make money, but to sell more socks, thus spoke Jeff Bezos.
– Apple TV+ (will spend $6 billion on content) isn’t around to make money, but to sell Apple devices and Apple Channels.
– AT&T (will spend at least $3 billion on HBO Max) isn’t around to make money, but to sell more cellular subscriptions.

In these cases, the explanation is that video is a means to an end. At extremes, defenders of the “lose money in media to make money elsewhere” even call it a “marketing expense”. 

It’s worth dwelling on the concept of “marketing expense” more. Because in the previous world—the old fashioned/traditional business world—it wasn’t like you could just label something as marketing and spend as much as you wanted on it. Indeed, marketing was always taken out of your operating profit. So the more you could trim marketing while keeping sales the same, the more you trimmed! That’s what advertising is the first thing to go in an economic downturn.

Despite the branding as marketing expenses, there is real money being spent on video. These are real products from real business units. Not simply “marketing”. We need a new name, which is why I’ve come up with:

Deficit-Financed Business Units.

DFBUs. Yes, I was in the Army so I acronymize everything. It’s worth unpacking the phrases to see why these definition makes so much sense. 

First, a venture is “deficit-financed” if the plan is to never make money on it. Or to make money, but so far in the future that current financing is still net present value negative. Thinking about this abstractly explains why. Say I offered you a billion dollars a year starting in 2050. The key is you have to pay me $20 billion now. Should you do it? Heck no! You could just invest that $20 billion and probably double it multiple times before 2050, making more than enough to pay yourself $1 billion per year.

That same scenario is a microcosm of “net present value”. Should Apple invest $20 billion right now to make $1 billion a year in 2050? Heck no! Just keep it in cash or cash equivalents. No matter if it is marketing.

Second, I like business unit because it really distinguishes between streaming video companies  and a marketing expense. Plopping down several million dollars for a Super Bowl ad could be a net present value negative decision. (And should be evaluated in those terms.) But we should distinguish from genuine efforts at marketing versus creating brand news businesses, that in most other contexts would need to make money. 

The Riskiness of DFBUs: You Don’t Make Actually Make Money on the Flywheel 

My worry for companies and investors is that they don’t insist on looking at these business ventures with an NPV lens. As a result, DFBUs become a license to lose money for big tech companies. They may even grab market share—that’s certainly the case with all of them—but that doesn’t mean they actually make money.

That license usually has a justifciation, though. If we lose money on this part of a flywheel, can it make more money elsewhere? In other words, the key question is:

Can Deficit-Financed Business Units Turn a Flywheel?

This is really the supposition that has fueled the rise of streaming video. If you have a true flywheel or ecosystem, getting more customers in will help cause it to spin. That’s expressly Jeff Bezos’ logic. Apple’s too. AT&T even.

The answer? Maybe. It depends on the flywheel.

My thesis is that they can, but they are risky and hence rare. Losing money is easy for a business to do. Allowing someone to lose money means they will. It makes their thinking sloppy. Moreover, it’s easy to get the tradeoffs slightly wrong, and you deficit-financed business unit just becomes a money losing hole.

And I think I can illustrate this with Disney. If you’ve been following me on social, you’ll know that my household has been into Disney’s Inside Out recently. Which is appropriate to call back to, for this scene:

That’s how I’d describe DFBUs, they’re shortcuts that should be labeled danger. The current danger-disguised-shortcut facing Disney is losing money on streaming (Disney+, ESPN+ and Hulu.) to make it on extra toy sales. The rationales I’ve seen justifying Disney’s move into streaming reinforce this money losing narrative. I’ve seen the same arguments used by the tech conglomerates trotted out for the House of Mouse. For example, I’ve seen Disney’s streaming efforts explained as…

– They’ll lose money on streaming to get folks into the “ecosystem” of theme parks and toys.
– Disney has a flywheel and streaming video will bring more subscribers into the flywheel.
– Disney should disrupt the theatrical business model to own the customer relationship in streaming. 

So all the buzz words. Of course, since strategy is numbers, the question isn’t what narrative you employ to justify losing money, but whether or not the investment will make it up in the long run. So let’s quantify—for what I think is the first time on the internet—the actual numbers behind those narratives.

The Messy Financials of Disney

One of the first explanations for Disney’s push into streaming was so it could “sell more toys”, just like Jeff Bezos sells more socks. But take a gander at this Hollywood Reporter image I love trotting out:

IMAGE 3 - THR Disney 2018

Toys—from here on “consumer products”—is a small, small part of Disney’s overall operating margin, isn’t it?

Let’s dig deeper. I approach a company’s financials like a hostile witness on the stand. What are they trying to hide? What don’t they want me to know?

For Disney, I looked at their financials going back to 2009. And a huge red flag jumps out, which should be a clue for the quality of the toy business:

Read More

Most Important Story of the Week – 29 May 20: All the Complications of the AT&T and Amazon Show Down

Since May kicked off, I’ve been back to writing two articles per week and have had my highest traffic month since launch. So thank you to all the readers and supporters. If you want to stay on top of all my writings, the best method is to either subscribe to my newsletter (at Substack) or through the WordPress application.

Meanwhile, onto one of the more fascinating stories of the year…

Most Important Story of the Week – HBO Max and Amazon Stare Down

Well, HBO Max launched.

If you’re comparing hype, it feels way less substantial than Disney+. Or even Apple TV+. But that’s to be expected. Disney+ was a brand new thing by one of the most powerful brands in America; HBO Max is a retread of a brand most people already know. Meanwhile, while Warner Bros has always had big films and series, but they aren’t associated with their parent company.

Since the HBO Max that launched this week is mostly the service promised last fall, I’m going to focus on the issue we’re all obsessed with: 

HBO Max didn’t launch on Amazon’s devices.

Technically, Roku devices too. But Amazon is the fascinating topic to me, since their negotiating position isn’t just about devices, it’s also about operating systems, content rights, and profit sharing. Let’s try to explain why this negotiating is too contentious, and so critical for AT&T to get right.

The Issue: Operating System vs Device

The core issue of the streaming wars is who gets to aggregate content and who gets to bundle that aggregated content. The aggregators are the streamers, in this case. Think Disney+. HBO Max. Netflix. Prime Video. Previously, they were the linear channels. And formerly ESPN, Disney Channel and HBO.

Bundlers figure out a way to offer access to streamers. In some cases, this is via device. Fire TV. Roku. Apple TV. Sometimes this is via an operating system. Like Apple Channels and Prime Video Channels. Maybe Hulu and Youtube in the future. Formerly, this was the MVPDs like Comcast, DirecTV and Spectrum.

Notice that Amazon has both a device and an operating system.

The trouble is their operating system is a lot like their streaming service. Specifically, if you subscribe to HBO through Prime Video channels, you can access your content via the Prime Video application. This way a customer using Amazon Channels can seamlessly go from Prime Video shows like The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel to Game of Thrones and The Sopranos. Honestly, you couldn’t tell the difference between where the content comes from.

From Amazon’s perspective, if HBO is already included in channels, then so should HBO Max. They signed a deal several years back to make this happen, so why not continue since every other HBO customer (mostly) gets HBO Max with HBO?

Because AT&T learned enough over the last few years to know what matters when launching a streamer. When HBO was mostly a cash play, Amazon was found money. Since HBO was also a key piece to Amazon Channels–clearly their biggest seller– Warner Bro negotiated fairly beneficial deal terms. The partnership worked, as Amazon felt free to leak that 5 million folks subscribe to HBO through their Channels program.

The difference between distributing on Fire TV devices and within Amazon Channels–and the fact that Amazon bundled those discussions together–basically shows how much AT&T stands to lose.

The Key Negotiating Deal Points

  1. User Experience – This issue more than any is what AT&T wants to control. Prime Video has been around for years, and it still gets the most “blah” reviews as a streaming platform. When AT&T sends its content to Prime Video–as it has to for the Channels program–it essentially gives up control for how it will be branded and leveraged. Try as you might to negotiate this, it’s really hard to manage as a third party. Especially a deal point like, “Make your service more user friendly.”

I would add, the other piece is building value in the eyes of customers. If a customer has to go to HBO Max’s application every day, they learn to value the content on that experience. In someone else’s streaming service that just doesn’t happen. It devalues the HBO brand overall. 

