Tag: Carousel

Aggreggedon: The Key Terrain of the Streaming Wars is Bundling

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

An Introduction
Part I – Define the Battlefield
Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars
Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained)

In war, what really matters on a map is the “key terrain”. The place on the map that if you control it, you have a much better chance at winning the upcoming battle or war. In Army lingo, terrain that control “affords a marked advantage”. Usually this is the high ground, but can be anything from a bridge to a national capitol, or airfield or even castle, in olden times.

So take a gander at our “map” of the video landscape from last week.

Image 7 Video Value WEb

As a commander, where do we want to control? What gives us a “marked advantage”? Well, I highlighted it in yellow. 

Last week, I “defined” the map and area of operations. Now we move onto the challenging tasking of describing that map. While I won’t use all of the Army’s frameworks, the concept of “key terrain” really does resonate with business. (Don’t worry, we’ll use other business analysis frameworks as well.)

Today, I’m going to highlight the key terrain the streaming wars will be fought over, and it’s not what most streaming observers and customers think it is. (If I had to guess, they’d call it subscribers.) I’ll start with the “BLUF”, then describe the situation in broad strokes, the reasons why digital bundlers are in a powerful position, the stark choice facing streamers, and finally the ramifications for all players in digital video. 

Bottom Line, Up Front – Digital Streaming Bundlers Are Best Positioned to Capture Value

While streamers started as the aggregators—Netflix inspired cord cutting by offering it’s own bundle—in the next five to ten years, the new digital video bundlers (who I call DVBs) will be in the best position to capture value (meaning profit and cash flow) in the video landscape. This means the winners will be folks like Amazon, Apple or Roku, and not Netflix, Disney, Comcast or AT&T.

The Situation: Netflix breaks the user experience monopoly of cable TV

In the past—meaning just ten years ago—the landscape was relatively simple for TV: you turned on a cable or satellite box, and scrolled. Netflix changed that all. Using its installed base of DVD subscribers, it started offering streaming video to its customers. Thus, when you sat down at your TV, you could decide, “Netflix or cable?” Netflix provided a second user experience to watch TV. Some people—though less than usually hyped—cancelled cable just to use Netflix and were dubbed “cord cutters”. 

Netflix was so successful, it inspired copycats from Amazon Prime to Apple TV+ to Disney+, who launched this week. Of course, the best place to watch TV isn’t from a computer screen, but from a living room TV. Devices were released to manage all these different streaming platforms, like smart TVs, Google Chromecast, Roku, Amazon Fire TV and Apple TV.

Which leads to my biggest theory of the landscape: customers will want to return to one operating system to manage all their television watching. Crucially, this may include bundling content. The cable companies didn’t just provide one user experience, they provided a bundle of cable channel at one fixed price. That bundle is dying.

But it’s returning. Instead of just channels, though, it will be a combination of virtual MVPDs (like Hulu Live TV, Youtube Live TV or AT&T TV), FASTs (like Pluto, STIRR, Xumi, and Tubo) and SVODs (like Netflix, Disney+, Hulu and Amazon Prime). The question is who mediates that experience. Someone will. And potentially to manage all their payments. And if you’re managing all the payments, you can bundle all the streamers/FASTs/vMVPDs into one monthly or annual price. A bundle.

The question is what do we call them? I’ve taken to the acronym DVB:

Digital Video Bundlers. 

I’ve colored this in yellow on my map because of how important I think it is. If an Amazon or Apple can own the customer relationship, they’ll own all the data and be best positioned to capture value from suppliers or competitors. Before I get into the ramifications, let me explain why I think this will happen.

Reasons Why The Bundle Will Return

The return of the bundle doesn’t just seem likely, but almost inevitable.

First, a clear customer value proposition – One user interface for all content.

Both Amazon and Apple have touted a clear proposition to users, which is the idea that you have one place to go to watch all your content. Meaning: if you log in, every subscription video service is in one location to easily search and browse without having to switch between apps. 

(In some cases, this vision is still aspirational, as opposed to realized. But it’s both companies’ dream user scenario.)

This makes sense from the cable example. The big revolution wrought by Netflix stemmed from the idea that suddenly customers now had to choose between two different ways to interact with the TV screen. Once that was severed, the cable bundle no longer offers it all. But neither did the “Netflix only” option, since you missed all traditional cable channels. Or other streamers like Hulu. This makes deciding what to watch just that much harder (and was to Netflix’s advantage).

