Tag: OTT

Is Streaming Winner Take All? My Question of the Year for 2021

Well, give 2021 credit for trying to catch up with 2020 in terms of monumental new stories. This is absolutely one of the craziest weeks in my lifetime and I assume many of the folks who read. (Though, for historical hindsight, we tend to forget how absolutely chaotic the 1960s were, which featured the assassinations of at least 3 major political leaders. This isn’t to downplay the events of this week, but to emphasize that US democracy is always a fragile creature.)

The holidays tend to be slow for entertainment news, so we can take our time catching up on it. The biggest story–how did the big straight-to-streaming films perform?–I’ll handled over at Decider. In the meantime, let’s get reflective on the year that will be.

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Most Important Question of the Year – Is Streaming a Winner-Take-All Market?

In my first column last year, I said that 2020 would be defined by this question:

“What is the same and what is different between streaming and traditional distribution?”

Little did I know that we’d have a lot of things that were extremely different in 2020, namely a global pandemic that threatened to upend streaming and traditional media. (The biggest hypothesis is still that Covid-19 “changed everything”. I don’t really buy that; flashy world-altering headlines get the clicks but I’m a little skeptical about how much actually changed. We’ll see.)

My 2020 question and the lack of an answer shows a lot of the problem with articles predicting the future. It turns out that’s really hard! That’s why I like the approach of not predicting the future, but figuring out the most important question for the given year. And I have the question that I think 2021 will potentially answer. And if it does answer it, the consequences for entertainment are huge:

Is Streaming Video a “Winner-Take-All” Market?

Specifically, will one firm take a commanding lead? Will they capture a huge portion of the marketplace? Something like 70-90% of the value of the market? Contrariwise, do the streamers split the market—defined by subscribers, revenue, viewership, you name it—roughly evenly? Or does it land somewhere in-between? Say a few big winners with a lot of smaller players fighting for scraps?

Take the United States, which is probably the most mature market. As it stands, we’re in between the extremes of market consolidation. There is one clear dominant streamer, but it has by no means a monopoly on viewing. Specifically, Netflix has roughly 30-35% of the viewership depending who is measuring and when:

Comscore via Hedgeye by Type copy

This year, that number grew a pinch. Long term, that share of streaming viewership is declining. This massive viewership translates into the largest streamer by total subscribers:

chart-us-paid-streaming-subscribers

That said, Netflix got to develop such a dominant position because until 2019, Netflix only had two real rivals, Hulu and Prime Video (CBS All-Access is older than you think, but until recently has felt like a side project for CBS.) Now Disney, HBO and NBC are all-in on streaming. And ViacomCBS is half-in on streaming.

Can those firms catch up to Netflix? Or does Netflix keep growing and outpace its rivals? Can Disney+ catch up with Netflix in total US subscribers? Or Peacock and HBO Max? 

I think 2021 is the year we find out. Not all the services will catch up to Netflix in one year, but we’ll at least find out if this is going to be competitive or not. And that’s huge.

The Ramifications of this Question

To start, Netflix is the biggest beneficiary of the assumption that there will be one winner in streaming. The thesis is that “Netflix will become TV”. Not just a channel, but the whole shebang. That’s a winner-take-all economy. That’s network effects. That’s what has driven the huge valuations of the rest of the FAANGs (Facebook, Apple, Amazon and Google).

If Netflix can’t dominate streaming, then the better analogy is that Netflix is a new “bundle of channels”, much like what Disney, NBC-Universal and Viacom-CBS already were in cable. What has changed is the distribution. If that’s the case, woe to Netflix’s stock price.

This also matters for all the other streamers. They want to be a piece of the streaming pie. If Netflix owns the whole pie outright, then the investments of Amazon, AT&T, Disney and Comcast will utterly fail.

Further, this impacts the device and operating systems of the world, Roku, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple and Sony (the RAMAS if you will). If Netflix is the once and future king, it will have the leverage to negotiate those devices into oblivion. If they aren’t, then all the streamers may lose to the RAMAS’ value capture. (Their fees to sell subscriptions will capture most of the profit margin from the streamers.) 