  1. Pricing – I haven’t negotiated these type of deals in a few years, but if terms are roughly similar to then, which I believe they are, there is a big monetary difference between a channels revenue split–which is a monthly recurring payment–and a device “bounty” where the device owner gets a one-time payment for signing up new customers. The latter is an enticement to have the device owner market your platform; the former is a deal tax primarily. But they work out to dramatically different financial outcomes for a streamer. A 30% fee in perpetuity can be awfully expensive.

But that’s not all the revenue Amazon wants…

  1. Advertising – This issue came up with Disney+’s negotiations as Amazon wants a cut of advertising revenue from the apps on its platform. On the one hand, this is bonkers as Amazon will have very little to do with creating value from those ads. On the other hand, in the old MVPD world, cable channels shared advertising time with MVPD operators. (That’s how local ads made it on old school cable networks.) Given that AT&T has dreams to launch an ad-supported version of HBO Max, this is likely a huge sticking point.
  2. Content – Andrew Rosen thinks a big hold up is that Amazon wants Warner Media content for IMDb TV’s FAST service. I’m not sure AT&T would ever consent to this, but not long after Disney+’s deal was closed the same group licensed Disney-owned shows to IMDb TV. Consider the market power that when AT&T is trying to negotiate for a device deal for its streamer, Amazon is essentially demanding that some of the content for that service wind up on a competing streamer. Such is Amazon’s market power, that a deal term could be forcing a studio to sell it content. (As I wrote on Twitter, the echoes to Standard Oil are remarkable.)

 

  1. Data – AT&T also wants the customer data. If you don’t control the user experience, you don’t control the data either. They basically go hand in hand. For as much as I love data–look, it was the first theme of this website–I do think “data” has been a bit overhyped in the business sphere. Data is an asset, but it isn’t actually cash. It is something that can generate more cash, but only if you use it properly. Still since it goes hand-in-hand with user experience, they’re tied together.

The Major Streamers Don’t Allow Bundling

That’s really the issue for AT&T. Netflix, Hulu/Disney+ and now HBO Max see themselves as bigger than just content in someone else’s streaming application. Heck, even Prime Video content isn’t available in Apple Channels!

And when you think about it, the ask by Amazon is kind of crazy. It’s not just asking to sell rights to HBO’s content, it’s asking for that content to essentially be bundled with the rest of its content. Which seems a lot more like a retransmission issue than simply allowing an application on your operating system. The best tweet which summarized this for me came from The Verge’s Julia Alexander:

Screen Shot 2020-05-29 at 12.18.15 PM

Exactly. Thus, the whole debate is fairly simple: AT&T considers itself a major player. And won’t allow itself to be bundled. 

Who is right?

First off, no one is right or wrong. The worst thing in the world is to pretend like negotiations between two businesses are about fairness or justice. Or that the needs/wants of customers matter. (If you want the needs of customers taken into account, government regulation is your only hope. And entertainment should be heavily regulated!)

Still, who is more right in holding to their position in this negotiation? AT&T.

When in doubt, ask who is creating value. AT&T has decades of valuable content, is spending billions making more and will have to spend hundreds of millions more to market that content. In other words, they’re doing all the work to launch a streamer. Amazon is a gatekeeper asking for a fee/toll/rent to allow it’s application on its platform. 

Not to mention AT&T bears most of the risk, unlike Amazon. To maximize that investment, they need to distribute and own that customer relationship. So they’re right to hold, and it will be fascinating to see who blinks first. 

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

A few other stories filtered in over the last week that competed for the top spot. A few were generally interesting, but just couldn’t compete with the HBO Max drama.

DAZN Shops Itself

A report from the Financial Times says that sports streamer DAZN is looking to raise money, which could mean anything from selling itself to finding a strategic partner to simply selling equity. Of all the newly launched streamers, DAZN has the toughest road to travel. Sports rights are extremely expensive, meaning they cost almost as much as the value they bring in. As much as I’d like an “indie” sports streamer to survive, DAZN needs cash to compete with the tech giants of the world.

Quibi Programming Strategy Reset

Less than two months in and Quibi is already revamping its programming line up. The plan is to focus more on what is working, which is apparently content that appeals to older, female viewers

Is this too aggressive of a pivot? Maybe. This is the perennial problem with data driving content decisions. Quibi is looking at what is working on their platform, and using that to make future content decisions.

But does that make sense? If your two best shows happened to appeal to that demographic, then it will make it look like that’s your best customer demographic. If you use that data to make more decisions, then you’ll no doubt appeal more and more to older, female viewers.

Do you see how this is a self-reinforcing algorithm? And how that can limit your potential audience.

Want to see how this applies to Netflix? Well, they too made originals, but they also put originals on the top of their home screen. This drove usage, because anything on the top screen gets clicks. But then Netflix made more originals using that data, in a self-reinforcing loop. Hence, why some of Netflix’s content feels so similar or appealing to the same demographics.

Disney World and Universal Studios Plan Summer Openings

July 15th is the planned date for Disney World to reopen at half capacity with tons of restrictions. Universal presented plans as well. This is both expected and seemingly on track for the next stage. My tentative prediction is that as thinks open up, folks will return to old habits and behaviors quicker than currently anticipated. If testing continues to ramp up, we could find this surprisingly normal looking.

Peacock Originals Slate on July 15th

When NBC released their plans for Peacock, my initial reaction was Peacock wants to be the most broadcast network of the streamers. This review of Peacock on Bloomberg essentially describes that as the mission statement. And this made me happy because, in full disclosure, I think broadly popular content has mostly been missing from the streaming wold.

As Peacock prepares its first set of originals for July 15th launch, are we getting a broadly appealing set of shows, or are we getting another rebound of peak-TV/prestige content? Looking at the list of shows–a Brave New World remake, a David Schwimmer comedy and an international thriller–I’m worried it’s more of the latter. However, they do have Psych 2 special. So we’ll see.

Data of the Week – Nielsen Top 100 Broadcast TV Shows

Twice a year, Michael Schneider uses Nielsen data to look at the top shows and then networks for the previous TV season or year. Here’s the 2019 season edition, which feels so bizarre in today’s coronavirus times. I’m mainly looking at it for the next set of shows to come to streaming channels. Look for 9-1-1 to one day get a pay day on streaming.

Entertainment Strategy Guy Update – Apple Content Moves

Apple Snags the New Scorsese Film from Paramount…

This could have been my story of the week, but for HBO Max launching. Dollar wise, it’s relatively small. Just $200 million or so among friends. 

But not with Netflix? What went wrong!!!

Likely the price tag and performance of The Irishman scared off Netflix. As I wrote in multiple outlets last December, Netflix doesn’t have the monetization methods to get a return on $300 million budget films. (That’s what I expect Netflix ended up paying for The Irishman.) Toss in all the controversy about theaters, maybe some DiCaprio nervousness about back end, and I think Apple TV+ with Paramount theatrical was the logical choice.

Is this good for Apple TV+? Sure. It will get a ton of new subscribers to check them out. Without a library, though, how long will they stay? Speaking of…

…and Fraggle Rock from Henson Company

Bloomberg reported last week that Apple was looking at licensing library content. Well, their first “big” purchase is Fraggle Rock’s library to complement an upcoming reboot. Then there was controversy in the entertainment journalism press about whether Apple had changed strategies or not. (Which would directly contradict my column from last week.) Apple PR went to multiple outlets to leak that “No, no, nothing has changed.”

My guess is both scenarios are true. If Apple can’t find a library to buy, they’ll say their strategy hasn’t changed. If they do? Then they’ll happily announce it.

Meanwhile, is Fraggle Rock a game changer? I doubt it. Kids need lots of content to go through. Almost more so than adults. Frankly, Apple TV+ doesn’t have it.

Most Important Story of the Week – 21 February 20: Rumors! Bob Iger and Apple TV+ Edition

Sometimes, you really don’t need to overthink your weekly column. Thank you, Disney, and really Bob Iger, for making this easy.

Most Important Story of the Week – Bob Iger Steps Down

Bob Iger stepped down from his role as CEO of Disney on Tuesday, but will remain as the company’s chairman of the board. What else do we know for sure?

