Category: The Great Irishman Challenge – Theaters vs Streaming?

Should Disney Have Released Mulan to PVOD?: Part III of “Should Your Film Go Straight-To-Streaming?”

Last week, we figured out that Mulan was likely watched by 1.2 million Americans on its opening weekend. (Plus or minus 1-1.5 million.) We estimated this means it likely ends up with a global PVOD of $150 million.

But what I didn’t do was explain what all that data means.

Which is today’s article. As I was writing up my implications, I realized I was really writing another entry in my series on the changing film distribution landscape, “Should you release your film straight-to-streaming (Netflix)?” So here’s the latest version of that. As before (See Part I here or Part II here), I’ll be asking myself the questions.

Was the Mulan PVOD “experiment” worth it?

I’m probably too much of a stickler on language–I called out a much more influential strategic technology analyst on Twitter for mixing up aggregation and bundling this week–but I do believe terms of art have a role in setting strategy. Words have meaning and mixing them up can make for sloppy understanding.

The word “experiment” should be reserved for true experiments. Meaning scientifically rigorous processes to draw statistically significant conclusions. In business, this is incredibly hard to do. Most often, we have a sample size of “1”. Given that a company can’t split the universe into multiple alternate realities to see what happens, if they change their strategy they have only one data point to draw conclusions from. They only have the one strategy to adjust. It’s an “n of 1” as I wrote last Wednesday. Meaning we can’t draw conclusions from it.

I prefer “test” instead.

Fine, was the Mulan “test” worth it?

Probably not. Because most “tests” really don’t help refine strategy. Strategically, it’s usually a mistake to run “tests” that muddy your strategy and/or consumer value/brand proposition. In this case, Mulan was huge news. With tens of millions of dollars on the line, you shouldn’t run “tests”, but make strategic decisions that align with your long term strategy.

As it is, Disney got the data that PVOD sales didn’t match their expectations. Consider a question I’ll ask later: What if Disney had released Hamilton on PVOD? Then arguably the test would have worked! But the true difference is one film was the most popular musical of the last decade, and the other was a live-action adaptation. The track record on live-action remakes is more mixed: they’ve had a much more up and down reception. (The Lion King and Beauty and the Beast did really well; Cinderella less so.) In other words, we could have guessed that Mulan could not launch well but Hamilton would have.

But that’s why Disney needs to decide if PVOD is a part of their strategy or not going forward.

Okay, my last try: “Was the Mulan PVOD release strategy the best one to maximize revenue?”

That is the best way to ask the question! Thanks, me.

I think it wasn’t. With the caveat that I’m second guessing the executives, let’s review the options Disney had in front of them. They could release in theaters now, or next year. They could try the PVOD test. They could release in TVOD. Or go straight to SVOD on Disney+.

Trying to run the numbers wouldn’t really help since it would require tons of estimates and just guess work. But if we’re ranking the options, my gut is Disney ended up choosing the 3rd or 4th worst option. I’d do it this way:

1. Release on TVOD in September in Disney+ territories, theaters elsewhere.
2. Release in September in theaters globally, with a shortened window.
3. Release sometime next year in theaters globally.
4. Release on PVOD in September as above.
5. Release straight to SVOD in Disney+ territories, theaters elsewhere.

Here’s my logic for number one: Mulan had higher brand equity than Trolls: World Tour, so it would have generated more interest. Indeed, the biggest release tactic that held Mulan back wasn’t the price, it was the distribution strategy. However, you could convince me that options 2 and 3 could have beat option 1.

As I wrote a few weeks back about “exclusive distribution channels” when it came to Spotify, Podcasts and Joe Rogan, when you go “exclusive” you artificially limit your upside. Disney essentially opted for the same path here. The problem was their exclusive channel doesn’t look to be worth it. Essentially, TVOD would have expanded the footprint by so much that it would likely have generated more sales. So that’s my number 1 option to maximize revenue. (And a lower price I think would have further convinced folks to buy it.)

What about the new subscribers Mulan brought in?

Uh, look at the Antenna data of new sign-ups in context of past releases:

antenna-longer-time-period-1

In other words, Mulan didn’t drive new subscribers. Because it was PVOD, fundamentally, it didn’t help with retention either. The number of new subscribers is barely statistically significant.

What about releasing in theaters?

Unlike Universal, Disney hasn’t been expressly antagonistic to theater chains. (Though as soon as AMC and Comcast agreed on a deal, they publicly became best buddies again.) So assuming Disney could have sold the theater chains on it, yes there is a chance they could have released Mulan in theaters followed by a simultaneous or 3 weeks later PVOD release. That would have made more money than PVOD only.

The logic for me is simple: give multiple options for customers to watch a film. The challenge is most theaters in huge markets are still closed. It’s that uncertainty that is hurting theaters more than anything. And the theater chains would have fought fiercely.

Could Disney have held it until next year?

They could, but three things are holding them back. Which I’ve been struggling to explain all summer, and think I just figured out.

First, the financial cost of capital. Which is the idea that if you spend $200 million to make a film, the goal is to eventually make $216 million accounting for inflation since the entertainment industry’s cost of capital is roughly 8%. (No matter what else you know about entertainment, that’s the key math.) If you wait a year, you need to make 8% extra to cover the costs of the delay. That’s the damage “cost of capital” does to a cash flow statement.

(Want an explainer on net present value/the time value of money? Go here.)

For big films, this is clearly worth it; smaller films it isn’t. If the next Fast and Furious film does a billion dollars, taking the 8% cost of capital hit is better than a 60% total revenue hit. Using this logic, Disney should have moved it back.

The second cost, though, may be the real driver. That of what I’m calling “organizational” cost of capital. If everyone moves their films back simultaneously, the problem is many of those films can’t release at the same time. And that means you can’t start making new films, since they won’t have anywhere to go.

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Mulan vs Tenet: I (Don’t) Declare a Winner

At first, I was tempted to call “Mulan vs Tenet” the biggest battle of the streaming wars. Each weekend in September, we’ve eagerly awaited answers to the hottest questions in film: Will Tenet save theaters? Will Mulan blow up the model? Who is making more money? Who is WINNING?!?!?

It turns out that the answer to the first two questions is probably no. As for the third and fourth, well, that’s tricky to answer. But since it’s the logical follow-up to my article on Monday, I’ll do my best.

But I wouldn’t call this a battle. If anything it’s a “skirmish” on one end of the larger distribution battle. (The sort of way that Pickett’s Charge was one tactical engagement in the larger Battle of Gettysburg.) Just because it is a skirmish doesn’t mean it isn’t important. Skirmishes are what win or lose battles! (For want of a nail…) 

So after three weeks of data, let’s analyze what we know. Here’s the outline of today’s article:

– First, two lessons on data that set the terms of the debate.
– Second, an analysis of what we know about each film, including US box office, International box office, and PVOD sales to date.
– Third, thoughts on each film’s revenue potential after these initial windows.
– Fourth, a comparison between the two films and declaring a winner.

Kidding! I won’t do that last part because I don’t know the answer. Moreover, I won’t draw giant conclusions about what this means for the future of film. Because frankly two films won’t fundamentally change the landscape. But I’ll explain that point in future articles. For now, the performance of these films to date.

(Also, I found that I was linking to a lot of my articles explaining the business of film. To keep this article clean and not polluted with links, I put a “reading list” at the bottom.)