Most smart TVs don’t offer a simple way to scan between streaming services. Instead, you decide what app to use and go to its platform to browse. Amazon and Apple want to incorporate everything into one user interface, so HBO content would sit next to Disney+ content which is next to CBS All-Access, for example. Meaning you can organize all your video in one place. Here’s Amazon Channels right now to show this vision:

Screen Shot 2019-11-14 at 10.38.31 AM.png

(By the way, Amazon and Apple both ruin this customer experience with a clear user experience fail. When customers surf TV and streaming, the expect everything to be watchable for free. Pay Per View, historically, was always limited to clearly defined section of the cable interface. In their efforts to have an accurate search, Amazon and Apple both surface results for their TVOD businesses, which customers despise. Loathe. Hate. Keep your “pay for it” shows and movies clearly separated from your TV experience.)

Second, a vague customer value proposition – One source for payments.

The second reason cited by folks selling subscriptions is it offers simplicity in payments. I’m less sold on this value proposition because people will likely still search for the best deals. But it’s a potential for some customers and has some value.

Third, a potential value proposition: the new bundle. (Which everyone is predicting)

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Unrolling the Map – The Video Value Web…Explained

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

Part I: An Introduction
Part II: Defining the Area of Operations, Interest and Influence in the Streaming Wars)

As an Army officer, getting lost is sort of the death knell for your career. For the Band of Brothers junkies out there, I’ve always had the “hot take” that if Captain Sobel could have read a map he would have stayed in charge of Easy Company. 

Having had to pull out a map and lead a group of soldiers somewhere, I can testify it’s a nerve-racking experience. There was always this moment when I started planning a mission—from my time in ROTC with squads to training in Ranger School with platoons to being on the ground in Afghanistan—that I essentially had to “unroll my map” and figure out where we were going.

Every time, my stomach would start to churn as I looked to see if I could understand what a bunch of squiggles on paper meant in the real world. Inevitably, I could. We’d start and finish planning and head out. Honestly, my stomach is churning thinking about it.

Today we unroll the map for digital video. But where is the map? There are a few lay outs I’ve seen, like this one from the Wall Street Journal. 

IMAGE 1 - WSJ Map

Or this map from Recode, which is probably the most commonly linked to image I’ve seen in the streaming wars.

IMAGE 2 - Recode Map

Unfortunately, each has flaws. In both cases, neither links how the various companies relate to each other, merely the sheer size in one case, or the type of business in the other. The challenge is that while you can see the various areas, the concept of the “value chain” is totally missing. Who is producing content versus who is distributing it? Yes, ad-supported is different than subscription, but don’t they fill the same customer need? I’d argue they do. (Also, while the Recode map looks really cool, you know I sort of loathe “market capitalization” as a measure of size.)

So I made my own lay-out. This has been an idea I’ve been tweaking for over a year. Essentially, I’m not just reading a map, but drawing my own of the entertainment landscape. Which is even more nerve racking then just reading the map.

Today, I’m going to explain the two business school frameworks that inspired my map of the entertainment landscape. Next, I’ll talk about the “jobs” completed by various steps in the process. Then, I’ll show the “Digital Video Value Web”, with some explanations about the key pieces. Finally, I’ll highlight the most important terrain of the streaming wars.

A Quick Reminder on Value Chains, Porter’s Five Forces and the “Value Web”

The value web is the name I picked for a mashing together of two well established frameworks for business. The first is this little guy, “the value chain”, who I explained back in May:

True Full Value Chain(I use potato chips to explain concepts.)

Reread that article for a fuller description, but a value chain is essentially every step of a business process that results in a good. So suppliers provide the raw materials to factories that turn it into goods, which go to distributors to send to stores, who sell it to customers. The “value” component is really asking creates or captures the most value along the way. 

The limitation to “value chain” analysis is revealed by the WSJ image. I could make a value chain for ad-supported video on demand, for streaming TV hardware, for sports, subscription video and traditional cable bundles. All those value chains would start to get confusing. But to understand the landscape, we need to understand those connections between the value chains.

We have another tool for that, fortunately. In the past, I’ve also explained “Porter’s Five Forces”. (It’s one of my most popular articles, actually.) Read that article here. Here’s a visual of that…

Screen Shot 2019-04-10 at 3.11.46 PM

Porter’s Five Forces is a good organizing tool to lay out the potential threats and opportunities for a specific business. Its limitation is its focus: it only looks at one specific company in one part of the value chain. For example, if I used it for “cable companies”, it would leave out the studios distributing the content, merely the channels providing them content. That’s like a map that is zoomed in to one hillside when we need to look at the whole mountain range.

My insight was simply to realize that the value chain is going across the middle of a Porter’s Five Forces diagram. If I combined them on one table, I could make essentially an overarching view of any rough industry. My name for this is a “value web” because I couldn’t find anyone else making a similar layout and I elevate value above all other business concepts. Here’s my version from my Porter’s Five Forces article.