– Iger said he’ll stay on in an active role to guide and manage content.
– His replacement, Bob Chapek, has had roles throughout Disney, from studios to merchandise to theme parks.
– Iger has long been speculated to want to retire, but kept staying on, first to see the 21st Century Fox Acquisition, and then to see the Disney+ launch.

Everything else is speculation. And there was plenty in the aftermath of this genuinely surprising news. The question for this column isn’t what happened or why or what fun rumor to promote, but what it means for the strategic landscape

The Entertainment CEO Hype Cycle

I occasionally write about CEO departures, but usually not as the most important story of the week. Why not? Well, frankly, most CEOs are “average”. Their company is moving along before they get there, and will mostly continue after they leavd. (Unless, of course, you’re a CEO reading this. I think you’re above average. Definitely. This is about all those other CEOs.)

This is especially true for lower level executives. For example, Discovery hired a new DTC boss from Hulu, Hulu promoted a new president, and CBS rearranged programming execs at All-Access, but neither will get a mention in my “other contenders” section down below. (Again, unless you’re a lower lever exec. You’re above average. Definitely. It’s all the other ones I’m talking about.)

To be clear, this isn’t because CEOs aren’t important. It’s more a comment that I don’t think anyone is really good at accurately judging who is good or not. Especially via the Hollywood trades. When a new head of a studio is hired, one or multiple trades/important papers (roughly, Variety, Hollywood Reporter, Deadline, NY Times, LA Times, Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal) writes a long in-depth article based around an interview with the executive. Their strengths are highlighted; their weaknesses minimized.

This makes sense. If you want to get Jen Salke to join your executive roundtable, you better talk her up right after she takes the job.

Then comes the downfall. Kevin Drum mentioned this on his blog a few weeks back and I’d call it the “candidate hype cycles”. UCLA political scientists have called this process in elections the “discover, scrutiny and decline” cycle. 

Image 1 - Hype Cycle

Well, the same thing happens with CEOs. They start, get tons of hype, and inevitably either fail or retire quietly. We could call it “hype, status quo and departure”. Like a politician, they have two paths at the end: If they get fired, you bury them; if they retire you celebrate their run.

Meanwhile, we never hear the bad things until they get fired or leave. For example, The Information revealed that Amazon hired Mike Hopkins was hired due to concerns about shows being late, over budget and, presumably, not that popular. Which would speak poorly of Salke, but again I’ve never seen a trade report that.

Every so often a CEO comes along though, who never loses the hype cycle. 

Value Over Replacement CEO

In the knowledge economy, the best workers aren’t just a little more valuable than their peers, but multiples better. The returns aren’t linear, but logarithmic. This applies to CEOs too; the best CEO isn’t just a little better than their peers, they are miles and miles better in terms of return on investment.

The best way to think about this, as I’ve written before, is the “Value over Replacement” concept from baseball and basketball. In basketball, this is LeBron James. His dominance is so much that singlehandedly he gave Miami and Cleveland championships and may do the same for the Lakers. As a result, he’s worth much more than any other player.

Let’s put this in a chart. Imagine every executive is ranked on a zero to 100 point scale. A fifty is the “average” employee or student or basketball player or CEO. The top is the 99th percentile employees, the one delivering outsized returns. The 1% are the folks who don’t just do average work, but actively damage your organization.

(And by the way, this is how I categorize every person I work/worked/could work with. At business school, since we did so many group projects, I was constantly scouting for who would help deliver outsized returns. Which made getting good grades easy. And yes this doesn’t apply to you if I worked with you. You were way above average. It’s about everyone else.)

This is how the chart would look. The percentiles are on the right; the returns on the left.

IMAGE 2 - VORCEO Chart

The question for Disney is…where is Bob Iger on that chart? Where is Bob Chapek?

The Disney Challenge

As I said above, I’m pretty brutally honest about where executives are on that “value over” chart and so often I’ve seen that when one executives gets replaced, despite all the internal worry, it usually ends up being about the same. So 95% of the time, say, if a CEO leaves a big company, since they were probably average, and their replacement will be average, everything will go on just the same. (Just usually paid more. See next section.)

Iger, was, though, firmly planted in the top 99%. Here’s Disney’s performance the last 20 years compared to the S&P 500. (He took over four years in to this chart.)

Image 3b DIS vs SP with Label

That’s an elite performance. And if like me you think stock performance isn’t the be-all-end-all, well, all the other narrative stuff from the acquisitions to the box office dominance to the pivot to streaming reinforces this. Iger was an elite CEO, which is a statement. Being top 1% of CEOs is supremely rare and valuable.

The challenge for Chapek is that no matter how good he is or isn’t, odds are he isn’t a 99% CEO. Just run the numbers: if we can’t predict how a CEO will turn out, then we have a “uniform distribution” meaning each outcome is equally likely. Therefore, Chapek has about a 1 in hundred chance matching or exceeding Iger’s performance. (That’s obviously why the board tried to cling to Iger for as long as possible.)

The Disney Nightmare Scenario

Does this mean the “end of Disney’s run”? Absolutely not. The situation Chapek is walking into is about as strong as you can get. Just being average means the company will be fine. If he’s slightly above average they’ll keep growing.

But every company has upside scenarios and downside scenarios, and the downside scenario feels a little more likely for me. If Chapek turns out to be worse than “average”, and there’s a fifty percent chance of that, then the company could regress.

But it could pair with four other potential risks:

– First, Lasseter turns out to be have been crucial for animation. (Like Frank G Wells was in the 1980s.) Arguably, since Iger moved Lasseter to Disney Animation, that side of the business rebounded. (Why might this not be true? Read Kim Master’s take here.) We’ll find out in about 1 to 2 years if this is true.
– Second, something happens to Kevin Feige. He runs the Marvel golden goose, If another company poached him, that would be “sub-optimal”.
– Third, streaming ins’t profitable and cord cutting accelerates. This your regular reminder that for all the value in parks and merchandise, uh, networks (specifically ESPN) actually powered Iger’s rise.

Screen Shot 2019-07-15 at 12.46.29 PM

– Fourth, the studios run out of creative energy on all the non-Marvel, Star Wars and animated films, having mostly coasted on remakes of classic Disney films. 

Those five risks could, to be clear, could not happen. And probably not all together.

But if I’m a Disney competitor, I’m happy with this news. I’d be optimistic that my studio/network/streamer has a chance to catch up to Disney. It’ll still be tough, but the chance is there.

Other Thoughts

– Is there another shoe to drop?
I have no idea. And based on all the reporting and speculation either way, I don’t think anyone knows anything. So your guess is as good as mine, so I’d guess status quo.

– What about the dual bosses structure?
I’m a little more concerned about this. Dual CEO structures are tricky. Sometimes a minor change like this can actually muck things up, more than the previous boss retiring and just exiting stage left. But we’ll see.

– Was Iger really that good?
Yes. I love hot takes as much as anyone. I’m one of the few folks who think that Plepler leaving HBO and then joining Apple could be the most overhyped stories of the year. But even I can’t with good conscious argue against Iger’s run.

That said, the context was also tremendous. While we rightfully praise Iger for his acquisitions, we sometimes forget that the real income driver in the 2000s was ESPN and it’s sky high sub-fee. (Look that chart just above!) Take that revenue/operating income from Iger and arguably he doesn’t have the cash for Marvel or Star Wars.

– If so many CEOs are average why do they get paid so much?
Bad oversight. Most corporate boards are fairly poor at actually identifying the value their CEOs generate. This is mostly to do with institutional structures. Even though they have average CEOs, they don’t realize it and pay them above average.

Data (?) of the Week – Apple TV+ Ratings?

In a few different conversations, I’ve been hearing that Apple TV+ is underperforming expectations. Honestly, even that isn’t strong enough. The ratings, the rumors imply, are so low that most observers wouldn’t actually believe it.

The challenge is to separate out the rumors that end up being completely false from those based on a nugget of truth. And fortunately, I spent some time doing this in a completely different field: military intelligence.

In intelligence, the hardest part is to manage “human intelligence”, meaning people. Specifically people who are usually betraying their country or allies and providing you information. The goal is to run a “source” who is well placed, so that they can provide a track record of accurate information. That builds trust.