Bottom Line, Up Front

– Comparing the box office of Tenet to PVOD of Mulan is comparing two different windows to each other. That isn’t apples to apples.
– That said, we can’t know the future value of either film because both “inputs” are “n of 1” meaning so unique that we can’t build a model.
Tenet will likely gross $325-350 in global box office.
Mulan will likely gross $70-100 million in global box office.
Mulan will end up with likely $155 million in global PVOD (with a big range of $105-$270 million.)
– As for lifetime earnings? No one really knows, because there aren’t good comps to make accurate estimates.

Two Data Lessons: Apples to Apples and “n of 1”

My primary job on this site, as I see it, is to explain the entertainment business. You can find lots of places on the internet opining about the entertainment business; I’m trying to teach you why it works the way it does. And in the “Mulan v Tenet” debate, I see two major mistakes being made.

First, Apples-To-Apples

That’s my simple term for comparing like-to-like. In some ways, statistics/data analysis/science is essentially the quest for comparing things like-to-like as much as possible. That way you can isolate the the true drivers of causality. (That’s why random controlled trials are random and controlled.)

Here’s a simple example from last week: folks saw that 7 Park’s data was much larger than peer analytics companies for Mulan’s debut. The key, though, was that they were measuring eight days of data, and not just the opening weekend. They were also measuring the percentage of folks who watched Mulan who were active users, not all subscribers. Once you accounted for this, their math (1.5 million subscribers), was close to other estimates (1 million at the low end for Antenna and 1.1 from Samba TV). Comparing things apples-to-apples solved the problem.

In “Mulan v Tenet”, the key question/claim at the center of the debate misunderstands this notion. Consider these major windows of movie revenue:

IMAGE 1 - Table Second Window Waterfall

The question I’ve seen written and been asked repeated is, “Is Mulan making more than Tenet?” We could reframe it based on the windows in question. Basically, “Is Mulan making more money in PVOD than Tenet in domestic box office?” That would look like this:

IMAGE 2 - MvT Current Debate

But this isn’t the right question. It’s comparing apples-to-hammers. (A Chuck Klosterman phrase.) Look:

Image 3 - MvT Good

This framing really sets the terms of debate better, in my opinion. Even after Tenet leaves theaters, it can go to US domestic TVOD and home entertainment. So even if the answer to the current question is, “Yes, Mulan has likely made more in PVOD than Tenet at the domestic box office,” the question doesn’t make sense.

(Since PVOD wasn’t a window when I first made this table, I added it above. And I summarized all digital/streaming the “pay windows” to show the timeline better.) 

Really the question is, who will make more domestic revenue? So we should fill in this whole chart, accounting for blacked out windows:

Screen Shot 2020-09-23 at 1.23.54 PM

And we can see that two big chunks of revenue for that are the same: who will make more in Pay 1, Pay 2 and library distribution? (That means all the future revenue implied by streaming (like Netflix), airing on premium channels (like HBO), cable (like TNT) and other places. Now that question is tricky because of our next data point.)

“n” of 1

I was inspired by the “n” of 1 after reading earlier this year an article in the Economist about the rise of “n” of 1 medicine. “n” is statistics jargon for sample size. If you poll 3,000 folks about the Presidency, your “n” is 3,000. If your sample size is all Americans, that’s a sample (population technically) of 300 million. “n” of 1 medicine is referring to treatments designed for one individual with a unique life-threatening condition. It means the “sample size” is so unique it’s a category by itself.

This applies to box office and film revenue analysis. When we make forecasts based on opening weekend performance, we can do that because movies are similar and we can account for the differences to compare things apples-to-apples. Hence, we use Marvel films to forecast how much money films based on superheroes will make, while accounting for the time of year of the release and various other factors. (Scott Mendelson at Forbes is my favorite analyst at this.)

Once we have box office, we can use its results to forecast all the other windows a feature film is sold into. That’s how my film forecasting model works. It’s a fairly accurate system. We can also do it for PVOD, TVOD, streaming, TV and any revenue stream. Once we have an input, we can derive the rest.

The challenge for both Mulan and Tenet is they are unprecedented. They are without comps in the United States because: 1. No other blockbuster film has released during a pandemic that closed 70% of theaters and 2. No other film released to Disney+ exclusively for a one-time $30 payment. 

Because of this, making any forecasts about profitability is perilous. Or should I say, highly uncertain. Meaning, while I know what Mulan did in PVOD—see Monday—I’m much more uncertain about what this means for future windows. Conversely, while I know how well Tenet is doing, I don’t know what that means for future revenue streams, since Tenet is only available in 70% of US markets, that account for about 40% ticket sales.

So let’s start with what we do know.

The Data: International and US Box Office, Mulan PVOD and Forecasts

The easiest data to find is domestic and international box office. Since Tenet has been out a bit longer, it’s getting easier to see what its final total will be. So I’ve included the likely final box office total ranges offered by Scott Mendelson.

IMAGE 5 - Box Office with Rnagers

Are those numbers good or bad? Well, we’re in the middle of a pandemic, so who knows? As Mendelson makes the case, for an original material sci-fi live action film, Tenet is doing really well!

Meanwhile, even the ranges on Tenet are fairly uncertain. I put $350 million as the likely ceiling, but if New York and California reopen theaters, there could be give it a late boost (and stronger “legs”) as folks go to see it. Or not! A recovery that happens quickly is also unlikely so it could stay middling. 

Meanwhile, we know from Monday about how well Mulan is doing on PVOD.

IMAGE 6 Mulan Summary PVOD

The wildcard of the Mulan PVOD numbers is the fact that Mulan wasn’t just PVOD in the United States, but globally where Disney+ is available. My analysis from Monday focused on US analytics firms since there aren’t a lot of estimates for global performance. It turns out Mulan was released in every Disney+ territory but France and India, which includes these territories:

IMAGE 7 - Territories and Price

You’ll note it’s also cheaper in dollar terms in other territories. Time to go to the comps. What I did was find the last five Disney live-action remakes, pull down their box office by territory, and use that as a comp for demand:

IMAGE 8 - Disney Live Action Comps

The way to read this chart is that the “Disney+ territories that have Mulan” tend to account for 43-75% of the box office of the United States box office. Great! That becomes our tool to forecast PVOD revenue in those other territories. My low will be 40% (slightly lower than the Jungle Book comp) and I made a high of 100% based on Scott Mendelson’s back-of-the-envelope estimate. I consider that the far outlier, but with this much uncertainty that’s okay. Here’s the results:

IMAGE 9 Mulan International

Of course, I had high case and low case forecasts from Monday, which we could combine. The worry with our estimates now is that we’re making estimates on estimates, which doubles the uncertainty. Which you’ll see in how big our range is getting:

Screen Shot 2020-09-23 at 1.27.19 PM

What do we know? We have estimates for how Tenet and Mulan both did in their opening “windows”, one of which was PVOD/theatrical, and one which was theatrical only.

What don’t we know? What comes next.

The Comparison: Mulan v Tenet

Here’s a rough look at the current revenue of both Mulan and Tenet. As in how much each film has brought their studios as of this (rough) moment, roughly through their first month of releases:

IMAGE 11 Current Revenue

To answer the question I said you shouldn’t ask up above, yes Mulan globally has made more money than Tenet as of this moment. Crucially, the presumed 90% net take beats the 50% domestic/35% international split of theatrical. (Though I think that Disney’s split with PVOD partners like Apple, and Amazon may actually be lower than 90%, but don’t know for sure.) Here’s the look at the question I said we should ask:

IMAGE 12 Lifetime Estimate

I love this look because it clarifies how much we don’t know. Which is frankly how much Tenet will make on TVOD/DVD, how much Mulan will make in home entertainment, how much more Tenet can make by going to premium cable, and how much both will make in streaming.