Screen Shot 2019-04-10 at 3.12.03 PM

Now we can make one for digital video.

The “Jobs” Done at Each Step of Digital Video

The first step was to pull out my value chain for streaming video. I’d previously made that here:TV Value ChainThe challenge was that I left out a fairly big component of the video value chain when I focused on distributors. Really, after a distributor sells their film to a cable channel, they don’t care how customers get that cable channel. But someone is “providing” that feed of cable channels. For the streaming wars that matters.

To borrow a phrase from Clayton Christensen, essentially the cable companies do the “job” of providing access to bundles of entertainment. I like putting “ing” after a step of the process because it gets at the type of work being performed. Applying this to my value chain you get:

Talent (acting, writing, directing, so on)
Producing
Distribution
TBD
Providing

The challenge is that “TBD”. What is it that a cable channel is doing? Or a movie theater? Or a streaming video service? I’d argue they’re all providing the same job, which is creating a library of content to watch, even if they use different monetization methods for those libraries. Frankly, the best word to describe that is “aggregating”. (And yes, we’ll get to Ben Thompson’s Aggregation Theory later in this series.)

That explains part of the “TBD”, but not really the whole thing. Because cable companies then aggregate the “aggregators” or channels. So what do we call them? They are definitely NOT in the same step of the value chain. A a group of cable channels is a separate business from the channels themselves. In reality, they’re providing access to a “bundle” of content which they charge for one price. I call that bundling.

(To quote a second business thinker—cited by Mike Raab recently—James Barksdale has said all business is either bundling or unbundling.)

With that, we have our six jobs being performed (with customers waiting at the end). 

The Video Value Web

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Defining the Battlefield – Areas of Operation, Interest and Influence in The Streaming Wars

(Welcome to my series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the “Streaming Wars” Battlefield”. Combining my experience as a former Army intelligence officer and streaming video strategy planner, I’m applying a military planning framework to the “streaming wars” to explain where entertainment is right now, and where I think it is going. Read the rest of the series through these links:

Part I: An Introduction)

Certain parts of the US Army’s IPB process have such a good correlation to business planning it makes me wish I had connected these two ideas—intelligence preparation of the battlefield and business strategy—earlier. (As a professor described me once before, I’m a sucker for frameworks and planning processes.)

Take this map from a Wikipedia page, based on the US Army’s IPB manual (available free/open source online, I was taught off an older version):

Image 1 Battlespace Lay Out

It’s a subtly simple concept: the area you are assigned (your area of operations) is part of larger area you can directly “influence”, but you still need to be aware of the even larger environment, the “area of interest”. 

Today, I’m going to define the entertainment battlefield within those three terms. I have four rough categories: entertainment business, related industries, geography and regulatory environment. But first, let’s define these terms to make sure we’re all on the same page. 

Defining “Area of Operations”, “Area of Influence” and “Area of Interest” in war and business

Let’s start with an example to illustrate this. Say you have an Army Brigade deployed to Afghanistan. (About 5,000 troops.) If they are assigned “Kunar Province”, that’s their area of operations (AO). The definition of this in the manual is (paraphrased) “the territory your boss gives you”. In practice, this means the place with all your troops that you defend, protect or attack into. 

Of course, while your area of operations is “Kunar Province”, that brigade commander could influence a larger territory. This could mean being able to deploy their troops or fire artillery into the surrounding area. In Afghanistan, this would likely mean the provinces around Kunar, like Nuristan, Nangahar or Kabul. (Here’s a map of Afghanistan for reference. Kunar is the upper right.)

IMAGE 2 Map Afghanistan

Of course, the commander can’t influence Pakistan directly, because it’s off-limits, but Pakistan can influence Kunar Province. (Specifically, by acting as a logistics base for insurgents.) Making it an “area of interest” the commander needs to monitor.

It’s a great framework because it reminds you to broaden your thinking to solve your problems. If you only focus on your area of operations, you miss new trends and forces from outside your day-to-day focus. On the other extreme, though you can monitor what is going on in your “area of interest”, you can’t influence it without losing focus. As well, the most important events that could impact your mission will happen in your area of operations. And if your area of operations is bigger than your area of influence, you’re likely spread too thin.

Do these lessons apply to business strategy? Absolutely. 

Let’s use my default explanation of potato chips. The brand manager for Kettle Chips has “chips” as their area of operations. That’s their AO; they focus on managing and impacting potato chip sales. But they can “influence” the entire snack market. They’re fighting for shelf space against pretzels, nuts, healthy snacks and candy. Of course, the rest of the retail industry is an “area of interest”. 

Most business leaders probably don’t think in these terms, but doing the thought exercise may reveal some insights into either blind spots or areas you’re spread too thin.