Still, you only trust them so far. Even if one source tells you something, you always want to confirm it. Multiple sources is always better than one source. And ideally from multiple types of intelligence. So a good analyst pairs signals intelligence (tapping phones) with human intelligence (people telling you what is happening) with imagery and other analysis.

I trust the rumor mill in this case. And I wouldn’t pass this rumor on if I only had one source. Like I said, I’ve heard this in a few conversations and from folks I really trust. I know they’re hearing this from folks on the inside. (None of my sources come from Apple directly, in full disclosure.)

Still, that’s just human intelligence. Can we triangulate this? Sure. Take this “open source” intelligence from Bernstein Research via Bloomberg. According to their research, via analyzing Apple’s earnings report, fewer than 10% of eligible Apple customers signed up for Apple TV+, or about 10 million folks.

My rumor is about viewership specifically, but the two are correlated. If you only get 10 million folks to sign up in the first place, the available folks to watch the shows is just smaller. Similarly, if the content isn’t resonating or buzzy, then you won’t get folks to sign up. 

Moreover, the rumors I’m hearing are about recent viewership. As in since the new year started. The key driver there is, of the folks who signed up, how many hung around? Well, when in doubt, Google Trends…

IMAGE 5 -GTrend NFLX vs Dis vs ATV

In other words, this look at Google Trends implies that Apple TV+ has never quite had the brand resonance as either Netflix or Disney. Notably, this is just using search terms, which tells a slightly different story than this Google Trends look, by topic, which shows a Disney+ decline. Google Trends is just one measurement I use, and it can have some quirks that don’t capture the true underlying awareness.

For Apple TV+, I still think the name is clunky. Which may hurt it in Google searches. So let’s look for specific shows instead. In the rumors, I’m hearing that Apple is seeing a big decline since the launch. So look at this chart:

IMAGE 6 - G Trend without Mando

In other words, the decay is real. It’s a little slower than Netflix or Amazon series, because the weekly release still generates news stories when the series concludes, which you see in The Morning Show, but the decay is there. Worse, the new shows aren’t launching nearly as well as the initial batch and accompanying marketing spend.

And how do the Apple shows do compared to, say, The Mandalorian?

IMAGE 7 - G Trend with Mando

They disappear entirely.

This matches other metrics that are publicly available. Say what you will about IMDb and Rotten Tomatoes, but the volume of reviews actually is fairly predictive of viewership. Not everyone leaves a review, but more viewed shows tend to have more reviews. Which makes sense. You can see the decline in popularity in Apple shows recently in reviews too:

IMAGE 8 - Ratings Data

Here’s my whole table if you want to see the by show look:

IMAGE 9 Ratings TableMaybe Amazing Stories comes out in April and completely arrests this slide. But Apple will have to rely almost entirely on paid marketing to get the word out since usage of their app seems to be low. Moreover, the biggest challenge is just that Apple TV+ won’t have a lot of shows for the rest of the year, if the lack of announced shows is to be believed. Here’s that table converted to chart form:

IMAGE 9 Count of Shows by Year

And that’s assuming a lot of the renewed shows make it by the end of 2020, which I bet doesn’t happen.

What Does this Mean for Apple’s Plans?

This week Tim Cook repeated that he’s not in the business of renting content. Apple TV+ is originals. That’s the brand.

This strategy doesn’t make sense. Netflix and Amazon had tons of licensed content to keep folks engaged while they built out originals. Disney+, HBO Max and Peacock will have loads of library content as originals ramp. Apple TV+ has none of that. So Apple needs to either ramp originals much more quickly than they are…or they need to rent some TV shows.

Here’s the analogy I’d use. Say about 25,000 people per night tune into Apple TV+. Using Michael Schneider’s annual look at cable channels, that means Apple TV+ is the El Rey Network. Which is bad. 

Would you buy a phone for the El Rey Network? Probably not.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

A+E Networks signs a big licensing deal with Peacock

The definition of a conglomerate should be any firm so big you forget they own half of another big company. In this case, A&E Networks is a legitimate cable business, but Disney quietly owns half. Instead of licensing their highly viewed unscripted originals for Hulu, Peacock got the rights. This is another bold move for Peacock. They are leaning into broad content, which I respect. (The History content pairs well with Law and Order and Chicago series.) Meanwhile, Hulu seems increasingly falling into the prestige lane. This leaves a gap for Disney: they need a streaming service that’s broad, but not genre like Disney+. It should be Hulu, but they’re not making the moves for that.

Discovery May Launch a Streamer

Discovery had their earnings, which were overwhelmed by the surge of news about stock market declines. On the streaming side, they’re contemplating launching a streamer in the US later this year, while happy with their other efforts. So continue to monitor for now.

Most Important Story of the Week – 17 January 20: The Optimistic and Pessimistic Strategy Cases for Peacock

With that, the final major entrant of the streaming wars has called their shot. (Besides SuperCBS. Is holding on to CBS All-Access and Showtime really their entire plan?) So we didn’t have to go very far to find our…

Most Important Story of the Week – Peacock Announces Their Plan

Investor day presentations are the ultimate in needing to see through the flash for the substance. In data, it’s all about “signal versus noise”. In presentations, the noise is deliberate. It’s designed to confuse, overwhelm and mislead to get you to invest, support or buy. (Which is why I think most biz presentations internally should be in black and white. Let ideas stand on their own merits, not the quality of powerpointing.)

From that angle, I’d put Comcast-NBC-Universal’s Peacock debut above HBO Max and Apple TV+, but still lagging Disney+ (who knocked everyone’s socks off). They leaned into the “30 Rock” angle, which is smart branding. This is all the more reason we need to wear our skeptical glasses to look for what NBC-Universal didn’t tell us, or what Comcast overhyped.

Overall, my gut take is more bullish than when I first heard of “Peacock”, with some huge lingering caveats. Reading my draft today, I found the positives more compelling than negatives, which surprised me. I’ll dive into this area in three parts: The upside case, the downside case, and implications for (selected) competitors.

The Upside/Bull/Optimistic Case for Peacock

Strategy: Zigging while others zag means becoming the “broadcast streamer”

By the time Peacock is fully launched–while April is the target date, it won’t go national until July–it will be the last streaming platform to the party. NBC’s logic seems to be, if you’re late to the party, be free. 

Not a bad plan!

Then that way all the already spent wallets still have room. Since broadcast has always been “free”, you just pay with your time, there is some justification in saying, “We’re the broadcast platform of streaming.” I’ve always felt that NBC-Universal had the most broadly appealing cable channel offering. They have sports, news, dramas, comedies, and reality. Now it’s all coming to one platform.

Really, the way to look at this isn’t that Peacock is a slow follow of Netflix, but a fast follow of Pluto/Tumi/Xumo. Since I think those companies really do fill a customer need, I like the idea. Moreover, they have a differentiator, as they themselves pointed out, Peacock is essentially the premium FAST

Screen Shot 2020-01-17 at 1.18.25 PMWhile I respect the “zig while others zag” approach to business, it doesn’t work if you don’t have a strategy. My initial take is Comcast has a strategy here.

Customer Targeting: Latinx viewers

A natural part of business analysis is to assume everyone is like you. Avoid this temptation. In entertainment, this means I, for example, have huge blind spots in international viewership. This even applies to the US, where I lag in coverage on Spanish language programming. Comcast has owned Telemundo for a bit now, so they don’t have this blindspot:

Screen Shot 2020-01-17 at 11.42.07 AMCredit to Peacock for seeing this customer need and serving this demographic. (Netflix does serve this too, and entered Latin America very early on.) The “Spanish Language Streaming Wars” are probably worth a deep dive article.

Company: A surprising willingness to be innovative.

Consider this an extension of the “zigging while others zag”, but I had a genuine worry that Peacock would end up as another clone of Disney+, Netflix, Prime Video and HBO Max. (Mostly the same product and similar content profiles.) 

Except Peacock is definitely trying out a few new things, which shows a commitment to change we don’t usually see. Specifically, the “live channels” approach, which only furthers the “fast follow of PlutoTV” thesis. If you know what you want to watch, the UX will have on-demand video. But for everyone else–or the folks who just want something on in the background–Peacock will have live/streaming channels. Will this work? Maybe, maybe not, but at least it shows some innovation. (For example, nothing in the Disney+ launch was innovative to that platform, just more streamlined than Netflix.)