Why not try to estimate it? 

Because I don’t believe the Tenet or Mulan numbers are good comps for forecasting. 

If Tenet’s US box office is depressed because of Covid-19, then it’s home entertainment could make as much as Trolls: World Tour or Mulan at home. Meaning it could have as large a window as Mulan had since 60% of theatrical attendees couldn’t see it. It’s rumored that Mulan will go wide on TVOD (including iTunes, Amazon and maybe even Pay-Per-View), but I don’t know if that viewership has already been cannibalized by this PVOD experiment. If it hasn’t, it could add 33% more revenue as Trolls: World Tour did when it went cheaper on TVOD in July.

Meanwhile, Tenet will eventually be on HBO and likely HBO Max. But Mulan will stay on Disney+ exclusively? Could I calculate that exclusivity value? Nope. Because I still don’t know enough about Disney subscribers to conclude that this PVOD experiment drove subscribers or that Mulan will have good replay value on the platform. (Unlike Netflix, who we have multiple years of US-only data to parse.)

This is the “n of 1” problem I discussed above. There are so many conflicting variables that my usual methods of forecasting are out the window. Same for the studios. They’ll basically have to collect the revenue and see what shakes out.

Thus, at $35 million dollars difference between the two, I’m calling this a push. It’s as likely Tenet makes more money for Warner Bros. as it is Mulan makes more money for Disney.

In short, we’ll never really know who “won” this skirmish since our numbers are close enough to call it a draw. I’d add, using one proxy for demand, Google Trends, it looks like Mulan peaked higher, but Tenet may last longer.

IMAGE 13 G Trends Tenet vs Mulan WW

As for how demand shifts from here, we’ll see as they release on additional platforms.

Reading List

Really, this article is a continuation of this series I started in December on “Should You Release Your Film Straight to Netflix? Part I” and “Part II” In that series, I explore the economics of taking a film straight to streaming.

Previously, I built a model on how to forecast “revenue” for straight to streaming titles in this series, “The Great Irishman Project”. It’s fairly tricky to forecast streaming revenue, but definitely possible. (Netflix does it!) See my methods explained here.

I also built and explained a film finance model for feature films released traditionally, which I first explained back when I launched the site in a series evaluating the Disney-Lucasfilm acquisition.

1.2 Million Folks Bought Mulan in the US During It’s Opening Weeknd: The (Not) Definitive Analysis of Disney’s Mulan Experiment

How many folks bought Mulan?

That’s the buzziest question in the streaming wars right now.

Since we don’t know, we’re left to pick at the analytics tea leaves. Fortunately, as each day passes, we’ve got more tea leaves to pick through.

(Partly, the question is relevant because it gets to the buzziest question, “Who’s winning, Tenet or Mulan?”. I’ll answer that on Wednesday.)

Far from throwing my hands up, I’ve started to realize these tea leaves are signal not noise. So if/until Disney tells us otherwise, I’ve done my best to compile all the Mulan on Disney+ data we have. Consider this a “meta-analysis” on Mulan. First, I’ll summarize each data source and what it tells us, next I’ll try to compare this to Trolls: World Tour, then I’ll compare all the data sources, and finally I’ll make my estimates for Mulan’s performance.

(I covered some of these data points in a column and Tweet thread two weeks ago. Today, I’m updating all that data and tossing in my estimates at the end. Also, if you’re new to the EntStrategyGuy, my newsletter goes out every two weeks with links to my writings and the favorite things I read over the last two weeks.)

To start, though…

Bottom Line, Up Front

Don’t want to read the entire thing? Fine, here are the talking points you can deliver confidently without reading the whole article.

— The story about Mulan’s performance is remarkably consistent, if you ensure you are comparing “Apples to Apples”.
— Right now, I’m fairly confident at estimating that its opening weekend Mulan was purchased about 1.2 million times. (Other estimates range between 1 to 1.5 million, giving us a fairly tight range.)
— That implies that it made about $36 million on its opening in total revenue.
— Based on its rapid decay, the Trolls: World Tour comp and the fact that it will only be in PVOD for 8 weeks, I estimate Mulan will generate about $90 million in US sales over its lifetime. (Based on the estiamtes, this could be as smalls $75 million and as high as $135 million.)

What We Know: 6 Different Sources Tell a Remarkably Similar Story about Mulan

Disney took a big swing by releasing Mulan straight to Disney+ (and only Disney+) for $30 a pop. That left multiple analytics firms—each vying to get new customers to buy its data, a important point about self-interest to note—to fill in the gap. Reelgood said one thing about the popularity; Samba TV said something else; Antenna said something else and then Yahoo took 7 Park’s data in a completely different direction.

The better analogy than tea leaves is actually the old parable about the elephant and the five blind men. Each grabs a different part of the elephant, so feels something different. That applies to our measurement firms. One is measuring viewership; another purchases; another app downloads. Toss in different time periods and sources, and it seems bewildering.

But if you put the whole picture together, it’s not that confusing. After 7 Park put out a great thread clarifying their data this weekend, I’m fairly convinced each source is telling the roughly same picture.

Source 1: Google Trends

This source is so easy anyone can use it. So be careful. Google tracks search traffic data which has been shown to be a very good proxy for interest. Here’s the time period going back to when Covid-19 started featuring top streaming films:

G Trends - PVOD Comparison

What’s the simple takeaway? Interest in Hamilton far outpaced anything else in the straight-to-streaming space. (See my article in Decider for details.) This, for me, is the context of Mulan.

However, since we’re triangulating on Disney+, it’s also worth looking at a “Disney+ only” look:

G Trends - PVOD Disney Only v02

Mulan was big, but paled in comparison to Hamilton.

Source 2: Antenna

Antenna tracks subscription behavior across a range of services such as iTunes, Amazon Fire TV, Roku, Google Play and others. Last week, they released their analysis of Mulan’s opening weekend in this great chart:

Antenna Longer Time Period

This is the most skeptical look I have of Mulan’s huge driver in interest from Disney. Yes, it helped boost sign-ups for Disney+, but less than any other major theatrical driver of the last few months. Also note how this aligns/correlates with Google Trend data, but not perfectly. Black is King did better than Mulan, according to Antenna, but Google Trends has lower interest. (Google Trends has more interest in Artemis Fowl than Black is King.) 

There is a similar story with Frozen 2 driving more sign-ups than Onward according to Antenna, and Google Trends telling an opposite story. (This explanation is fairly simple: Frozen 2 launched right as lockdowns started, so that’s more the story of lockdowns driving parents to subscriber, not interest in Frozen 2.)

Antenna’s data goes further on Mulan. They also used their data to breakdown Mulan purchases by sign-up time period. 

Antenna Subscriber Percentages

Antenna also  released purchases by sign-up time period. So I took those numbers, and combined them with the above chart to give us this estimate of the average % of subscribers who dropped $30 on Mulan:

Antenna Subscriber Purchas Rate

Save that number, we’ll get back to it. But it’s not the only look Antenna provided. They gave some data to LightShed Partners (and then tweeted it), which compares daily sales of various PVOD releases with “purchases by day”:

Antenna Daily Purchases

This is great because we can use a few numbers to compare Trolls: World Tour sales to Mulan. Hang on to this number too. And pay attention to those steep decay curves.

Source 3: 7 Park

7Park is another data analytics firm, though they don’t clarify where and how their data is collected. However, they have been releasing streaming data for a while now.