Defining Our Area of Operations: Digital Video

Since we don’t have a “battlefield commander”, our “area of operations” is up to me to define. As I said last article, I’m focused on digital video. This is the heart of the “streaming wars”. But I’ll include anything “digital” in this from streaming (SVOD) to ad-supported (AVOD) to virtual MVPDs to FASTs (free-ad-supported streaming). These “areas of operation” mean those things the digital players can directly control, including the apps they roll out, how they distribute those, the prices they charge, but most importantly, the content they put on those platforms.

Geography: The United States

I don’t have enough bandwidth to cover the entire world in this series. Though Netflix and Amazon have notably turned the streaming wars into a world war, with global launches in a hundred plus countries, the start of the streaming wars will be US-centric. The United States produces the most content and if its streaming companies cough, the whole digital ecosystem will catch a cold. 

Other Industries: Communications

In this case, “communications”—my catch all for cellular, telecoms, cable and satellite connections to transmit data—is the key industry included in our area of operations. If you can’t distribute your content over the pipes, you can’t compete. So we’ll check in on the big players in communications like AT&T, Comcast, Charter, Dish, Verizon and Sprint/T-Mobile.

Regulation: The FCC (and Other Antitrust Regulators in the US)

Since our geography is the United States, the roles of the FCC, FTC and antitrust regulators could have a key impact on our area of operations. In the last twenty years, the trend has been toward lax regulatory footprint. Whether that continues is a key question for entertainment companies, and it’s coming right as the streaming wars kicks off. (Meaning November 2020 could be important.)

Defining Our Area of Influence: Video

The story of the streaming wars is really a story of the evolution of “video”. There are the traditional distribution methods (theaters, home entertainment, broadcast, etc) that are being disrupted by digital methods. What that means for us is that the giant conglomerates battling in the streaming wars can heavily influence these others parts of the value chain, even if that’s not the ground being fought for. 

We’ve already seen the influence of digital video in one of the most important areas of Hollywood production: the price of content. Essentially, everyone is paying more for scripted TV series, with a parade of articles on how much more these cost every studio. Netflix—a digital only provider—started this push by its winning bid for House of Cards, but Amazon, Disney+ and now HBO Max are al competing to raise these prices even further.

When I roll out my “map” of our area of operations, I’m going to include all of the video ecosystem since it can so easily be influenced and influence the digital video space. 

Geography: High Income or Growth Countries

Just because I’m focusing on the United States doesn’t mean I won’t acknowledge the rest of the globe. Indeed, one of the descriptions of this battlefield is how certain firms paying for global rights—whether accurately valued or not—is impacting those content prices I just mentioned.

When it comes to what can really influence and be influenced, high income or high growth countries such as the European Union, Latin America, India and parts of Asia fall under this analogy. While lots of potential customers may live outside those limited territories, the bulk of near term streaming revenue will come from there.

Other Industries: Technology

Arguably, the tech firms are already inside the area of operations, but for this category I’m specifically referring to the new innovations in technology that can change the next generation of streaming. Digital video is already our battleground, but what comes next? Virtual reality? Artificial Intelligence? And how can the entertainment companies influence that in turn?

Regulation: The EU Antitrust Authorities

The European Union’s antitrust authority is the biggest influencer here. Already Google and Amazon are heavily trying to influence how they are regulated in Europe, to more or less success. Again, only some of these will impact our United States area of operations, but we need to monitor it.

Defining Our Areas of Interest: Other Entertainment Options

As Reed Hastings pointed out:

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“Hurry Up and Wait” for the Streaming Wars: Netflix’s Q3 2019 Earnings Report

(Before you start, consider signing up for my newsletter! Yes I know you have too many already, but this is the best way to help support independent writers such as myself. Sign up here.)

If you ever found yourself in the armed forces, you may be familiar with the phenomenon of “hurry up and wait”. It worked like this. A dignitary is coming in. Say a three star general. So your two star general plans a division parade. Which means the Command Sergeant Major sets it up. Scheduled to start at 1000 (ten hundred in parlance), the Division Sergeant Major tells his Brigades he wants them in position by 0930, so of course that means standing in place at 0915.

Woe to the unit that is late, by the way, which is why everyone is “hurrying”.

Here’s where the fun starts. The brigades don’t want to be late for the 0915 “time hack”, so they have their troops show up in formation at 0830, to be ready 30 minutes early too. Then the battalions say, well, “Let’s be ready 30 minutes before that.”

And so on. With companies, platoons and even squads.

Eventually, you have thousands of soldiers leaving their houses at 0500 in the morning—and skipping PT— so that they can stand in formation for 3 hours doing nothing. Hurry up and wait.