My Take? Streaming Won’t Consolidate

If you’ve read my website for any amount of time, you can guess how I think this question will be answered. (So fine, I am making a prediction!) While content often performs with “logarithmic distribution of returns”, channels don’t have quite the same variability. (Or the winners can shift over time fairly easily. NBC won the 1990s, CBS won the 2000s; HBO won the 2000s, but Showtime almost caught them until Game of Thrones.) Frankly, this is where I see streaming headed: consumers will have multiple streaming services simultaneously, meaning there will be leaders, but not dominant winners.

Notably, part of this thesis stems from a skepticism on the presence of “network effects” for streaming video. (And the dreaded “flywheel” for Netflix.) For user-generated content, network effects were very, very real. The more users posting videos on one platform, the more viewers used the platform, so the more creators who posted videos on that platform. Hence, Youtube has demand-side increased returns, and it’s winner-take-all. Same for Google in search, Facebook in social, and Amazon more web marketplaces. 

The biggest input for streaming video, though, isn’t user data—which allegedly is Netflix’s driver of their winner-take-all flywheel—but the quality of content. And since the difference between 30 million subscribers and 60 million in data terms doesn’t produce that much better content, network effects in streaming video likely won’t appear. So it won’t be a winner-take-all market.

At least that’s my theory!

I’m not certain and as an analyst I’m willing to be upfront with you, instead of pretending to a level of uncertainty most analysts can’t truly possess. (Is this a bit of shade throwing at some of my entertainment business peers? Sure. Welcome to 2021!) The rest of this year will help me/us figure out if we are/were right or wrong. 

Other Questions That Will Define 2021

Does the live/experiential economy feature a boom?

When a vaccine was announced, I speculated about the upcoming “year of bacchanalia”. Over the break, I was glad to see another pundit take this same stand in Andrew Sullivan. His/my thesis is that once the vaccine begins rolling out in force, we’ll see folks make up for the lost time of 2021 by partying. For entertainment, this means lots of potential revenue. Concerts will see booming attendance, same with music festivals, bars, parties, travel, theme parks. You name it, we celebrate it. Quoting myself:

Customers in 2021. My biggest prediction is that we see a big rebound emotionally/culturally/socially. Take the Roaring 1920s and pack it into one year. Folks throwing big parties. Or holding double birthday parties. Splurging on outdoor concerts and festivals. Big vacations. In other words, 2021 becomes the year of the party. The pent up demand hypothesis.

The challenge will be figuring out if this is happening. If we use full-year numbers, it will be hard to see, since no one knows when we’ll feel safe to party again. It could be by March (if deaths fall quicker than expected) or fall (when we achieve herd immunity). Or somewhere in between. I’ll be looking to use per capita numbers as much as possible to untangle this.

What happens to theaters?

They’ll suffer the same uncertainty as the live economy, with more pronounced scheduling problems. The key date for me is May 7th, when Black Widow premieres. If theaters can be at full capacity in America by then, the entire world looks better. The other question is how firm the theatrical release slate is and how much the studios are willing to spend on marketing. And then whether or not the theaters can make it to May. Lots of question marks.

What happens to the economy?

The entertainment industry isn’t quite as recession proof as folks have made it out before. If wallets are trimmed, some entertainment spending goes with it. Some cheaper forms of entertainment, though, can resist this trend (like theaters) and some limited capacity forms of entertainment can also focus on high-wealth individuals (like concerts, sporting events and some theme parks). 

Thus, in 2021, entertainment folks would rather have a booming economy than a stagnant one. Folks are now openly speculating about a “v-shaped” recovery again, but it remains to be seen if the damage of 2020 can be overcome that easily. (Lots of businesses closed that may never come back, and that damage can take years to overcome.) The solution is lots of stimulus, which it sounds like Biden is considering.

Other Contenders for Most Important Story

If I weren’t speculating about the future of this year, what could have been the story of the week? Glad you asked. 