7 Park entered the data fray this week with a buzzy article on Yahoo, that slightly oversold the analysis. 7 Park measured, through the first 12 days of September (which covers through Saturday of Mulan’s second weekend), the percentage of users who watched Mulan among all Disney+ users during the time period measured. That italicized portion is key. Which is why Mulan could get 29% of streams during its opening weekend, but then a much smaller number when you look at Q3 to date:

7 Park Long Time Period

How does that 10.3% compare to Antenna and Google Trends? Favorably. As 7 Park pointed out in their thread, the demand ratio from Hamilton to Mulan matches Google Trend very well. As for their data versus Antenna, they measure different things. One compares to subscriber base while the other compares to active users. Assuming active users are between 50-75% of the total subscriber based, then the numbers tell a similar story.

Source 4: Samba TV

Samba TV measures viewership on connected TVs specifically. Samba TV also ran an analysis on Mulan viewership, from the opening weekend, coming up with the number that 1.12 million folks purchased Mulan during the opening weekend. It’s unclear if this is connected TV’s only or if they extrapolated out to all customers. Does this match the other numbers? Yes, as we’ll see.

Source 5: Sensor Tower

Sensor Tower measures application downloads. For the streaming wars, they track how often folks are installing streaming application. (Hedgeye analyst extraordinaire Andrew Freedman uses their data to forecast Netflix and Disney+ subscribers fairly well.) According to Sensor Tower, Mulan drove a week-over-week increase in downloads of 68%, which compares to 79% for Hamilton during its opening weekend. This is a bit lower than the Antenna, 7Park or Google Trends data. Sensor Tower only tracks mobile viewing, which may explain the difference.

Source 5: Reelgood

The biggest outlier is Reelgood’s data. Reelgood is an application that helps folks find and curate their streaming offerings. Reelgood uses their data (they claim 2 million users) to then estimate demand for various titles. Here’s their chart with notably the streams as a percentage of top 20 streams.

Reelgood Top 20 copy

This genuinely surprised me since customers had to purchase Mulan, which should have decreased its viewership. Instead, in a follow up, Reelgood said that Mulan actually surpassed Hamilton, which only had 9.68% of streams. This is the only source that implies that demand for Mulan was higher than Hamilton. So it’s our biggest outlier.

Missing Sources

Just to note, of the major sources I track, Nielsen and Parrot Analytics both haven’t entered the Mulan fray. The reason is that both focus on TV series with their publicly available data. (Though Nielsen does have feature film viewership data.)

Trolls Would Tour Comparison

That’s the data, let’s make the comparisons. First, here is the leaked details or estimates of Trolls: World Tour’s performance.

Screen Shot 2020-09-21 at 12.59.08 PM

Unlike Disney (so far), Comcast was much more willing to leak positive data about their Trolls: World Tour experiment. A few things to note, these estimates aren’t quite as steep as Antenna’s data, but match real world churn/decay better. We’ve seen this with other streaming titles where the opening weekend is about half the viewership of the first month or so of a title. And then with trolls the opening month is about half the viewership of the title lifetime to date.

This point may be interesting, but its definitely possible that about as many folks watched Trolls: World Tour after it dropped to $6 to rent then watched at $20. This chart from The-Numbers shows how popular Trolls: World Tour was even 3 months after PVOD:

DEG At home

WIth these numbers, we can compare purchases between Trolls: World Tour and Mulan using Antenna’s data. I did this by measuring the various peaks in the above Antenna chart with purchases by day.  Which made this chart:

Antenna Demand as Trolls

Since they’re decaying at roughly the same rate, we can use this to estimate Mulan sales. In other words, I estimate that Mulan had about 61% of the sales of Trolls: World Tour on PVOD. The caveat is that Mulan is available in less places than Trolls or Scoob, meaning demand could have been as high, but without additional TVOD channels it reached less customers. But that still results in lower sales/demand.

Comparing all the Sources

Wow. So if you’re still with me, here’s my summary of everything we know. Here are the estimates I derived for purchases for the first weekend, where the data allowed me to make that estimate:

Summary Comparison v01

Let me explain this. Given that Antenna and 7 Park are percentages of subscribers or active users, the 15-35 million are potential ranges of Disney subscribers/users. Then I picked the number that is my current “best guess” for each. In other words, I think Disney+ has about 30 million US subscribers, and about 20 million active users in a given quarter. If you disagree, pick another input. For Samba TV, I just used their estimates. For Trolls: World Tour I multiplied the estimated 2.25 million Trolls opening weekend customers (40 million divided by $20) by 61%, the rough proportion from the chart above.

All these sources say about 1.1-1.4 million folks watched on the opening weekend. Splitting the difference, and picking the number I like best, gives me an estimate of 1.2 million.

From there, we can estimate lifetime sales. I’m using my estimate that opening weekend will generate 50% of the first month’s sales. Both Antenna and Google Trends back this up. For example, it has already seen a second weekend drop in demand of about 75% in Google Trends. Also, given this decay, I think its second month will only see about 20% more sales:

Summary Estimate Lifetime

Using best case scenarios (33% viewing in the second month, 1.5 million opening weekend), I get to $135 million lifetime PVOD. Using worst case, I get to $75 million.

Phew. I’m wiped out. There are tons more issues to unpack, especially how this compares to Tenet. But I’ll do that next time.

Should You Release Your Movie Straight to Netflix? Part II: The Streaming (nee Netflix) Counter-Arguments

Last December, I started a series whose goal was to valiantly defend the theatrical distribution model. This doesn’t come (only) from some soft spot in my heart for theaters, but from the economics of making movies. Studios can earn a lot more money by releasing their films theatrically. I’ve taken to calling this the “Booksmart Conundrum”.

Nevertheless, the question I asked last winter—“Should you release your film straight-to-streaming (Netflix) or to theaters?—is as relevant now as ever. Indeed, it’s almost quaint to imagine an article from last December is still relevant, given all that’s happened:

– Coronavirus came and closed theaters.
– Comcast (via Universal) released Trolls: World Tour straight-to-video.
– Disney put Artemis Fowl straight to Disney+, and later Hamilton.
– Netflix bought the rights to countless films and put them straight on its service too.

Does all that news invalidate my article series? Far from it. Here’s the plan. I’m going to continue my Q&A as I had it planned last December. Then, I’ll dedicate an entire article to the post-Coronavirus landscape and it’s implications. 

So let’s do it.

Question: Seriously, you’re going to pretend “Covid-19/Coronavirus” never happened?

Not at all. Obviously the immediate impacts are real and I’m monitoring them in my weekly column. (Example of my latest back in June, here.)

But the core economics of releasing films in one streaming window versus multiple windows starting with theaters hasn’t really changed. They may have been tweaked given some of the new behaviors—but you know I’m skeptical on that—but Coronavirus is the “Asterisk Extraordinaire” of our time. The more confident someone is in predicting the future impact of Covid-19, the more likely they are to be wrong.

What matters for studios in the immediate term is when traditional theatrical releases restart. I still maintain that will happen before the end of the year, and likely in August. And when that happens 90% of the model will be intact. So that’s what we’ll discuss in this series.

Question: Fine, can you remind me where we were?

Sure, because I had to do it myself. To start, I finally built a straight-to-streaming financial model for films. This means that via Netflix Datecdote I can estimate how much money an individual film made for Netflix. How cool!