That’s my feeling for Netflix’s latest earnings report. If I can speak for my fellow Netflix hawks—be they bulls or bears—we had this date circled since July. Will Netflix miss subscribers targets again? Could the stock tank? Or will Netflix crush estimates? And what will Reed Hastings and Ted Sarandos have to say about the “streaming wars”, which start next month? 

No kidding, the (hashtag) streaming wars made it in the shareholder letter.

IMAGE 1 - The Streaming Wars

After all the waiting…we didn’t learn much. Netflix hit almost all their targets on the dot and Hastings/Sarandos didn’t reveal any ground breaking news.

Instead, we hurried up, but we’re still waiting for the streaming wars. Sigh. Still, we learned a few things in the latest earnings report. Let’s start with strategy, touch on the specifics and end with the subscribers/financials. Oh, and meta thoughts to conclude.

Strategy: Focused, but Narrow?

When it comes to strategy, Netflix probably has the clearest plan and simplest business model of all the streamers. They sell subscriptions and they plan to dominate all scripted and reality viewing. If you want to know their strategic advantage, it’s that. They know what they are, and they’re extremely focused on that.

And they still have a big goals: they want to take over TV all over the globe. If you want Netflix’s global upside for share price, it’s all this. Honestly, “Netflix bears” like myself probably neglect how much additional revenue can come from this global conquest.

But it isn’t cheap, of course. Netflix is spending $10 billion in amortized and $15+ billion in actual cash each year (from 10K) to get those new subscribers. Worse, the most valuable subscribers are in the United States, then Europe, then Japan and then descending down the GDP per capita income ladder. And those most valuable markets are nearing Netflix saturation. (Meanwhile some, like China, remain off limits.)

The most interesting observation, for me, was about the content strategy. Here’s the introduction to the content section of the shareholder letter:

IMAGE 2 - Content Strategy Summary

This content strategy manages to be both broad and limited, at the same time. Broad because Netflix is competing on film and TV and scripted and unscripted for kids and adults and everyone. 

And it’s limited because that’s all they are competing on? If “live TV” isn’t an option, that means  events, sports and news just aren’t in the cards.

In other words, for all the growth in content spend, many TV consumers will want a TV service that provides news and sports. If Netflix can’t fulfill someone’s entire TV demand, that means customers will have to watch other options too. If you value Netflix’s stock price as “becoming TV”, well you’re seeing a company that knows it won’t be that. Sure, it has a chance (that is becoming smaller every week) of “become all scripted and reality TV”, but that will be a pricey fight.

My view is that as long as customers need to have other TV services, Netflix is increasingly likely to be churned out of someone’s regular diet.

Nor does Netflix have the capital to branch out into a large new business like either buying DAZN or Roku or even a Lionsgate. They could merge with any of those, but any new venture that has huge upfront costs will stress their cash flow even further. Apple, Amazon and Disney don’t have those hindrances. That means Netflix needs to be perfect on everything decision from here on out to maximize that share price. That’s tough. 

So let’s get into those specifics.

Content: Some Selected Datecdotes Tell Us Some Things

Let’s start with the headlines you did not see yesterday. And the “null results” because I want to place in your easily available forebrain the idea that most shows aren’t doing well on Netflix. Or they are and it behooves Netflix to keep them secret. (I guess.)

Headline one: 

Of 162 original launches in Q3, 93% did under 29 million viewers. They were bombs.

Fine that is a bit provocative. Technically, I don’t know how many series really had less than 29 million viewers. Just because the lowest Netflix datecdote was 29 million doesn’t mean some other movie secretly did more than that, and Netflix just didn’t say. (Which, why hide that?) How’s this:

We don’t know how 93% of Netflix originals performed last year.

It’s crazy to consider that’s how many launches Netflix had in Q3, but according to my data—which means sorting this long, long list from All Your Screens Rick Ellis—that’s accurate. And given that when we do get inadvertent leaks—Steven Soderbergh said in an interview High Flying Bird had 8 million views—they are much lower, I’d bet that most other content releases were much lower than the leaks.

On to the datecdotes (explanation here) we did receive. These are both higher and lower than it seems. On the high side, I counted 12 datecdotes (authorized or leaked) since Q2. No seriously, four movies and 8 TV series. The challenge is that four of these datecdotes apply to two series (Netflix released 7 and 28 day numbers for both Stranger Things and La Casa de Papel.) And three of the TV series releases didn’t actually have numbers just “biggest TV series in the country” (Sintonia, The Naked Director and Sacred Heart.)

Since I’ve done feature films the last two times, I’m going to try to draw out some conclusions from the TV side this edition. Here’s my summary table of the data:

Screen Shot 2019-10-17 at 4.28.29 PM.pngAnd now some implications.