Roku Acquires Quibi’s Library

Is this a good deal for Roku? Who knows. If I knew the price, I still couldn’t tell you because I don’t know how good these shows are. If the price was very, very low, then maybe. Really, though, this is still a content licensing deal since Quibi didn’t own most of the shows, but was either licensing them or co-producing them with top talent.

Apple TV+’s Bold January Release Schedule

I’m sure if Apple TV+ could have, they would have released a lot of season 2 TV series back in the fall, a year or so after they launched. Instead, a lot of shows got the “Covid-19 pause” and it looks like Apple TV+ is on track for a big January, with Dickinson, Servant, Losing Alice and Palmer releasing each week in January. Also–and this is big–Apple TV+ is moving some shows to a weekly release

The upside is this will keep folks engaged (hopefully) through Q1. So I love that. The downside is a few other big shows still have vague “2021” release dates, like The Morning Show and Foundation. Apple TV+ still has new service growing pains, clearly.

For those keeping track, Disney+,  Apple TV+ and Prime Video have all released some shows weekly. (HBO Max has flip flopped on this point.) At this point we have to ask, who really knows more about release schedules: the rest of the market or Netflix?

Discovery Plus Launched

And it’s here! Discovery+ launched this week, and the reviews are much stronger than I anticipated. Rick Ellis makes the case that Discovery+ will help a lot of folks cut the cord, what I would call the next gen of cord cutters. Dan Rayburn says it is intuitive to use and has a massive library. I’ll be curious when we see the numbers on this one.

I’d also add, the Food Network Kitchen experiment doesn’t seem to be going well, and I wonder how long that standalone service lasts.

Netflix Increases Prices in the UK

This brings the UK in line with US prices (roughly) so it wasn’t unexpected. (The price increase in the US was!) Still, it will be fascinating to see how these latest price hikes fare in the next year with much more competition.

CyberPunk 2077 Security Fraud Case

Read about this interesting case either at Sportico or Matt Levine’s newsletter. Essentially, some folks are suing the makers of CyberPunk 2077 for releasing a game that was so bad it had to be recalled. Of course, some entrepreneurial lawyers will always sue claiming “securities fraud” for almost anything. However, this could set a precedent for digital products that are released and fail to meet their billing.

M&A Updates

Amazon is acquiring another audio platform, podcaster Wondery, to boost its Amazon Music platform. As the article notes, Amazon also owns Audible, which competes with a separate subscription in narrative audio. When a company is so big it’s competing against itself, that’s probably too big, right?

As for the strategy, it’s fine. The biggest harbinger of doom is for Spotify, though. It would be much easier to corner the market on audio if Apple, Google and Amazon weren’t all fighting you for it. (We could also ask, is music streaming winner take all?)

Context Update 

When it comes to regulations, I have my eye on antitrust for 2021. (I should have put that in the other questions above!) I hadn’t really considered unionization, but this could absolutely become an issue for the big tech firms. Like antitrust, this is a regulatory issue where a motivated Biden Presidency could make lots of changes without Congress passing new laws. So keep an eye on Amazon to see if unionization pushes come to them.

Is Disney Is Throwing Away Its Money Generating Machine? Thinking Critically About Deficit-Financed Business Units

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

An Introduction
Part I – Define the Battlefield
Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars
Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained
Aggreggedon: The Key Terrain of the Streaming Wars is Bundling
The Flywheel Is a Lie! Distinguishing Between Ecosystems, Business Models, & Network Effects and How They All Impact the Streaming Wars

If Disney+ has done nothing else, it has given the Disneyphiles tons of extra documentaries to consume. Making of Disneyland here. Insights into props here. More behind the scenes here.

My wife and I have watched some of “The Imagineering Story” documentary and there was a tidbit in the first episode about Disneyland’s launch which has stuck with me:

Disneyland was profitable by the end of the first year.

To compare Disney to the company that led the introduction to last week’s article, if Amazon opens a “BezosLand” in Seattle, do you think it would make money in its first year? 

Heck no!

It would probably never make money. It would be created as a unique bonus for Prime subscribers who could attend for free. We would never find out how much money they make and if there were rumors BezosLand was losing billions every year, they’d leak to a few favorite journalists that the “data” makes it all up for them in selling more socks.