Content: Pretty darn strong, especially in TV.

Peacock helpfully provided a list of the shows they plan to air. (Probably not an exhaustive list.) And it’s pretty strong. I’m as impressed as I was during the HBO Max roll out. (Also credit to NBC PR for making the document available and hence easy on journalists to absorb.) Here are some specific content pieces I think will be strengths:

The USA Network Shows: This is the bread and butter that built Bonnie Hammer’s career–former head of NBC Universal Cable Productions, she now runs content for all NBC Universal–so naturally a lot of these shows will be on Peacock including Suits, Covert Affairs, Monk and Psych. It remains to be seen if they are “exclusive” digitally, but still a good slate. USA Network is historically underrated because it’s popular in middle America, not one the coasts.

The big broadcast shows: Everyone knows about The Office, but everything from Cheers to Brooklyn 99 to Frasier to Everybody Loves Raymond to Two and a Half Men will be on Peacock. That’s a hefty dose of rewatchable series. And lots of rewatchable procedurals in Law & Order and Chicago series.

Bravo/E! tentpoles: One of the strengths of NBC-Universal, I’ve always felt, is that they have a broad reach of channels to draw content from, for example, the unscripted reality space. At first, I didn’t see these shows on the list, but a lot of them will be on Peacock. While most reality doesn’t fare well in bingeing long term, some does.

Late Night: Premiering their two Late Night shows in the primetime window is a great change for customers, such as myself who usually watch tape delayed. This feels smart to me, as more and more content gets time shifted.

Content: New categories to one streaming platform: sports and news.

HBO Max won’t have sports; Disney is pushing all sports to ESPN+, and Netflix refuses to even consider it. Thus, NBC steps into the breach and says their streaming platform will have sports in the same interface. (Amazon, of course, has toyed with sports for a while and offers a few sports channels as add-ons, plus one NFL game in America.) Thus, ignoring the type of content, NBC may have an advantage here. ESPN+ and DAZN remain separate apps which could decrease engagement, except for hardcore sports fans.

But we can’t ignore content forever. The question is whether English soccer, NHL and two weeks of Olympics every two years is enough to sustain sports. I don’t think so, which is why I think Comcast could be a buyer for additional sports rights, be it more NFL, NBA, MLB or college rights. (The great pitch too is that this is both digital and physical, keeping both windows. I think professional leagues are rightfully scared of a “digital only” approach that risks losing viewership/fan engagement overall.)

As for news, the best thing about news is it’s much cheaper than sports to get into. Plus, NBC has a fairly strong brand, if titled toward one side of the political aisle on cable.

The Downside/Bear/Pessimistic Case for Peacock

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If The Streaming Wars are a War…Then What War Are They?

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

An Introduction
Part I – Define the Battlefield
Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars
Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained
Aggreggedon: The Key Terrain of the Streaming Wars is Bundling

In November, a war started. 

Fortunately, in this war, no one will die and the biggest risk is to the stock price of ViacomCBS. If the biggest war our current generation is a streaming war, then the future isn’t all gloom and doom.

Since I’m writing an “intelligence preparation of the battlefield” for the streaming wars, it sort of begs the question: if the streaming wars are a war, what kind of war are they? To prove I’m not making a straw man here, here’s a host of articles asking about the streaming wars, but no one tying them to the best comparable war.

Screen Shot 2019-11-18 at 10.45.42 AM

Screen Shot 2019-11-18 at 10.46.25 AM

Screen Shot 2019-11-18 at 10.47.02 AM

Screen Shot 2019-11-18 at 10.48.09 AM

I was a history major and in the military. I should be able to figure this out. Let’s do it.

The Plan

1. Will rank wars from “easily discarded” to “Pretty darn close”. Scroll down to the bottom to find out the winner(s).

2. One imaginary war per section. 

3. I’m fairly “American” so all of these wars will inevitably come from that bias viewpoint.

Easily Discarded

The Civil War (and most other civil wars)

The case for the Civil War—and other civil wars—is that the entertainment industry itself is like a country riven by sectarian strife. The Confederates would be the traditional studio conglomerates and cable MVPDs clinging to their profits, while upstart streamers are, I guess, the Union? Trying to impede the new movement? Or maybe switch the two and the streamers are the Confederates splitting off from the Union? See, it doesn’t really work.

The Persian Gulf War or Franco-Prussian War

The problem with these wars is they were too darn quick, each lasting under a year. The streaming wars won’t end any time soon.

Alexander the Great, The Huns or The Khans Conquer the Known World

Every so often, some military leader just up and conquered most of the known world. Four years ago, we probably would have said Netflix was set up to do just this. Yet, unlike the foes who fell under Alexander, Attila and Genghis, the traditional studios may have a fighting chance to defend their territory.

Independence Day War

This is the fictional version of massively powerful invaders taking over everything, just this time with aliens. We only have two sides in this war, where the streaming wars are multi-polar, so we’ll need some better analogies.

Closer, but Key Flaws

Punic Wars

We have our first “traditional” war where two massive powers square off for domination of, literally, Western civilization. If Carthage had defeated Rome, all of human history may have taken a different course. (Instead of Rome, the Western World would have been centered around North Africa.) If the upstart tech streamers defeat the traditional entertainment conglomerates, the results for investors may be similarly momentous.

The challenge is we’re not dealing with two united sides in the streaming wars. Disney+ is fighting for control from HBO Max as much as they are fighting Netflix and Amazon. However, if I did make this analogy, it would mean Ted Sarandos is Hannibal and his elephants are Netflix originals powered by algorithms. Which could mean Bob Iger is Scipio Africanus, but now we’re going too far.

The French Revolution

Revolutions are like Civil Wars, just without sides or uniforms. Which make it tough to compare to our streaming wars. Sure, our combatants don’t wear uniforms—well, NBC Pages do, but you know what I mean—but you have to like the symbolism of revolution. Streamings isn’t a war, but a “digital revolution” in how we receive content! 

That has an ethos of “power to the people” who are rising up and saying, “No more high cable prices, I’m cutting the cord!” Of course, the data doesn’t support that—most Netflix subscribers have cable; most cord cutters pay well below costs for content—but it sounds good.

The Cold War

If I took points from The French Revolution for not wearing uniforms, well no one wore any uniforms in the Cold War either. This war was waged via proxies, spies and nuclear stock piles. All of which I have a tough time comparing to the streaming wars. In its favor, The Cold War was a global enterprise, with battlefields from a divided Germany to Vietnam to Latin America to China to Korea to Afghanistan. The streaming wars will match that scope.

War of the Ring (Lord of the Rings)

Human-Covenant War (Halo)

Lots of science fiction or fantasy works have two sides squaring off for all the marbles just like the Punic Wars:

Lord of The Rings. This is the literary equivalent of the Punic Wars. The humans battled Sauron for literal survival. And somehow a hobbit saved humanity.

Halo. This is the video game equivalent of the Punic Wars. The humans battled the Covenant for literal survival. And somehow a super-soldier saved humanity.

Pretty Darn Close

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The Great Irishman Challenge – How to Calculate the Straight-to-Streaming Film Profitability? Part II

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

On Monday, I explained the grand plan of Richard Rushfield and I plan to estimate the value of future Netflix films, starting with The Irishman, out earlier this month in limited theatrical release, but coming to the world’s biggest streamer next Wednesday. For traditionally released theatrical films with normal second windows, we have a robust model we can employ. 

What about streaming only? Well, that’s where it gets tricky.

A lot of folks do some back of the envelope math for this, and this can be a useful way to look at the problem of valuing streaming. Take Richard’s approach from a few weeks, back looking at Disney films that had been in theaters after 3 weeks (when Netflix pulls them from streaming). Of all the films, Disney earned roughly $310 million after 3 weeks of theatrical distribution. That’s the equivalent, Richard noted, of 4.3 million customers subscribing for 12 months on Disney+. If that number seems big, it should be, which shows the value of theatrical releases for studios.

Could we just take that approach and just apply it to The Irishman? Unfortunately, it has some flaws, mainly double counting subscribers. We need a different method to employ in “The Great Irishman Challenge”. Unlike traditionally released films, in steaming there are a few ways to value a given title’s performance, and each method has its own pros and cons, ranging from crippling to merely difficult to over come. 