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Why I Think Netflix Will End Up with 70 Million US Subscribers: Applying Bass Diffusion To The Streaming Wars

(Before we start, I launched a newsletter! It’s weekly and it’s short, and I explained my logic here. Sign up here.)

My goal is to try, as best I can, to explain the complicated parts of the entertainment biz, trying to walk readers through what I’m doing and how I’m doing it. Unfortunately, even when I’ve tried to simplify things, I’ve gotten comments that my articles are pretty dense. That’s what happens when you don’t have an editor. 

With that preamble, today’s article is math-y.

This is about as math-y as I can get. I’ll be slinging terms like linear programming and mean absolute percentage error. To help out, I’m going to start with a BLUF (bottom line up front) so you can read my findings even if you don’t want to read my process to learn how I pulled it off.

Today is the “Bass Diffusion Model” in action. In layman’s terms, the Bass Diffusion Model is a way to calculate a “total addressable market” (TAM or “market size” in non-jargon terms) for various new products or innovations. As the headline suggests, today we’re turning our gaze towards Netflix as a stand-in for the streaming world.

BLUF – Netflix’s Market Size in the US is closer to 70 million than 90 million

When you apply the Bass Diffusion Model to Netflix’s US operations, the model which fits best has a market size in the United States of around 70-72 million subscribers. In other words, a saturated US market is much closer to the low end of Netflix’s projected outcome (60 million) than the high end (90 million). 

The Bass Diffusion model fits the data pretty well. My average “error” fitting the Bass Model to Netflix is 1 million for streaming only and 600K for all subscribers.

That said, applying the Bass model to Netflix isn’t perfect. First, Netflix transitioned from a DVD company to a streaming company, which is arguably two different product innovations. Second, Netflix isn’t alone in the streaming world, and we only have current Netflix subscribers in any period, and don’t know how many folks are still streaming, but no longer Netflix subscribers. Third, this is a US only model. In the future, I plan to apply the projections to the international markets (which has its own problems) and for all streamers.

The Origin Story – Seeing Bass Diffusion Applied in the early 2010s.

Going to b-school during the Qwikster debacle of 2013 made for interesting class discussions. Overnight, Netflix became a laughing stock. Yet, even with that debacle the year before, they had kept adding streaming customers. They were the growth story already—23%!—leading some early analysts to throw out huge potential market sizes. How long would this double digit growth continue for?

That’s when my professor—a marketing professor, naturally—trotted out the Bass Diffusion Model. We’d all learned this model in marketing the year before; I’d never considered applying it here. He did, and out popped a total market size: about 60 million US subscribers. The model fit really well. 

That 60 million has stuck in my head and influenced my thinking ever since. It’s why I launched this series and why I kept my annual subscriber projections a bit lower than most observers last January. Seriously, look at this chart I made back for an article on Hulu at DeciderBass doesn’t leap off as strongly as it did for Fortnite, but you can see it for Netflix and especially see it for Hulu.

Image 1 - NFLX StartFrankly, because of that one application, the 60 million subscribers point in the US felt like the point where we’d see Netflix slow down. Then, in Q2 of this year…that reality finally happened.

The good news for Netflix is the last few years have had better subscriber growth for Netflix than that old Bass model. (For those keeping score, my projection last year was probably too low.) The bad news? Well, 90 million subscribers is looking MUCH harder to reach. But instead of relying on old estimates, today is about making new ones.

The Task – Forecast Netflix Subscriber Growth in the United States

Just to be clear, my goal today is to apply the Bass Diffusion Model to Netflix’s US subscriber count. Why US only? Well, it has a few more data points which will make it a bit more accurate. More over, the recent slow down point gives me a bit more confidence that we’re seeing the inflection, which I’m not sure we’ve seen internationally yet. 

I’ll be building two models, though, because Netflix has actually had two products: the DVD delivery and streaming video. Unfortunately, Netflix has been a bit tricky when it releases subscriber counts, which means I needed to make some assumptions. Let’s explain those.

The Data – Netflix Subscriber Counts Over Time

To really make the Bass model work, I needed to do a lot of cleaning of my Netflix subscriber data to make sure everything I was calculating was apples-to-apples. Wait, doesn’t Netflix provide this? They do, every year. Here’s a Statista table summarizing that. Can’t we just use that?

Unfortunately, it’s a bit unreliable. When I use data, I pull it myself so I can vet it. For example, with those Statista numbers, are those numbers paid subscribers or free? Streaming only? Or all subscribers? Many tables and charts for Netflix actually mix up those categories in the same chart.

In fact, even in my chart above—the one for Decider—I did a bit of that.