It feels quaint what Walt Disney did in the 1960s: He saw a way to create value—have amusement parks that were clean and cutting edge that emphasized decades old beloved characters—and when he launched it, he was quickly proven right. This is capitalism at its finest: for his bet he earned lots and lots of money. Shareholders still are benefitting from his foresight.

Far from being quaint, Walt Disney was actually on to something. For most companies making money is key. This is true even in the streaming wars. But we’ve lost sight of that fact because so many companies entering the streaming wars with plans to lose oodles of money doing so. 

This is part II of my three part exploration of “flywheels” in the streaming wars. Last time I defined my terms. Next time, I’ll use the principles of this article to look at a few other new streamers. Today, the lesson is all about why making money still matters, even in streaming. And Disney’s future is the case study.

Summary

– The best way to evaluate any business is still Net Present Value.
– Even in flywheels and deficit-financed business units, the goal is still the same: to invest money in net present value positive endeavors.
– The risk of a “flywheel” with a deficit-financed component is that you simply lose money, not start the flywheel spinning.
– Disney provides the case study in this: if streaming can’t/won’t make money, their flywheel of toys, parks and resorts won’t make up for it.
– Thesis: The best business model makes money at every point, not “flywheels” that lose money in one area to make money in others. This is actually the forgotten lesson of Walt Disney.

A Reminder about Net Present Value

Fortunately, the key to evaluating flywheels is the same as the key to evaluating all businesses: 

Net Present Value

Or NPV. The short hand for calculating “net present value of the discounted future cash flows”. That’s a finance-y way of saying that a company should invest in businesses that promise to make money. Again, we’re talking Finance 101 here. But it’s worth repeating because I’ve seen many businesses or ventures praised in the streaming world who likely won’t make money, even on a net present value basis. (They use narratives, not numbers. And strategy is numbers.)

Read my explainer for this concept here. (And no website can do it justice, you really should read your finance textbook to understand the details.) But for a reminder, since I use it a lot, 90% of NPV decisions look like this:

– You invest a lot of money at the start. (Capital expenditure)
– You slowly start to make some money. (Revenue)
– You still have some ongoing costs. (Cost of goods sold.)
– You subtract the two, and keep the remaining. (Profit)
– You take those future sums and account for the time value of money. (Discounting)

Since we’re talking Disney, here’s a look at my big series on how much they made from Star Wars toys:

IMAGE 2 - Discounted Star WarsThe problem I keep running into with streaming video is folks seem very willing to ignore these two core principles when evaluating the streaming wars. Most money losing/unknown streaming or digital video ventures are excused because frankly we don’t know. Since we don’t have the numbers—and it’s hard to calculate them—we use narratives instead.

If you take nothing away from this article, remember that even a flywheel can be evaluated on NPV terms. It’s components can, nee MUST!, be evaluated on NPV positive terms as well. Otherwise, companies run a huge risk.

“A License to Lose Money”: Explaining Deficit-Financed Business Units

Consider:

– Prime Video (money made unknown) isn’t around to make money, but to sell more socks, thus spoke Jeff Bezos.
– Apple TV+ (will spend $6 billion on content) isn’t around to make money, but to sell Apple devices and Apple Channels.
– AT&T (will spend at least $3 billion on HBO Max) isn’t around to make money, but to sell more cellular subscriptions.

In these cases, the explanation is that video is a means to an end. At extremes, defenders of the “lose money in media to make money elsewhere” even call it a “marketing expense”. 

It’s worth dwelling on the concept of “marketing expense” more. Because in the previous world—the old fashioned/traditional business world—it wasn’t like you could just label something as marketing and spend as much as you wanted on it. Indeed, marketing was always taken out of your operating profit. So the more you could trim marketing while keeping sales the same, the more you trimmed! That’s why advertising is the first thing to go in an economic downturn.

Despite the branding as marketing expenses, there is real money being spent on video. These are real products from real business units. Not simply “marketing”. We need a new name, which is why I’ve come up with:

Deficit-Financed Business Units.