Which I’ll (re)explain today, along with describing which ones are fine, which ones are incorrect, and which ones I prefer. At the end, I’ll explain which one we’re using.

Four Ways to Value Streaming Video and One Way NOT To

I’ve previously valued streaming video in two articles. First, back in January, I looked at Disney’s decision to keep theatrical windows for Star Wars films. Second, back in May, I explained streaming video models in order to put a value to HBO’s Game of Thrones. Today’s article will explain all the models from those two articles and add a new method I figured out how to calculate last month. (I had employed this method at a previous employer, but needed a key piece of data, as you’ll see.)

For each of these methods, I’m going to assume that Netflix had a feature film that was seen by 40 million subscribers in the first 28 days, divided evenly between the US and international. The film cost $115 to make and Netflix spent $50 million to market it. As for box office? Let’s say it had $120 million in the US and $80 million globally.

Sub-Optimal Method #1: Multiply Customers by Month by Price

This is the most common method of “back of the envelope” valuations I’ve seen for Netflix films. Usually, you hear folks do a version of this on podcasts, and I’ve seen it for Lord of The Rings on Amazon a few different times. Also, you could do “customer years” the way Richard did above. Here’s how the model for this approach would look:

IMAGE 7 By Viewers per Month

The problems? First, this is one-quarter of Netflix’s subscriber base attributed to a film in one month, which would probably be one-third of their active users. In other words, if Netflix had two other properties getting similar ratings, then every other film released that month would “financially” be a net loser. Second, this approach doesn’t account for “customer lifetime value”, which is really the better approach to valuing customers, versus the one month or 12 month view. Third, this approach doesn’t distinguish between films and TV series total hours of viewing (because it is just subscribers) so it’s tilted towards films, which are shorter and easier to finish.

Still, you can use this to ballpark how long a film would need to make its money back. It’s just sub-optimal because of double counting.

Sub-Optimal Method #2: Attribute Customers by Usage

One of the interesting ways to look at content is to think about what percentage of viewership a title makes up of all the viewership on your platform. If 10% of all hours watched are your platform are Friends, that has to mean something. The challenge is knowing how much people actually watch on Netflix. Netflix has helpfully told us twice (twice!) that they stream about 100 million hours daily in the United States. That means I can calculate potential usage of a TV series or film! That would look like this:

IMAGE 8 by Usage

The problems? First, getting the usage data is really tough. For films, we’d have a pretty easy time, but for TV series, we really don’t know how many people watch how many episodes. And getting usage numbers for Amazon or Hulu may be nearly impossible. Second, it also doesn’t factor in “customer lifetime value”. Third, it over-weights TV library content because there is just a lot more to watch, hence it’s “usage” is much higher, if you can get that viewership data. 

Still, you can use this to compare the usage of various shows and movies. It’s just sub-optimal because it’s tilted to shows with much longer runs.

The Bad Method: Multiplying Subscribers by Customer Lifetime Value

I’ve seen this mentioned in places, though running them down is tough on Twitter. So this may be a strawman, but it’s worth pointing out in case it hits anyone to do. Twice, I’ve criticized valuation methods because they don’t use customer lifetime value. You may be tempted, then to just take the number of subscribers and multiply by CLV instead. Like this:

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The Great Irishman Challenge – How to Calculate Feature Film Profitability? Part I

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

Chatting with the esteemed Richard Rushfield a few months back—we share sensibilities on Hollywood and the (hashtag) streaming wars—he pitched me a straight forward question. Could we build a model that can answer this deceptively simple challenge:

Did The Irishman make money for Netflix?

It’s a good question because the buzz for The Irishman from critics has been so positive. From what I can tell—based on “film Twitter” reactions—this would be the greatest film ever made by man, except that with this masterpiece Martin Scorsese has elevated from mere mortal to filmmaking demigod.

It would be cool to know if Netflix made any money off it.

Which is pretty tough. I mean, we don’t even know the ratings for Netflix films…how can we determine if they are profitable? It will be hard, but to quote a famous president, we write these articles not because they are easy, but because they are hard.

So you know what? Richard and I are taking the law into our own hands. Yeah, we paint houses, with financial models and data hacks! 

Later this week, in The Ankler newslettersubscribe here for the must read newsletter—Richard will explain our purpose, reasoning and goals to start this project early. Today, I’m going start explaining how we’ll develop a “Feature Film Profitability Score”. In previous articles, I’ve pretty much built the models needed for this analysis. Now, I’m just combining them with a little special sauce. 

Moreover, we’re doing all this ahead of time. We’re not judging The Irishman based on preconceived notions, but based on its actual performance. Moreover, once we build this capability, we can leverage it for future releases on many streaming platforms.

Here’s what today’s article will explain:

– The specific profitability score we’re creating.
– The four models of film release in the streaming era.
– A quick review of the traditional film model.
– Some notes on competing theatrical film models.

The “bottom line up front” is that combining my methods for valuing theatrically-released films and streaming video, we can make a model of success depending on either box office results or streaming popularity. While the last seems unknown, using some publicly available data—mainly Google Trends, potentially other third party survey data, or even Netflix datecdotes—we can make guesses on popularity.

The Goal: A “Feature Film Profitability Score”

At the end of the day, the goal is to keep this project simple. So Richard asked if I could boil this down to one (1!) number for every film—streaming or theatrical—that determines, “How profitable was this?”

Well, I failed, but I have this down to 2 numbers. Let me explain why. The obvious start is that a film can make a lot of money. This is good. Making nearly $2 billion dollars on Avengers: Endgame, Avatar, or Titanic matters. That’s a lot of money. 

But you don’t just want raw totals. If it costs $1 billion to make $1.5 billion, that’s not as good of a value for investors as making a film for $200 million that makes $700 million. Same raw total, but one required less up front capital. This is a quick definition of ROI, by the way. The Joker is currently the ROI golden child of the trades. The all-time ROI club is films such as Blair Witch, Paranormal Activity, or Saw that still fill the dreams of indie horror producers everywhere. 

If you wanted a quad chart of success, you could see this:

IMAGE 1 Profitability Quad ChartEssentially, films in the upper right are living the dream. Films in the lower right made a lot of money, but not a great return on investment. Films in the upper left made some money (they aren’t all negative), but had great ROI, meaning they were likely cheap but just not as big as some other films. And don’t be in the lower left—though most films are—which means you aren’t making money period. The majority of films in the current climate end up there. Combining these two numbers—with other metrics I’ll explain—brings us to this scorecard we’ll give The Irishman:

Ankler Image - Feature Film Profitability ScoreBeside the two promised numbers, I have four “breakeven numbers” for streaming films in particular. That’s because “breakeven” is easy for feature films (make more money than you cost), but with streaming the challenge is “what is making money”. I’ll explain those in the last section, but before we get there, we have to explain why I needed to build a new model in the first place.

The Four Models of Film Distribution in the Streaming Era

It’s no surprise that film distribution is changing. And commonly, we say, “Hey Netflix is skipping theaters.” That’s decision number one: to go to theaters or not; Netflix opts not; Amazon (formerly) and traditional studios opt in. Financial modeling wise, that’s an easy decision to calculate.

The tougher part to keep track of—and it is neglected in the media coverage—is the second window and beyond distribution plan. (I’m calling everything from home entertainment to Pay Per View to TVOD/EST to linear licensing to streaming licensing “second windows” for simplicity.) See, a new streamer like Apple is going to put its movies in theaters, but then—from what I understand—release it to Apple TV+ directly, exclusively and forever. Amazon too from now on. In other words, all these windows get condensed into this one:

IMAGE 3 - Traditional Second Window vs StreamingThe cool thing is that all the companies I think of make these two choices, meaning we have only need four models for films:

IMAGE 4 - Future of feature Film dist(Two quad charts in one article? Probably my favorite article of the year. Well, after this one.)

The one variable is Apple TV+. I believe they are doing streaming only, but haven’t confirmed yet. With that understanding, let’s build our models. I’ll need a model for theatrical and streaming only to evaluate the Irishman.

My “Traditional” Theatrical Model 

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Most Important Story of the Week – 15 November 19: Disney+ “Sparks Joy” in Customers. What Are the Business Ramifications?

Is content is king?