You can read how I built the model, why it works, and the results for The Irishman here. I built this model at the behest of the venerable Richard Rushfield for his Ankler newsletter, and showed how I can use this model very recently when I calculated the results for Extraction on Netflix too. I would add, Nina Metz at the Chicago Tribune did a great write up on my methodology too.

The most useful part of a model, though, isn’t the results but what the model tells you about how the world works. That’s the point of this series: take the model and use it to draw insights about streaming versus theatrical business models. In Part I, we focused on how much money a film makes in the various “windows” it transitions through. No matter how you cut it, theatrical distribution is a huge part of that window. Over 30% easily, but that’s actually rising as home video declines. (Also don’t neglect how home entertainment, TVOD, EST, and premium cable can add to the bottom line too.)

Another key insight is how much better the margins are better for theatrical viewing than they are for viewing at home. As a result, if you don’t release in theaters, you’re giving away potential revenue. Did I calculate this specifically for Netflix? I did, and found out, under a pretty reasonable scenario, they could have easily left $750 million dollars on the table in 2019.

Question: Three quarters of a billion dollars? Why would Netflix do that? If you were making the strongest pro-straight to streaming argument, what would it be?

The folks at Netflix aren’t crazy. They can build these models too. And the folks at Amazon tried to release their films in theaters. The most generous explanation I can give would go like this:

When a film goes to theaters first, it risks being viewed as unpopular if it flops. That would destroy the value on the streaming platform. Moreover, by going straight-to-streaming, Netflix and others have the added value of exclusivity on the platform, driving new subscribers. This is really the point of putting films on streaming anyways, to acquire and retain subscribers.

That’s really two explanations in one. First, failure at the box office destroys value and second that exclusivity raises value.

Q: Is this a strawman, or do you have someone making this argument explicitly?

This is the argument Scott Stuber—Netflix head of film— made to Variety at their conference. His quote:

IMAGE 1 - Stuber to Variety QuoteEssentially, he’s more afraid that film will bomb at the box office than it won’t perform on his service.

Well, I have a two word answer for him:

Late Night.

Q: What does Late Night have to do with it?

Read More

Read My Latest at The Ankler (Paywall): Are Superhero Movies Doomed?

If you don’t follow me on social or subscribe to my newsletter, you may have missed my latest guest article at The Ankler (behind a paywall). It’s a short one, but a goody. 

In it I compared Netflix’s recent Hard R action films, and their “datecdotes”, to Netflix’s other big swings, like Bird Box and The Irishman. It’s behind The Ankler’s paywall, but worth it to find out about my provocative title. Not to step on the toes, but I don’t see how $15 a month streaming will ever make $200 million production budget feature films profitable. And this has ramifications for superhero, sci-fi and even animated films. Even if you don’t buy that thesis, it has a good comparison of all their films recent performance.

Check it out!

Should You Release Your Movie Straight to Netflix? Part I: The basic maths

Since 2019 started, there has been a debate among the entertainment biz literati (you know who they are):

Should you keep releasing your films in theaters, or go straight to streaming?

I first saw this in January when some folks on Twitter argued Disney should release Star Wars films straight-to-streaming now that Disney+ was coming. (My rebuttal here.) Then, when Booksmart flopped, I saw this debate take over Twitter. In short, why bother looking bad releasing in theaters, when you can go to Netflix and get 40 million views?

The Booksmart-esque examples kept coming. Late Night’s flop brought Amazon to the debate. Then Brittany Runs a Marathon. It got so bad, Amazon got out of the theatrical release business altogether. (So the big-for-Amazon Aeronauts abandoned traditional theatrical in exchange for a “four wall” strategy like Netflix.)

Meanwhile, this question is on every company’s mind. Netflix doesn’t do theatrical runs; Amazon just left the business; Apple is figuring out what it wants to do; Disney, Warner Bros and Universal are leaning into theatrical, except when they aren’t as Disney did with Lady and the Tramp. Paramount is an arms dealer at its finest. Let’s not sugar coat how important this question is. It’s literally a billion dollar question, per company! 

Getting this question right is business strategy at it’s finest: so who’s making the right call?

Judging by the online narrative, the Netflix supporters say Netflix. Most “arguments” for going straight-to-streaming seem to rely on personal experience, first, and Netflix’s stock price, second. Hardly ever do I see the piece of information I love most: numbers. (Strategy is numbers!)

Before I finished my series on The Great Irishman Challenge, I would have had trouble relying on anything more than qualitative/narrative explanations too. Without a model, testing assumptions or quantifying the financial impact of these strategic implications would have been little more than guesswork. But since I have it, I think I can try to quantify some aspects of this debate better than I’ve seen before. 

This debate has so many components, arguments and counter-arguments, that as I wrote my response, it was fairly jumbled. To organize my thinking, I’m deploying a “question and answer” format. Which I think helps. Still, before I get to that here’s my…

Bottom Line, Up Front

While very small films or historically poor performing theatrical films—think documentaries or foreign language films—may benefit from going straight-to-streaming, the vast majority of “studio films”—larger than $5 million production budgets, will make much more money for their producers by having theatrical distribution. (On average.) The “strategic” benefits of skipping the theatrical window don’t exist in practice as much as theory. So much so I call it the “straight-to-streaming trap”. 

Question: If you only had two words, why should movies avoid the “straight-to-streaming” trap?

Avengers: Endgame.

Q: Okay, explain.

Well, it made $2.7 billion (with a b) dollars in theatrical box office. Of course, Disney doesn’t keep all of that in revenue. Depending if it is US or international, Disney keeps 35-50%, and less in China. Still, I’d estimate Disney kept about $1.1 billion (and even that is low considering how powerful Disney’s bargaining power is with studios).

Assuming a $350 million production budget and a $200 million marketing budget, after just theatrical distribution, Disney has $550 million in gross profit to split with talent. In just one window! That doesn’t factor in toys, DVDs, electronic rentals or future streaming/cable value. Just one window netted over half a billion dollars. 

I honestly can’t fathom a scenario where Disney would have made more money by ignoring theatrical. (Again, that was my thesis back in January about Star Wars, but these are equivalent franchises.) That’s like having a barrel of oil and not refining the entire thing.

Q: Excuse me, oil?

Oil. Every year, one of the best things I read is The Economist’s Christmas Double Issue. Two years ago, they had a graphic about how a barrel of oil is refined into its component parts. Here’s the link for subscribers, but they had the whole thing on Google Images:

Image 1 - Economist Oil 20171223_XMC600_weblarge.png

In short, a barrel of oil is sort of like the not-quite-true aphorism that the Native American’s used every part of the buffalo. (Which was taken to another extreme by American meat packing at the turn of the century, who used every part of the pig/cow. Read Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle for details.)

871878e86165ef98858ea0235551942d

(Source: The Far Side cartoon. How is that not a piece of IP up for sale?)

As oil companies heat a barrel of oil, the raw material separates into different types of chemicals that are then used for everything from gasoline to diesel fuel to sulphur to countless other compounds. This is necessary because different size oil molecules have different uses. The goal for the oil company when refining oil is to extract as much value as possible from the oil they spent real money bringing out of the ground.

I love this analogy for theaters. Each window is a heavier as in greater gross margin type of oil. Netflix is essentially skipping the heaviest molecules (theaters, home entertainment) for the lightest (digital streaming). Long term, that means a lot of lost potential revenue.

Q: And can we quantify that?