DFBUs. Yes, I was in the Army so I acronymize everything. It’s worth unpacking the phrases to see why these definition makes so much sense. 

First, a venture is “deficit-financed” if the plan is to never make money on it. Or to make money, but so far in the future that current financing is still net present value negative. Thinking about this abstractly explains why. Say I offered you a billion dollars a year starting in 2050. The key is you have to pay me $20 billion now. Should you do it? Heck no! You could just invest that $20 billion and probably double it multiple times before 2050, making more than enough to pay yourself $1 billion per year.

That same scenario is a microcosm of “net present value”. Should Apple invest $20 billion right now to make $1 billion a year in 2050? Heck no! Just keep it in cash or cash equivalents. No matter if it is marketing.

Second, I like business unit because it really distinguishes between streaming video companies  and a marketing expense. Plopping down several million dollars for a Super Bowl ad could be a net present value negative decision. (And should be evaluated in those terms.) But we should distinguish from genuine efforts at marketing versus creating brand news businesses, that in most other contexts would need to make money. 

The Riskiness of DFBUs: You Don’t Make Actually Make Money on the Flywheel 

My worry for companies and investors is that they don’t insist on looking at these business ventures with an NPV lens. As a result, DFBUs become a license to lose money for big tech companies. They may even grab market share—that’s certainly the case with all of them—but that doesn’t mean they actually make money.

That license usually has a justifciation, though. If we lose money on this part of a flywheel, can it make more money elsewhere? In other words, the key question is:

Can Deficit-Financed Business Units Turn a Flywheel?

This is really the supposition that has fueled the rise of streaming video. If you have a true flywheel or ecosystem, getting more customers in will help cause it to spin. That’s expressly Jeff Bezos’ logic. Apple’s too. AT&T even.

The answer? Maybe. It depends on the flywheel.

My thesis is that they can, but they are risky and hence rare. Losing money is easy for a business to do. Allowing someone to lose money means they will. It makes their thinking sloppy. Moreover, it’s easy to get the tradeoffs slightly wrong, and you deficit-financed business unit just becomes a money losing hole.

And I think I can illustrate this with Disney. If you’ve been following me on social, you’ll know that my household has been into Disney’s Inside Out recently. Which is appropriate to call back to, for this scene:

That’s how I’d describe DFBUs, they’re shortcuts that should be labeled danger. The current danger-disguised-shortcut facing Disney is losing money on streaming (Disney+, ESPN+ and Hulu.) to make it on extra toy sales. The rationales I’ve seen justifying Disney’s move into streaming reinforce this money losing narrative. I’ve seen the same arguments used by the tech conglomerates trotted out for the House of Mouse. For example, I’ve seen Disney’s streaming efforts explained as…

– They’ll lose money on streaming to get folks into the “ecosystem” of theme parks and toys.
– Disney has a flywheel and streaming video will bring more subscribers into the flywheel.
– Disney should disrupt the theatrical business model to own the customer relationship in streaming. 

So all the buzz words. Of course, since strategy is numbers, the question isn’t what narrative you employ to justify losing money, but whether or not the investment will make it up in the long run. So let’s quantify—for what I think is the first time on the internet—the actual numbers behind those narratives.

The Messy Financials of Disney

One of the first explanations for Disney’s push into streaming was so it could “sell more toys”, just like Jeff Bezos sells more socks. But take a gander at this Hollywood Reporter image I love trotting out:

IMAGE 3 - THR Disney 2018

Toys—from here on “consumer products”—is a small, small part of Disney’s overall operating margin, isn’t it?

Let’s dig deeper. I approach a company’s financials like a hostile witness on the stand. What are they trying to hide? What don’t they want me to know?