After this week, how could anyone doubt it? Disney+ showed what having the biggest movies of the last few decades can do for a streaming launch.

But that’s not all! Apple landed one of the biggest free agent producers in former HBO chief Richard Plepler, for a deal whose terms aren’t disclosed. Nor even his role. But we can’t look past Disney can we? Nope. In fact, we’re giving a triple shot of Disney: first, the strategic implications; second, the competitive ramificaitons; third, the numbers.

[Programming note: Starting next week, I’ll be on paternity leave for the birth of my child. I have some articles mostly finished to keep posting, but the weekly column will be on hold until December.]

Most Important Story of the Week – Disney+ and Its Customer Value Proposition

When in doubt, we should default back to the “value creation” model for every business. Is a company capturing value or creating it? 

Disney+ Value Creation Model

I’m going to use my personal example to get at where I see the customer value proposition here. Specifically why me—and apparently 10 million other folks—rushed to sign-up or log-in on day one. Marie Kondo—the famed personal organizer—has a simple test for whether or not you keep something in your house. When you look at it, “Does it spark joy?”

That’s how I personally felt about Disney+.

For once, every Disney film my daughter loves was in one location. Every Marvel and Star Wars film I love was there too. Along with hidden joys like the Swiss Family Robinson or The Journey of Natty Gann. Or the X-Men Animated Series! And Gargoyles! Seeing those films brought visions of how I will binge TV for the next few weeks. 

As I was scrolling through the interface—I didn’t have any troubles—Kondo’s phrase hit me, “Spark joy”. 

It’s fairly incredible a streaming video service can evoke that level of emotion. But that’s the best way to describe the initial experience. Caveat galore that this is just my anecdote. But to judge by my texts and social feeds, the majority of the Disney conversation was celebrating all these films that were previously divvied up between FX, USA, TNT, Starz, Netflix and DVDs into one easy location. By a few reports, some folks even stayed home from work for the launch. That’s the type of devotion only major sporting events or, um, Marvel/Star Wars movies can evoke. 

(Yes, plenty of people gave it an “eh” online too.) 

To put this into the “value creation model”, if my price is $4 a month, the difference between the amount I would pay and $4 is the “consumer surplus”. Right now, I have to imagine that for hardcore fans like me, even an HBO level price would probably make sense, if the shows stay at the quality of The Mandalorian. 

Critically for this analysis, just because the price is so low now doesn’t mean it will stay that way. Disney—like Netflix, Hulu and likely every streamer—is definitely underwater from a pricing perspective. Lots of folks locked in at $4 a month, and to produce even the new content will likely be more expensive than that. The key for Disney is figuring out how quickly they can make the price exceed costs. (Yes, as my big series of the year goes on, “An IPB of the Streaming Wars”, I’ll try to quantify this more exactly.)

Then the question is: at profitability, is Disney capturing value (just pricing below costs) or truly creating it? Given that Disney boosted my WTP for a streaming service, I’m leaning towards the latter. Moreover, Disney+ as a platform may drive some value beyond the access to its incredibly popular films. In other words, the whole of Disney+ may be greater than the sum of its parts. And these are valuable parts. (The biggest driver of entertainment WTP is simply having hit shows and movies.) 

So let’s explore the upside theories for Disney+’s value-added future. Since I’m never satisfied, I have some concerns too about some of their strategy.

Upside Theory: The Simpler User Interface – Decluttered

Let’s stay on Marie Kondo idea for a moment. Mary McNamara wrote an article in the LA Times not too long ago making the case that Netflix needs a Marie Kondo-style clean up. She’s not wrong. The reason—as emphasized by AT&T in their recent inventor presentation—is that it takes customers 7 minutes to find a show to watch. (Using a DVR, conversely, takes about 30 seconds…) Netflix is filled with lots and lots of shows and films, many of them “sub-optimal” from a customer perspective. Which makes finding shows difficult.

Well, the Disney+ app is made for McNamara (assuming she likes Disney movies!). Disney+ has a fairly limited interface—reminiscent of the HBO Go application—organized by the various content families. Within each section are the cream of the crop movies at the top, with the rest down below. In other words, the service doesn’t overwhelm you, and what is left will will “spark joy”. This is the best case for Disney+.

Downside Theory: The Nostalgia Factor Wears Off

Credit for this one goes to a Twitter conversation about how quickly “nostalgia” will wear off from the devoted fans. My answer is that in some cases, it never will. Those are the hardcore fans who go to D23. They aren’t enough, though, to build a media business.

For the rest, this is the biggest risk. Sure, I’ve had joy sparked at launch. How long does that last? How much does my daughter actually use the application? (We actually don’t let her watch alone on the iPad.) Especially for the older TV shows. Do they need more TV series to drive adult viewership, as I speculated here? I may find it cool to watch Duck Tales (1980s version), but do I actually binge the entire thing? Nostalgia may get folks in the door but a compelling offering will need new content to keep folks engaged.

Upside Theory: I Was Wrong about The Vault (It’s All Here)

Disney proved my August theory about missing films completely wrong. In the 11th hour they went out and got them all. Which is probably pricey, but helped the value proposition. Since they have all these movies, Disney+ would has something like 20% of the box office demand of the last decade on its service. That’s incredible compared to rival services. I was wrong and they have the entire vault for the most part. Here’s the box office films from the last four years:

image-5-disney-last-five-years.png

But this isn’t all good news. They likely had to pay huge amounts to other distributors to facilitate bringing all these films over. Will this immediate launch help pay that off? Absolutely, but they are deficit spending to make it happen.

Downside Theory: Why Did Disney+ Launch with Avengers Endgame?

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Aggreggedon: The Key Terrain of the Streaming Wars is Bundling

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

An Introduction
Part I – Define the Battlefield
Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars
Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained)

In war, what really matters on a map is the “key terrain”. The place on the map that if you control it, you have a much better chance at winning the upcoming battle or war. In Army lingo, terrain that control “affords a marked advantage”. Usually this is the high ground, but can be anything from a bridge to a national capitol, or airfield or even castle, in olden times.

So take a gander at our “map” of the video landscape from last week.

Image 7 Video Value WEb

As a commander, where do we want to control? What gives us a “marked advantage”? Well, I highlighted it in yellow. 

Last week, I “defined” the map and area of operations. Now we move onto the challenging tasking of describing that map. While I won’t use all of the Army’s frameworks, the concept of “key terrain” really does resonate with business. (Don’t worry, we’ll use other business analysis frameworks as well.)

Today, I’m going to highlight the key terrain the streaming wars will be fought over, and it’s not what most streaming observers and customers think it is. (If I had to guess, they’d call it subscribers.) I’ll start with the “BLUF”, then describe the situation in broad strokes, the reasons why digital bundlers are in a powerful position, the stark choice facing streamers, and finally the ramifications for all players in digital video. 

Bottom Line, Up Front – Digital Streaming Bundlers Are Best Positioned to Capture Value

While streamers started as the aggregators—Netflix inspired cord cutting by offering it’s own bundle—in the next five to ten years, the new digital video bundlers (who I call DVBs) will be in the best position to capture value (meaning profit and cash flow) in the video landscape. This means the winners will be folks like Amazon, Apple or Roku, and not Netflix, Disney, Comcast or AT&T.

The Situation: Netflix breaks the user experience monopoly of cable TV

In the past—meaning just ten years ago—the landscape was relatively simple for TV: you turned on a cable or satellite box, and scrolled. Netflix changed that all. Using its installed base of DVD subscribers, it started offering streaming video to its customers. Thus, when you sat down at your TV, you could decide, “Netflix or cable?” Netflix provided a second user experience to watch TV. Some people—though less than usually hyped—cancelled cable just to use Netflix and were dubbed “cord cutters”. 

Netflix was so successful, it inspired copycats from Amazon Prime to Apple TV+ to Disney+, who launched this week. Of course, the best place to watch TV isn’t from a computer screen, but from a living room TV. Devices were released to manage all these different streaming platforms, like smart TVs, Google Chromecast, Roku, Amazon Fire TV and Apple TV.

Which leads to my biggest theory of the landscape: customers will want to return to one operating system to manage all their television watching. Crucially, this may include bundling content. The cable companies didn’t just provide one user experience, they provided a bundle of cable channel at one fixed price. That bundle is dying.