Yes, and that’s what I spent a chunk of November doing. Here’s the “financial revenue” waterfall I’ve been using for theatrical films. Actually, here’s how it’s looked historically:

Image 2 - Financial Waterfall Historically

And here are my recent assumptions:

IMAGE 3 - Financial Waterfall Now

In other words, if you skip theaters, there goes 35-40% of your revenue. (While box office isn’t rising, as a percentage of feature film revenue, it is increasing because home entertainment is shrinking. By next year, it may be 40% of a film’s take.) If you skip home entertainment, that’s another big chunk of revenue. And frankly, it makes sense that theaters make so much money because it’s more expensive to go.

Q: The gross margins are higher for theaters than streaming? Do you have numbers for that?

Frankly, these are the numbers that any discussion about Netflix and Amazon have to start with. You can end up where you want, but if you ignore these numbers you’re likely using fuzzy math to justify your preexisting conclusions.

So let’s take each window into rough “per person per film hour” revenue in the United States. Just to make it explicit. Theaters have an average ticket price of call it $10. (It’s slightly lower, but I like to round my numbers.) Since each person pays that to see a film, it’s a $5 per person per film hour for the average two hour film.

Now, compare that Netflix, where the average subscription watches 40 hours of content per month. (According to past leaks/surveys.) Since a US customer pays $12, that’s $0.30 per hour. But since more than one person can watch, we can assume 1.5 customers share that viewership. Which takes it down to $0.20 per film. Which leads to this crucial note on potential revenue:

The streaming window is 8% of the total revenue of the theatrical window per person.

As I said above, theatrical is much, much more lucrative for studios than streaming. (The specific way to calculate the value to Netflix of a film is different than the usage version above—see here for those—but this is to show the potential size difference for different windows.)

Q: So let’s ask the obvious: have you quantified how much Netflix could have made releasing films in theaters this year?

Rightey-oh I have. Let’s talk upside. I took a selection of Netflix’s most noteworthy/expensive films, and asked Twitter for ideas for some quick and dirty “upside” comps for them. (I focused on the most recent films as possible, and matching rating/genre primarily.) Here’s the list I settled on:

IMAGE 4 - Netflix Film Comps

There’s your headline/nut graph/lede at the end of the article: if Netflix released its 10 (arguably) most valuable films from December 2019 to December 2020 (with Bird Box sneaking in), it could have made $750 in additional cash flow to the bottom line in just theatrical box office. If Netflix had to throw in $50 million per film on this list in additional marketing (which feels high), that’s still $250 extra million.

I’d add this list isn’t a ridiculous list of comps. A Quiet Place is definitely the same sized hit that Netflix is portraying Bird Box, so that number is reasonable. Meanwhile, I put in a couple of films well under $100 million in total gross and a lot of other solid doubles. 

So why hasn’t Netflix looked at this revenue and jumped? I’d argue sloppy financial thinking. And changing their strategy has PR implications. Others, though, would argue it’s about exclusivity for their platform. (Presumably some folks would see it in theaters, but not on Netflix.) 

To keep this article from going too long, I’m going to continue the Q&A in my next article. Essentially, I’ll lay out and debate the pro-straight-to-streaming arguments in their own place.

How The Irishman Lost $280 Million: The Great Irishman Challenge Part IV – The Results

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

The biggest uncertainty in The Great Irishman Project was figuring out how well the film did with viewers in the first place. I was all set today to parse Nielsen’s estimates from last week, but doing so meant tons of estimating based on a very limited data set. So I waited.

Specifically, I had a suspicion that Netflix would feel forced to tell us something. They couldn’t let Nielsen drive the narrative for their most high profile picture of the year. Sure enough, we got the results today, as Ted Sarandos spoke at the UBS Media conference:

26.4 million subscribers watched 70% of The Irishman in its first week.
40 million are projected to watch in the first 28 days.

Huzzaw! Now we can be a lot more confident in our estimates.

Here’s today’s plan. First, I’ll given you the “Bottom Line, Up Front”. The results and my model. Second, I’ll discuss a few specific estimates and inputs I still had to make. Third, I’ll answer what I assume will be the most commonly asked questions or criticisms of my model. In Q&A format.

(Also, look for my write-up in The Ankler if you’re subscribed.)

Bottom Line, Up Front: Netflix will lose $280 million The Irishman

As I wrote in Part I, the goal was to make a scorecard, and here it is:

IMAGE 20 - Irishman Profiitability

For the full model, here you go:

Image 21 - Irishman Full Model

In other words, if this were a big budget tentpole from Disney or Warner Bros–whose flops have extremely public numbers–I think Netflix would have to write down the costs for “only” getting 40 million viewers in the first four weeks. This film was extremely expensive, and it’s already decaying fairly rapidly in viewership. Even with a bump from a Best Picture nomination, Netflix will lose money on this investment.

The Model Details

Even having built the model ahead of time, I had to make some assumptions. Here they are.

Determining US versus International Split

One of the big assumptions of my model right now is that international viewership is much less valuable than US viewership. I do this based on their reporter lower international “Average Revenue Per User” and higher churn rate overseas (from what I’ve been told/researched). As a result, the more US customers for a film (for now) the better it is financially for Netflix.

We have two data points to triangulate the split for The Irishman. First, we can look at historical box office trends of mobster films. According to all the films listed as “Mafia” in The-Numbers database, about 61% of box office comes from domestic versus international box office. For example, a film like American Hustle did $150 million in the US/Canada vs $107 million in the rest of the world. Black Mass from 2015 was even more weighted to the US: $62 million vs $36 million rest of world. (The Departed did $132 million US to $157 million rest of world.) This would imply viewership was skewed to the US.

Second, Nielsen provided their estimates that 13.2 million people watched The Irishman during its first five days of release. That’s almost exactly half of the 70% completion Netflix claims. If we assume this would increase with two more days viewership, again we get closer to 55-60% of viewership being in US/domestic.

I decided to use 62.5% US viewership for Netflix. This is pretty beneficial to Netflix, but makes sense. In all, since US viewers pay more on average for longer, this change benefits Netflix.

Changes to Best Picture Bump

My initial model assumed 25% more folks would watch on Netflix if The Irishman is nominated for Best Picture. I decided to bump this up to 25% first window revenue, since that’s a more accurate reflection of the box office bump. (That’s also a benefit to Netflix’s bottom line.)

Adding in Box Office?

I wanted to add in box office revenue, but Netflix hasn’t released any since this film wasn’t released in the traditional theatrical system. (Netflix rented out theaters and then collected the revenue themselves.) Given the limited number of theaters, I think leaving this out won’t drastically impact the bottom line. 

Frequently Asked Questions

I imagine a lot of folks have a lot of questions about this analysis. Let’s try to answer what I imagine are the most common.

What is the best case for Netflix?

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The Great Irishman Challenge – Appendix: How Confident Am I?

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

On Twitter, TV journalist and friend of the website Rick Ellis of All Your Screens pointed out that my model is likely not to be accurate:

You know what, he’s right!

I don’t have leaked Netflix internal accounting and data. This means that I have to make a lot of assumptions to build my models. The more assumptions in an estimate, the more sources for error. While estimates are naturally more accurate than forecasts, they’re still estimates. Meaning they are not an exact science.

Before I publish my results for The Irishman—my next article for those waiting—it’s worth probing what type of analysis this Great Irishman Project” is. As I’ve been thinking about it, I have three analogies to explain what I’m trying to do here, ranging from a weak to strong.

Analogy 1: The Scientific Method

This is the gold standard. Arguably, the very principle that has driven human progress for the last 500 years.

And it doesn’t apply here.