So I updated all my Netflix subscriber numbers, calculating streaming and all subscribers for Netflix from the beginning of time. This took me SO long—and I had some insights into Netflix’s history from it—that I’m going to write it up as its own, probably too-in-the-weeds, article. In the meantime, just know these colors are the six different ways Netflix has revealed subscribers to investors:

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Introducing the Entertainment Strategy Guy Newsletter

Wait, do you REALLY need another newsletter. Probably not. Peak newsletter baby!

Let me defend why you should add just one more email to your already considerable deluge. Then I’ll give you the details.

In My Defense – Why You Need Another Newsletter

Here’s my guess as to how 95% of my readers start their work day. They come into the office, go to their desk, and turn on their computer. Then they open their email program of choice.

Then they read and answer emails. All damn day.

Am I wrong? Maybe. I’d love to imagine a small sub-segment who says, “Nope, I review my to do list, then complete my most important work task before turning on email.” But that’s not happening. If I’m wrong, it’s more likely that a lot of people woke up and the first thing they did was open their phone to see if they had any emails from work to read. (Then, Twitter.) 

That’s why newsletters have taken off among a certain psychographic set. They deliver news via the (dark) social media platform of necessity and convenience. This is especially true with the professionals—across entertainment, media, tech, academia—that I consider my core target audience.

Without a newsletter, I have to rely on folks 1. Stumbling across articles in their never-ending Twitter or Linked-In scroll, or 2. Remembering that good website they read once and hopefully bookmarked. (Do people even still bookmark websites?)

Even if you remember to return back to my website regularly, did you know I published at Decider or Linked-In or The Ankler? Probably not. Instead, let’s just be sure you can find all my stuff every week. And a very short newsletter is the best way to deliver on that promise. I’ve also heard from a few readers who want this service.

The Newsletter – What It Is

Here are the details on the newsletter:

Distribution – Substack

I looked at a few options and liked their combination of features, volume and pricing the best. 

Content

The newsletter will have links to all my writing of the last week. This is across all the outlets I’m writing for, including my website, guest articles, Linked-In articles and really good Twitter Threads. 

Plus, it will have the “media” related recommendations from my weekly column. So my “long read of the week”, “listen of the week” and “newsletter of the week” will end up here. This should hopefully make my weekly column a bit shorter.

As a result, the “Most Important Story of the Week and Other Good Reads” will drop the “good reads” portion to focus on news and opinions including, “Most Important Story of the Week”, “Other Candidates”, “Data of the Week”, “Entertainment Strategy Guy Updates” and “Lots of News with No News”. 

Timing?

Once per week, weekly. No more. It will go out Monday in the AM covering the previous week’s stories. 

Price

Free. 

Is this locked in stone?

No. I wish I could say that my newsletter will be free for always. I debated making that bold claim.

But I need to make a living writing. With my guest articles for certain outlets, I’m getting there and I hope to add advertising in the future (FYC related), but if my weekly column is getting enough traction, I can’t rule out monetizing it. In the near future, though, this is the plan.

How do I subscribe?

Go here, and sign up. Hit me up if you run into any trouble. There is currently one sample draft from this week to review. I plan to keep about 4 to five emails up in the archives at Substack.

How do I help out?

Tell your friends. When the newsletter comes out, since it is free, forward it to everyone you think will find it interesting. Reply to a company wide email chain with the link and say, “Hey you should all read this.” (Kidding. Don’t do that. And never reply “Unsubscribe” to an email chain.)

I do appreciate everyone who has spread the word so far and will keep doing so.

How Much Money Did HBO Make on Game of Thrones – Director’s Commentary Part III: Sanity Checking the Model

Today, is the “sanity check” of my Game of Thrones article guessing how much money it made. I’ve explained where the numbers came from, the high and low cases and all my math. But does this make sense? Can we double check my work? Sure. Again, this is in an FAQ format.

Last big area. Double checking your work. Did you do that?

Yeah, I went through the model a few times. I actually woke up in the night it published in a cold sweat worried I had added or subtracted a line wrong and checked the model in the AM right before it published. I didn’t find anything.

I’ll add, building the high and low cases after the fact caused me to go through the model at least twice more line by line. Still no mistakes found, so the numbers add up correctly. (If you disagree with the inputs, that’s a different question.)

(Though, I could tell stories about models not adding up and really, really, really well paid executives missing it. I mean, REALLY well paid executives.)

That’s not what I meant. Is there anyway to triangulate if these numbers are right?

Ahh. As I think I mentioned elsewhere, getting actual profit participation statements from talent would be the best place to start. Some of the agencies or management companies or talent themselves would have these, and they’d give us the nitty gritty details. HBO, though, wouldn’t admit that the series drove subscribers growth in those statements. We’d need HBO’s analysis of subscribers and trends for that, but that won’t get shared outside of HBO.