But it’s returning. Instead of just channels, though, it will be a combination of virtual MVPDs (like Hulu Live TV, Youtube Live TV or AT&T TV), FASTs (like Pluto, STIRR, Xumi, and Tubo) and SVODs (like Netflix, Disney+, Hulu and Amazon Prime). The question is who mediates that experience. Someone will. And potentially to manage all their payments. And if you’re managing all the payments, you can bundle all the streamers/FASTs/vMVPDs into one monthly or annual price. A bundle.

The question is what do we call them? I’ve taken to the acronym DVB:

Digital Video Bundlers. 

I’ve colored this in yellow on my map because of how important I think it is. If an Amazon or Apple can own the customer relationship, they’ll own all the data and be best positioned to capture value from suppliers or competitors. Before I get into the ramifications, let me explain why I think this will happen.

Reasons Why The Bundle Will Return

The return of the bundle doesn’t just seem likely, but almost inevitable.

First, a clear customer value proposition – One user interface for all content.

Both Amazon and Apple have touted a clear proposition to users, which is the idea that you have one place to go to watch all your content. Meaning: if you log in, every subscription video service is in one location to easily search and browse without having to switch between apps. 

(In some cases, this vision is still aspirational, as opposed to realized. But it’s both companies’ dream user scenario.)

This makes sense from the cable example. The big revolution wrought by Netflix stemmed from the idea that suddenly customers now had to choose between two different ways to interact with the TV screen. Once that was severed, the cable bundle no longer offers it all. But neither did the “Netflix only” option, since you missed all traditional cable channels. Or other streamers like Hulu. This makes deciding what to watch just that much harder (and was to Netflix’s advantage).

Most smart TVs don’t offer a simple way to scan between streaming services. Instead, you decide what app to use and go to its platform to browse. Amazon and Apple want to incorporate everything into one user interface, so HBO content would sit next to Disney+ content which is next to CBS All-Access, for example. Meaning you can organize all your video in one place. Here’s Amazon Channels right now to show this vision:

Screen Shot 2019-11-14 at 10.38.31 AM.png

(By the way, Amazon and Apple both ruin this customer experience with a clear user experience fail. When customers surf TV and streaming, the expect everything to be watchable for free. Pay Per View, historically, was always limited to clearly defined section of the cable interface. In their efforts to have an accurate search, Amazon and Apple both surface results for their TVOD businesses, which customers despise. Loathe. Hate. Keep your “pay for it” shows and movies clearly separated from your TV experience.)

Second, a vague customer value proposition – One source for payments.

The second reason cited by folks selling subscriptions is it offers simplicity in payments. I’m less sold on this value proposition because people will likely still search for the best deals. But it’s a potential for some customers and has some value.

Third, a potential value proposition: the new bundle. (Which everyone is predicting)

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Introducing An Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

An Introduction
Part I – Define the Battlefield
Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars
Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained
Aggreggedon: The Key Terrain of the Streaming Wars is Bundling
The Flywheel is a Lie! Distinguishing Between Ecosystems, Business Models, & Network Effects and How They All Impact the Streaming Wars

As the streaming wars kick off this month, one question is dominating every conversation online, whether implicitly or explicitly:

Who will win?

As if this were a professional sports league. And only one studio gets the championship each year. Or even more extreme, like it is a war to be won. To steal a quote from Game of Thrones, “When you play the streaming wars, you win or you die.

Listen, it won’t be that extreme, Mike Raab explained on Medium last week. Or as Alan Wolk has said, no one will “kill” Netflix anytime soon.

But if you’re an executive, there are plenty of questions about the streaming wars you still need answered:

– What is the landscape of digital video, and how is your company positioned?
– Who are the strongest competitors in digital video?
– What are the biggest economic, technological and regulatory forces facing streaming?

If you can answer those questions, you can then answer the most important question for your company, business unit or team:

– What should we do to “win” the streaming wars?

Frankly, what I described above is how an intelligence officer in the United States Army would approach the battlefield in a war. Before a military commander can decide what to do, she needs to know what she is facing. That makes this analogy between real wars and the streaming wars fairly apt. The biggest change is we’ll change “win” to “create or capture value”.

So if we want to explain the streaming wars, we need someone versed in both intelligence planning for the military and the economics of streaming.

Fortunately, I’ve worn both intelligence officer and entertainment strategic planner hats in my life…

Introducing: The Entertainment Strategy Guy’s “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” for the Streaming Wars

As the streaming wars kick off in earnest, it seems like the perfect time to reflect more broadly on the streaming war, going a bit beyond my weekly columns and analysis. There have been some great layouts of the industry the last few months, but none that captured everything I’ve been seeing (with my own unique nee skeptical) take on the industry. 

So that’s my job for November. A lay out of the streaming video landscape. An explanation of the business of streaming. An intelligence briefing for the streaming wars. Since I used to make those for the US Army—a story for another time—that’s the framework I’ll use to organize my thinking.

In today’s article, I’ll explain what the IPB process is, and how I need to translate it to the streaming wars. Then, I’ll explain what I will and won’t cover in my first version of this.

What is an “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”?

In truly US Army fashion, an acronym fills in where regular words will do. So Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield becomes IPB.

An IPB is both a process completed by a staff (the IPB planning process) and the product(s) that results, usually a powerpoint presentation, but sometimes a document or brief. It also usually results in maps and graphics. It can also include a plan to collect further intelligence.

The strength of an IPB is the clear process. For a bit now, I’ve been collecting thoughts on specific companies and larger issues in the streaming wars, but I didn’t have an organizing framework. The IPB process provides that. It’s a great tool because it’s flexible enough to be used by intelligence officers from small battalions to gigantic corps managing entire theaters of war, in situations involving a pitched battle with tanks in the desert to combating insurgencies in the jungles. 

Or in our case, the streaming wars.

Which battlefield in the streaming wars?

Crucially, I need to pick which battlefield I’m analyzing. The streaming wars will be a global war, but I’m going to start by focusing on the United States. Frankly, each country probably deserves its own analysis because of its own unique situation. But we have to start somewhere and I think covering the entire globe will be too tough for one month. 

Moreover, even in the United States, I’ll be focusing on digital video. Meaning streamers, bundlers, aggregators and virtual MVPDs. But digitally distributed. Broadcast, cable, theaters and home entertainment are all interesting, but for a future analysis.

With that, let’s explain this tool. (By the by, if you want to download a copy yourself. The U.S. Army hosts them online.)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield…Explained

An IPB consists of four parts:

– Define the Battlefield (in jargon terms, “operational environment”)
– Describe the Battlefield
– Evaluate the Threat (formerly “enemy”)
– Determine Threat Courses of Action

Let’s define a few terms to unpack that simple four step process. In previous iterations, the operational environment was called the “battlefield”, but that wasn’t an acronym so the Army had to change it. We’re going to stick with “battlefield” since it is so much clearer of a phrase to use and “IPOE” just doesn’t sound right.

The battlefield is where your unit is conducting its operations. In a lot of was this is the military analogue to properly defining the problem. If you don’t know where you can and can’t operate, you can’t properly plan. It’s also particularly important in the military context because knowing where fellow military units are prevents friendly fire. (It’s a simple leap to make an analogy to a giant conglomerate with competing business units here.)

Once you know the battlefield, you then describe it. For the Army, this usually means three areas: terrain, weather and civilian considerations. Weather is just weather. But the terrain is what most Cold War military veterans were raised on, and it was summarized by the acronym OACOK: Obstacles, Avenues of Approach, Cover and Concealment, Observation, and Key Terrain. After the post 9/11 wars, when counter-insurgency became a thing again, the civilian part of the OE was described with ASCOPE or Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events. We’ll use different tools to describe the streaming war’s battlefield.

Next comes the threat. In the olden times, the Army called this the enemy. But then insurgencies were filled with political and non-violent actors, so this became “the threat”. During the evaluation part of IPB, you basically ask, “How dangerous are they? How many of them are there? What weapons do they have? What can they do?” When the Russians were the main bad guy, this meant a lot of maps with graphics describing effective firing ranges for artillery and machine guns and what not. For insurgencies, it meant capturing a lot more data about the relationships of society. The best word to capture this is “capabilities”.

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