For Disney, I looked at their financials going back to 2009. And a huge red flag jumps out, which should be a clue for the quality of the toy business:

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Most Important Story of the Week – 17 January 20: The Optimistic and Pessimistic Strategy Cases for Peacock

With that, the final major entrant of the streaming wars has called their shot. (Besides SuperCBS. Is holding on to CBS All-Access and Showtime really their entire plan?) So we didn’t have to go very far to find our…

Most Important Story of the Week – Peacock Announces Their Plan

Investor day presentations are the ultimate in needing to see through the flash for the substance. In data, it’s all about “signal versus noise”. In presentations, the noise is deliberate. It’s designed to confuse, overwhelm and mislead to get you to invest, support or buy. (Which is why I think most biz presentations internally should be in black and white. Let ideas stand on their own merits, not the quality of powerpointing.)

From that angle, I’d put Comcast-NBC-Universal’s Peacock debut above HBO Max and Apple TV+, but still lagging Disney+ (who knocked everyone’s socks off). They leaned into the “30 Rock” angle, which is smart branding. This is all the more reason we need to wear our skeptical glasses to look for what NBC-Universal didn’t tell us, or what Comcast overhyped.

Overall, my gut take is more bullish than when I first heard of “Peacock”, with some huge lingering caveats. Reading my draft today, I found the positives more compelling than negatives, which surprised me. I’ll dive into this area in three parts: The upside case, the downside case, and implications for (selected) competitors.

The Upside/Bull/Optimistic Case for Peacock

Strategy: Zigging while others zag means becoming the “broadcast streamer”

By the time Peacock is fully launched–while April is the target date, it won’t go national until July–it will be the last streaming platform to the party. NBC’s logic seems to be, if you’re late to the party, be free. 

Not a bad plan!

Then that way all the already spent wallets still have room. Since broadcast has always been “free”, you just pay with your time, there is some justification in saying, “We’re the broadcast platform of streaming.” I’ve always felt that NBC-Universal had the most broadly appealing cable channel offering. They have sports, news, dramas, comedies, and reality. Now it’s all coming to one platform.

Really, the way to look at this isn’t that Peacock is a slow follow of Netflix, but a fast follow of Pluto/Tumi/Xumo. Since I think those companies really do fill a customer need, I like the idea. Moreover, they have a differentiator, as they themselves pointed out, Peacock is essentially the premium FAST

Screen Shot 2020-01-17 at 1.18.25 PMWhile I respect the “zig while others zag” approach to business, it doesn’t work if you don’t have a strategy. My initial take is Comcast has a strategy here.

Customer Targeting: Latinx viewers

A natural part of business analysis is to assume everyone is like you. Avoid this temptation. In entertainment, this means I, for example, have huge blind spots in international viewership. This even applies to the US, where I lag in coverage on Spanish language programming. Comcast has owned Telemundo for a bit now, so they don’t have this blindspot:

Screen Shot 2020-01-17 at 11.42.07 AMCredit to Peacock for seeing this customer need and serving this demographic. (Netflix does serve this too, and entered Latin America very early on.) The “Spanish Language Streaming Wars” are probably worth a deep dive article.

Company: A surprising willingness to be innovative.

Consider this an extension of the “zigging while others zag”, but I had a genuine worry that Peacock would end up as another clone of Disney+, Netflix, Prime Video and HBO Max. (Mostly the same product and similar content profiles.) 

Except Peacock is definitely trying out a few new things, which shows a commitment to change we don’t usually see. Specifically, the “live channels” approach, which only furthers the “fast follow of PlutoTV” thesis. If you know what you want to watch, the UX will have on-demand video. But for everyone else–or the folks who just want something on in the background–Peacock will have live/streaming channels. Will this work? Maybe, maybe not, but at least it shows some innovation. (For example, nothing in the Disney+ launch was innovative to that platform, just more streamlined than Netflix.)

Content: Pretty darn strong, especially in TV.

Peacock helpfully provided a list of the shows they plan to air. (Probably not an exhaustive list.) And it’s pretty strong. I’m as impressed as I was during the HBO Max roll out. (Also credit to NBC PR for making the document available and hence easy on journalists to absorb.) Here are some specific content pieces I think will be strengths:

The USA Network Shows: This is the bread and butter that built Bonnie Hammer’s career–former head of NBC Universal Cable Productions, she now runs content for all NBC Universal–so naturally a lot of these shows will be on Peacock including Suits, Covert Affairs, Monk and Psych. It remains to be seen if they are “exclusive” digitally, but still a good slate. USA Network is historically underrated because it’s popular in middle America, not one the coasts.