To be clear, you don’t have those?

No, I don’t. (I don’t think anyone else does. At least, they won’t go on the record about it.)

What other methods could we use sanity check your model?

I tried to double check my work in a few different ways. The first was to try to find other estimates. 

One of my biggest disappointments of this process was that so few people had tried to do this similar calculation. I think the biggest hold up for journalists proper is that it requires estimating and guessing for a lot of pieces, and most websites/newspapers deal in cold hard facts. (Or other people guessing.) The best articles still tend to to talk “top line” costs, and really just say that Game of Thrones cost a lot, and sold lots of merchandise, without quantifying either. Here are some of the better examples:

2011 – The Hollywood Reporter, “Game of Thrones by the Numbers”

2012 – Slate“How HBO and Showtime Make Money Despite Low Ratings”

2014 – Yahoo, “The Burning Question: How Does Game of Thrones Thrive?” (though caution, this has the terrible “mutliply number of subscribers by months GoT is on)

2017 – The Conversation“How Game of Thrones Became TV’s First Global Blockbuster” (Also, not really answering the same question, but a great read.)

2017 – Marketplace“Let’s Do the Numbers on Game of Thrones

Also, this pops up all the time on Quora, and the answers historically are either just revenue totals or way off. (However, I’ve started hopping in some of the threads to correct the record.)

Finally, I just today found this Wikipedia article on “the most highest grossing media franchises”. Like this morning.

Was the Wikipedia article on total revenue helpful?

In some ways, absolutely. In others, not.

Let’s start with the not. This Wikipedia article cites an article that misquotes a New York Times article, confusing HBO’s annual profit with Game of Thrones profit, which is how they estimate the series earned $4 to 5 billion in subscription revenue. Also, the video games and book sales are likely on the low end, and merchandise isn’t included. However, they pointed me to The-Numbers.com for physical disc sales—a website I used in my Star Wars series—and well, I wish I had found these specific pages before. (I couldn’t find them after a bunch of searching.)

So you updated your Game of Thrones home entertainment numbers?

Oh, no. But their estimates were mighty close to mine and I think it shows both the difficulty and fun of trying to get these estimates right. (When I dive back into Star Wars—around December this year #ClickBait—I’m going to tie The-Numbers estimates to that series too.) Anyways, I pulled the last 8 years of top 100 titles sold in physical disks (Blu-Ray and DVD) and calculated how much GoT earned. For fun, here’s a few other TV titles I saw too:

Table 1 - Total DVD Sales By Year

This is another data point that Game of Thrones is just a monster across every other category. The two other arguably biggest shows in TV at the time didn’t even make it past 2013 with sales. However, to put TV disc sales in context, they’re still dwarfed by movie sales. Here’s Harry Potter and Star Wars this decade:

Table 2 Total Movie Sales

Let’s take those numbers, and compare them to my estimates, and see how close I was:

Table 3 - Initial Estimates w THe Numbers

On the one hand, my numbers get to a gross revenue about twice as high, though my exact sales figures are nearly exact. Exact! 

Huh. What happened?

Well, to start, my initial number is lower, while my decay is similar. My sales figures after season four factor raised the price too, compensating for the idea of selling box sets. Or multiple seasons. I also estimated the sales in the last year.

Moreover, The-Numbers numbers have some limitations. First, these are US only numbers. Game of Thrones, as we’ve mentioned before, is huge overseas, including the UK, Australia and Germany, and Europe has a stronger home entertainment market than the US.

Second, these are only top 100 lists. We don’t have, for example, sales of previous seasons. (They never rated high enough to make the top 100, meaning they have a ceiling of $10 million in 2015, which is pretty high when you think about it.) Also, the biggest unit sales were for individual seasons. We don’t know how many box sets were sold in any given year for past seasons.

Third, this year is the year of the whole series box set. And I have 2 million units projected to sell for it this year and going forward. And even with the decline in home entertainment sales (see my later question on this), I still think it will be a thing. (I think entire Star Wars and Marvel Cinematic Universe box sets will be a thing too.)

Would you change your home entertainment estimates then?

Probably, I would drive my base case up by a little bit. I’d use this as the base case for the US—for new series sales. Then I’d have a library sales figure with some box sets driving up the US average. Then, I’d factor in international sales. However, I think the number would get pretty close to the estimates I already have. I’d consider moving down the top estimate to as well. However, these tweaks wouldn’t drastically change the model as HBO was only keeping 20% of these sales in my model.

How has the decay in physical discs impacted this analysis?

Sure, yeah, home entreatment is declining. It still $23 billion in total retail sales, which is more than streamers are displacing. In other words, the studios and all of entertainment will feel this loss at some point. Here’s the total home entertainment sales by year:

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