I know, I know. It would be great if it did. But to apply the scientific method means starting with a hypothesis, then gathering data to prove or disprove it. That’s not my approach at all. I’m building models based on my experience and data. Which are “scientific”, but I can’t “test” them on Netflix’s releases.

The streamers specifically have reams and reams of data. They can set theories and test whether they are correct on marketing, user experience and sometimes content. (However, they often overhype their data and stretch the limits of statistical accuracy.) Unfortunately, for yours truly, Netflix and Disney and other companies will never tell me if I am right or even super close with my models, so I can’t ever test my hypotheses.

Since we’re talking scientific method, it’s also worth pointing out that lots of data analysis at technology, consulting and really all companies is “faux scientific method” too. At their best, companies can set out hypotheses, and run tests to see what works best for their customers. At their worst, companies just collect a ton of data and use the data that supports their preexisting beliefs. That’s not the scientific method. (I can’t count the number of times I’ve seen a boss parsing a quad chart for connections that are noise, not signal.)

Analogy 2: Sports

One of my inspirations for this website was the boom in top notch sports writing. Specifically, the top tier analysts. Folks like Zach Lowe or Kevin Arnovitz on basketball, Bill Barnwell in football, Pete Zayas for the Lakers, or Chris Harris on fantasy football. These folks don’t just report the news, but analyze the what and how of sports. They provide deeper insights than just the box score, whether they use scouting, film breakdown or analytics.

I’ve tried to fill the same need in entertainment business. This industry is filled with a phenomenal amount of great reporters, but not the rigorous analysis I needed when I worked in entertainment. (There’s also a lot of great investor-side analysts, but they usually charge an arm and a leg for their work. Their focus is also less on strategy and more on stock price. Which is great for their clients, but not quite what entertainment professionals need.)

There are two huge differences between sports analysis and entertainment strategy analysis, though. First, I don’t have nearly as much data. For sports, even casual observers can now get advanced analytics, from Basketball Reference to NBA.com to Cleaning the Glass. Second, we don’t get the “results” beyond quarterly earnings reports, and even those can be woefully incomplete for streaming. Imagine how much tougher Zach Lowe’s life would be if he didn’t know the scores to games!

This analogy gets a lot closer to what I’m trying to do. Instead of breaking down how a play is run, I’m breaking down how film finances work. Then, I’m applying the data we do have to that model. Then I’m pulling insights for what that can tell us about entertainment strategy. If I had more data, I could pull even more insights.

To find the perfect analogy, we need a field where making predictions is key, but data is sparse. Well…

Analogy 3: Military Intelligence

In war you have to make predictions about what your enemy is thinking, planning and eventually doing. But the amount of information is usually extremely sparse. Even if you have tons of information, you are terrified that it’s all planted by the enemy in misdirection campaigns. Inevitably, an intelligence officer has to make assumption after assumption to project an enemy’s course of action.

As I laid out in my recent series, I used to be an intelligence office in the Army, making these types of predictions. I’m used to uncertainty when forecasting enemy actions.

That’s not a bad analogy either for companies in competitive fields. While every company professes to not care what any other company is doing, they’re lying. (All of Hollywood is obsessed with Netflix, even if they say they aren’t. And yes, Netflix is obsessed with Disney+ right now, even if they deny it.) Understanding whether your competitor is making hits or duds, burning cash or wallowing in it, and how they’re doing it, is a key piece of information for making decisions.

Most companies have blind spots into every other company the same way my models have blindspots into Netflix or Disney’s specific performance.

Just because our models have inaccuracies doesn’t mean we shouldn’t make them. And doesn’t mean they aren’t useful. If you waited in war until you have perfect information, you’d be plagued by indecision. That’s really what I’m doing here: I’m providing my competitive analysis of streaming video, starting with Netflix, at the same level of accuracy I’d try if I were doing this for insurgents in Afghanistan or working in a strategic planning group in a streaming company. Even though I could be wrong, I don’t have a choice because we need these assumptions to improve our estimates.

And yes, as a bonus, these models will eventually inform my larger series on an “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield”. Essentially, the models will tell us a lot about how can and can’t make money in streaming video, and how that can impact all of Hollywood. But that’s for a future article.

The Great Irishman Challenge – The Specific Assumptions for The Irishman Part III

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

Tomorrow, we start to get data for the Great Irishman Challenge. Well, we don’t, but it will hit screens everywhere as Netflix releases it and presumably places it front and center on everyone’s Netflix homepage. One of our goals with this project is to set our criteria ahead of time, this way we aren’t back-fitting the results to our preconceived notions about Netflix. 

Now that we have our models for valuing film explained and re-explained, it’s time to fill in the specifics. Today, I’m going to lay out what we know about The Irishman before it launches. I’ll update some assumptions on the model and revenue streams from some feedback. Then I’ll describe two key inputs for the streaming model—Customer Lifetime Value and Attribution of Subscribers. Plus, I’ll touch on how I plan to triangulate popularity after The Irishman launches, which may evolve as we get more data or potential partners. Finally, I’ll talk about the benefits for this model and how I plan to draw insights from it in December.

Assumption 1: Production Budget

Discussing with Richard, we think this is high. Super high. A pretty good summary of this is Jeff Sneider’s take on his Collider podcast a few months back (episode 11 specifically at minute 54):

“I’ve seen [The Irishman budget] figures from $125, $140, $150, $160, $175, $200 million for The Irishman. If you go on Deadline you can read an article that says the budget is $140 and then two hours later another writer is under a completely different impression and says it’s $200 million. No one is on the same page on the budget for this film. And let me tell you what that means. It means the budget is way f***ing higher than any of you are imagining.”

Gosh, that type of cynicism about PR efforts exactly matches my own. If you hear tons of different numbers that can’t seem to decide how much something cost, well the likeliest option is that it was WAY WAY WAY more. At a minimum, this is a $200 million dollar film. And I’m going to do some scenario modeling up to even $300 million. Which means I’ll split the difference and call it a $250 million dollar movie.

Is this ridiculous? Not so much when you think about it. Consider, what does it cost to get Martin Scorsese, Robert De Niro, Al Pacino and Joe Pesci (out of retirement) on a film set? Especially if you’re buying out all the backend, which Netflix had to do since there aren’t any second window revenue opportunities here. (Which is cool too because it simplifies my model.) If I told you between those four it cost $100 million in talent costs, would you blink an eye? Is $150 million too high? I’m assuming $125 million in talent costs.

Then we can add in the extra production costs. This was a very long shoot. (I saw 300 days somewhere.) And then it was as VFX-intensive as some Marvel movies due to the de-aging process, which also required extra work because initial versions didn’t work. (Sneider lays out this situation with great details in his podcast.) This film required a VFX push to get finished in time for launch at the New York film festival, meaning it ran up tons of overtime. Does that sound like $125 million in costs? Absolutely. If not more.

Assumption 2: Marketing Budget

The Irishman will have two marketing budgets. First, the initial roll out. I looked for estimates online and didn’t find a ton. That said, I’ve seen billboards, online ads and even commercial spots. Which screams definitely something, but less than a franchise tentpole roll out. I’d say it’s probably between $50-$100 million, and since I went high with the production budget, I’ll go low here.

(Also, to echo Richard Rushfield’s “see something; say something” if you know a better number for the marketing budget, shoot me a line.)