The big broadcast shows: Everyone knows about The Office, but everything from Cheers to Brooklyn 99 to Frasier to Everybody Loves Raymond to Two and a Half Men will be on Peacock. That’s a hefty dose of rewatchable series. And lots of rewatchable procedurals in Law & Order and Chicago series.

Bravo/E! tentpoles: One of the strengths of NBC-Universal, I’ve always felt, is that they have a broad reach of channels to draw content from, for example, the unscripted reality space. At first, I didn’t see these shows on the list, but a lot of them will be on Peacock. While most reality doesn’t fare well in bingeing long term, some does.

Late Night: Premiering their two Late Night shows in the primetime window is a great change for customers, such as myself who usually watch tape delayed. This feels smart to me, as more and more content gets time shifted.

Content: New categories to one streaming platform: sports and news.

HBO Max won’t have sports; Disney is pushing all sports to ESPN+, and Netflix refuses to even consider it. Thus, NBC steps into the breach and says their streaming platform will have sports in the same interface. (Amazon, of course, has toyed with sports for a while and offers a few sports channels as add-ons, plus one NFL game in America.) Thus, ignoring the type of content, NBC may have an advantage here. ESPN+ and DAZN remain separate apps which could decrease engagement, except for hardcore sports fans.

But we can’t ignore content forever. The question is whether English soccer, NHL and two weeks of Olympics every two years is enough to sustain sports. I don’t think so, which is why I think Comcast could be a buyer for additional sports rights, be it more NFL, NBA, MLB or college rights. (The great pitch too is that this is both digital and physical, keeping both windows. I think professional leagues are rightfully scared of a “digital only” approach that risks losing viewership/fan engagement overall.)

As for news, the best thing about news is it’s much cheaper than sports to get into. Plus, NBC has a fairly strong brand, if titled toward one side of the political aisle on cable.

The Downside/Bear/Pessimistic Case for Peacock

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Is Disney Bringing Back the Vault? My Analysis on the Strategic Implications of Disney+ Content Library

If the streaming wars were a medieval war, original content are the mounted knights. Especially the pricey TV series. Like knights of the medieval ages, these extremely expensive weapons will likely win the war for one side or the other. This would make the siege engines the tech stack and distribution infrastructure. The logistics supplying and feeding the armies is the hordes of lawyers and finance folks in the bowels of each studio.

But an army is much more than aristocrats in suits of armor. It needs masses of peasants clinging to sticks and spears, ready to be mowed down by mounted knights or crushed under hails of artillery. Who is that in the streaming wars?

Well, library content, of course. 

Over the last few weeks, we’ve gotten quite a bit of news about the size of the various infantry nee “library content” that a few of the new streaming services are rolling out. Let’s run down the news of the last few weeks:

– First, Disney reveals the number of films and episodes for Disney+ in its earnings call.

– Second, Bloomberg reveals Apple won’t have a content library.

– Third, Disney reveals not just the count of its library, but the specific films and TV series.

Altogether, we now know quite about Disney’s plans for Disney+. As a result, I’m going to dig MUCH too deep into it trying to draw out strategic implications and meaning from Disney+’s future content library. Today, my goal is to focus on the strategic dimensions of Disney’s content plan. Its strengths. Its weaknesses. What it says about Disney’s future plans (and constraints to those plans). 

I have two reasons for doing this. First, since Disney+ is fairly small of a library, we can draw a bit more conclusions than we could about some other streaming services—like Netflix or Amazon—which have thousands of movies that change constantly. 

Second, library content really is important. To continue the martial analogy, infantry won’t win the war on its own—smaller armies often best bigger ones—but having a bigger army sure can help. Having the best library content is a tremendous head start. 

Both those points collide in Disney+’s future catalogue. Despite its smaller library, Disney+ may launch with the most valuable content library in streaming. Pound for pound, this will be the strongest film slate on a streaming platform, with a decent TV slate. But I’ll be honest: it may not be as strong as you think. I’m about as bullish as they come on Disney+, but running through the actual numbers has sobered me up.

Let’s dig in to explain why.

What We Know about Disney+

One of the secretly important parts of the last Disney earnings call was their description of their upcoming content slate. Here’s a screen grab of Variety’s coverage, that quote Disney CEO Bob Iger directly:

IMAGE 1 - Variety Quote

If you’re like me, as you pondered this for a later Twitter thread, you captured the pieces in Excel. Like this:

IMAGE 2 My Capture

Unfortunately, we still had a lot of questions. Marvel films? Which ones? Star Wars films? Which ones? And which animated films? Then, before D23—Disney’s annual convention for super fans—Disney provided the answers to some news outlets, like the LA Times, which had had a huge list of confirmed films. So I dug in. 

Disney+ Film – By The Numbers

The obvious takeaway is that Disney+ won’t come close to the volume of films that other film services will have. To calculate this, I’ll be honest I simply googled “film library count” and looked up Amazon, Netflix and so on. I found a few sources for Netflix and fellow streamers. After that sleuthing, here’s my projections for the biggest streaming services.

IMAGE 3 - Est 2020 Film Smales

Here are the key sources I used: ReelGood (Netflix 2014, 2016), Flixable (Netflix 2010, 2018), HBO (current), Variety (Amazon and Hulu 2016) and Streaming Observer (Amazon, Netflix, Hulu and HBO, 2019). The caution is that I’m not sure the Amazon numbers are accurate and that some of the sources aren’t also counting films available for TVOD/EST. But these numbers were reported in Variety and Streaming Observer, so I’m inclined to trust them.

(Also, these were US numbers only. Other countries complicates it, but from what I can tell library sizes tend to be correlated over time.)

As has been reported constantly, Netflix is losing content. Specifically, it can’t license as much content for as cheaply. This showed up in the data: 

IMAGE 4 - 2010 to 2020 Film Slates

As studio launches their own streaming service, they take their films from fellow streamers. While Netflix has suffered the worst, Amazon isn’t immune. Meanwhile, HBO has stayed at the same, small level for most of the last decade. (Some estimates had HBO at 800 films, but counting the available films on their site gives me about 300.) Hulu has been shrinking like the others too. 

You may ask, “Where did the CBS All-Access numbers come from?” Well, that’s Paramount’s library of films, which CBS bragged about in the merger announcement. Obviously most of those films are in licensing deals already, but if SuperCBS really wanted to, they could try to get them back. That is the potential library for CBS All-Access. (And it isn’t as bad as the last ten years suggest. The Godfather? Titanic? Mission Impossible? Those have value.)

The Value of those Disney+ Films

The challenge is to take those raw numbers and try to convert them into actual values. If you’re a streamer, you can build a large data set—and I mean big—with streaming performance, Nielsen ratings, IMDb and other metrics, and judge the value of various content catalogues. While that gets you a very accurate number, at the end of the day we don’t need those extra bells and whistles becasuee we have box office performance.

Box office captures about 90% the value of a movie for a streamer. In other words, if you wanted to know if people like a movie (and will rewatch it), box office explains probably 90% of that behavior. 

So I pulled the last ten years of films, looking for how many Disney films ended up in the top 5, ten and 25. The results are, well impressive. Especially recently. (An additional, very safe assumption: that films released in the last year are more valuable than films released two years ago, and films in the last five years are more valuable than films from ten years ago, and so on.) If Disney can put all those films on its streaming service, in comes the money. So take a look at this table, with the top ten films by US box office, with Disney releases highlighted:

IMAGE 5 Disney Last Five YearsBy my reckoning, that’s 18 of the top 5 films of the last five years, 22 of the top 10 films and 32 of the top 25. Incredible. And I realize I’m not breaking any news here.

So here is some new news. As I mentioned above, Disney released to the LA Times a list of films confirmed for Disney+, and well, it’s quite a bit few films. Here’s the last ten years of top 10 box office films, with the films actually making it on to Disney+ highlighted in blue:

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