Then we have the Oscar budget, which is a little bit harder to disentangle. Already, Netflix has started their awards campaigning, but has specifically tied many of their films together, from A Marriage Story to The Irishman. We know from Richard’s reporting that Netflix likely spent over $50 million on Roma’s Oscar campaign last year. They look likely to beat that again. The question is, will they spend $50 million just on The Irishman, or split it with A Marriage Story? Both are getting rave reviews, and I think Netflix is desperate for a Best Picture win. I’m going to end up calling it about $40 million for The Irishman alone.

Assumption 3: Profit Sharing and other revenue streams

We have a few categories here, so let’s run through them.

Library Value? Yep. 

I added library value, assuming the retention model is the equivalent of the theatrical window. Meaning it sets the “price” of the film. Then, we can our theatrical financial model to value library windows. Meaning, the “value” to Netflix for the film after the initial release. To provide an example, Bird Box got most its viewership in the first month, but folks will keep watching it out on Netflix for years. That has a value, which is the “library” value. Using my theatrical model, I’m assuming library value of 25% of first window value. (Specifically, the 10% “digital” revenue for theatrical films is about 25% of the the free, cable, syndicated TV, pay TV and digital second window buckets.)

Box Office Bump? Yep.

If a Netflix film wins a Best Picture, or even gets nominated, that will result in boost in viewership. I’ve seen that for past film and TV series for major awards series. For most Netflix films, this isn’t worth a line in the model, but for this one it is. In this case, I’ll use a 25% threshold of the initial window for the Best Picture bump. This will have a “halo” effect on the library window as well.

Second Windows? None.

Since Netflix films are exclusive to the streamer, every other potential window from home entertainment to licensing to cable channels is a zero in my model. This simplifies our model.

Merchandise? None.

Mobster films don’t really sell a lot of merchandise. Especially brand new films without fan bases or cultural cachet. 

Distribution Fees? None.

Since there aren’t second window or merchandise revenue to shield from profit participation, I don’t need to model any Netflix distribution or marketing fees.

Talent participation? Some.

Initially, I didn’t have any profit sharing, but then I got a note that Netflix for super-duper-huge stars did put a bonus system in place for feature films. Basically, if you hit a certain viewership level, you get a 20% bonus in your paycheck. So I’ve updated the model with that assumption in place, assuming that 80 million views (or “one Bird Box”) is the threshold.

Assumption 4: Calculate CLV

It’s crucial have to a good estimate for customer lifetime value. These are calculated fairly often by other people (see estimates here, here, or here). My difference is I don’t factor in content costs because I’m trying to value the content itself. If I did factor them in, I’d be double counting content costs, and that’s a huge “no-no” in accounting.

So here are my inputs for CLV. First, blended average price per month comes from Netflix’s 10Ks. Customer retention estimates come from various sources, including Second Measure. Crucially, though, I have a much lower rate for international because I’ve heard the churn machine is very high overseas. Finally, I use other estimates of Netflix’s marketing spend for customer acquisition costs. All this leads us to:

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The Great Irishman Challenge – How to Calculate the Straight-to-Streaming Film Profitability? Part II

(For the last few weeks, I’ve been debuting a series of articles answering a question posed to me by The Ankler’s Richard Rushfield: Will The Irishman Make Any Money? It’s a great question because it gets as so many of the challenges of the business of streaming video. Read the rest here, here, here and here.)

On Monday, I explained the grand plan of Richard Rushfield and I plan to estimate the value of future Netflix films, starting with The Irishman, out earlier this month in limited theatrical release, but coming to the world’s biggest streamer next Wednesday. For traditionally released theatrical films with normal second windows, we have a robust model we can employ. 

What about streaming only? Well, that’s where it gets tricky.

A lot of folks do some back of the envelope math for this, and this can be a useful way to look at the problem of valuing streaming. Take Richard’s approach from a few weeks, back looking at Disney films that had been in theaters after 3 weeks (when Netflix pulls them from streaming). Of all the films, Disney earned roughly $310 million after 3 weeks of theatrical distribution. That’s the equivalent, Richard noted, of 4.3 million customers subscribing for 12 months on Disney+. If that number seems big, it should be, which shows the value of theatrical releases for studios.

Could we just take that approach and just apply it to The Irishman? Unfortunately, it has some flaws, mainly double counting subscribers. We need a different method to employ in “The Great Irishman Challenge”. Unlike traditionally released films, in steaming there are a few ways to value a given title’s performance, and each method has its own pros and cons, ranging from crippling to merely difficult to over come. 

Which I’ll (re)explain today, along with describing which ones are fine, which ones are incorrect, and which ones I prefer. At the end, I’ll explain which one we’re using.

Four Ways to Value Streaming Video and One Way NOT To

I’ve previously valued streaming video in two articles. First, back in January, I looked at Disney’s decision to keep theatrical windows for Star Wars films. Second, back in May, I explained streaming video models in order to put a value to HBO’s Game of Thrones. Today’s article will explain all the models from those two articles and add a new method I figured out how to calculate last month. (I had employed this method at a previous employer, but needed a key piece of data, as you’ll see.)

For each of these methods, I’m going to assume that Netflix had a feature film that was seen by 40 million subscribers in the first 28 days, divided evenly between the US and international. The film cost $115 to make and Netflix spent $50 million to market it. As for box office? Let’s say it had $120 million in the US and $80 million globally.

Sub-Optimal Method #1: Multiply Customers by Month by Price

This is the most common method of “back of the envelope” valuations I’ve seen for Netflix films. Usually, you hear folks do a version of this on podcasts, and I’ve seen it for Lord of The Rings on Amazon a few different times. Also, you could do “customer years” the way Richard did above. Here’s how the model for this approach would look:

IMAGE 7 By Viewers per Month

The problems? First, this is one-quarter of Netflix’s subscriber base attributed to a film in one month, which would probably be one-third of their active users. In other words, if Netflix had two other properties getting similar ratings, then every other film released that month would “financially” be a net loser. Second, this approach doesn’t account for “customer lifetime value”, which is really the better approach to valuing customers, versus the one month or 12 month view. Third, this approach doesn’t distinguish between films and TV series total hours of viewing (because it is just subscribers) so it’s tilted towards films, which are shorter and easier to finish.

Still, you can use this to ballpark how long a film would need to make its money back. It’s just sub-optimal because of double counting.

Sub-Optimal Method #2: Attribute Customers by Usage

One of the interesting ways to look at content is to think about what percentage of viewership a title makes up of all the viewership on your platform. If 10% of all hours watched are your platform are Friends, that has to mean something. The challenge is knowing how much people actually watch on Netflix. Netflix has helpfully told us twice (twice!) that they stream about 100 million hours daily in the United States. That means I can calculate potential usage of a TV series or film! That would look like this:

IMAGE 8 by Usage

The problems? First, getting the usage data is really tough. For films, we’d have a pretty easy time, but for TV series, we really don’t know how many people watch how many episodes. And getting usage numbers for Amazon or Hulu may be nearly impossible. Second, it also doesn’t factor in “customer lifetime value”. Third, it over-weights TV library content because there is just a lot more to watch, hence it’s “usage” is much higher, if you can get that viewership data. 

Still, you can use this to compare the usage of various shows and movies. It’s just sub-optimal because it’s tilted to shows with much longer runs.

The Bad Method: Multiplying Subscribers by Customer Lifetime Value

I’ve seen this mentioned in places, though running them down is tough on Twitter. So this may be a strawman, but it’s worth pointing out in case it hits anyone to do. Twice, I’ve criticized valuation methods because they don’t use customer lifetime value. You may be tempted, then to just take the number of subscribers and multiply by CLV instead. Like this:

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